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Abstract
Common lands in Haryana State, India have suffered severe degradation, continuous 
erosion and are becoming transformed to open access regimes due to increasing 
population pressure. This has resulted in environmental damage on a wide scale and 
reduced welfare of the inhabitants of the region. Realising the enormity of the 
problem and the critical need to initiate action for greening the common lands, the 
government and the people came together to establish a participatory planning and 
development process at the village level.
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the effectiveness of participation in 
managing common property resources. This was undertaken in two phases, firstly 
through analysis of empirical social and biological data, and secondly through the 
development of a mathematical model. Specific hypotheses addressed were: i) it is 
possible to define specific circumstances wherein the common property protects the 
natural resource base effectively; ii) there exists a level of complimentarity between 
common property resources and private property resources in the case study area; 
iii) that socio-economic and cultural factors favour converting open-access regimes 
to common property rather than to private property.
People’s participation level was estimated after conducting a survey of 15 villages in 
Haryana. The survey results are used to examine institutional development and the 
government’s role as an enabler in establishing the common property regime. The 
results of the case study, show that clear benefits may be derived from common 
property regimes, are used to examine institutional development at the village level. 
A composite resource condition index is developed in order to measure the success 
of village institutions. The mechanisms and processes involved in assisting local 
people to establish common property regimes are also discussed. A mathematical 
programming model incorporating household dynamics and their interactions with 
both common property resources and private property resources is developed and 
scoping studies are conducted to analyse the impact of participation in the 
management of common property resources and the relative effectiveness of 
common property regimes.
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Chapter - 1
Introduction and study proposal
The welfare of any nation is directly related to the management and productivity of its 
environmental systems. As the population and demands grow, so landuse patterns 
change, the regulatory mechanisms that earlier maintained a balance between man and 
nature may begin to breakdown and the prudent use of natural resources comes under 
strain. It is of critical importance, that management systems be designed so that 
renewable natural resources are available in the long run on a sustainable basis.
1.1 Background
Common property resources continue to be a significant component of the land 
resources base for rural communities in developing countries such as India. This is 
prominent in the semi-arid and arid areas of Haryana. Despite significant contributions to 
the rural community, common property resources have suffered severe degradation, 
continuous erosion and are becoming transformed in to open access regimes due to 
increasing population pressure. For many villages in southern Haryana this has 
increasingly turned out to be the dual tragedy of environmental collapse and 
pauperisation of the already poor.
Southern Haryana consists of the oldest mountain range in India, the Aravallis. The 
Aravallis play a significant role in protecting the fertile Indo-Gangetic plains on their 
eastern side against invading sand drifts from the Thar desert. Increasing pressure from 
human and livestock numbers has taken a heavy toll of the vegetation leaving the 
Aravallis almost bare with consequent adverse environmental effects. This has resulted 
in reduced welfare of the inhabitants of the region, particularly the women, who have to 
travel long distances to collect firewood and fodder. Realising the enormity of the 
problem and the critical need to initiate action for greening the Aravallis, the government
and the people came together to establish a participatory planning and development 
process in 1990 at the village level.
Where the participatory process has resulted in establishing a common property regime 
in place of an open access system reversal of environmental degradation has been 
recorded together with improvement in welfare of local people. Mechanisms and 
processes involved in assisting local people to establish common property resource 
management are discussed in this theses.
During 1989-94 I was entrusted with the responsibility of initiating the participatory 
process and implementing the participatory development of village common lands in the 
southern region of Haryana state. This gave me an opportunity to understand the 
problems faced by the poor villagers and their desire to overcome the environment 
induced poverty. The origins of this study go back as far as 1989. The successes and 
failures of this first experiment, provided me with rich experience of exploring the 
building of institutions at the village level.
Common property resources such as village common lands covering 10% of the total 
geographical area of the Haryana state have a pivotal role in the subsistence economy of 
the state. They serve protection, production and conservation roles and most often these 
roles conflict with other activities of the growing population adversely affecting the 
sustainability of the resources. Sustainability assumes significance because of the dual 
economic problem i.e., costs of irreversible economic activity and the utility yielding 
roles of these resources.
Historically these common lands were managed by the traditional management methods 
by the villagers coupled with state control. In the post-independence period development 
was seriously influenced by the theories of economic growth placing emphasis on 
savings and investment in the labour surplus economy. The planned investment in the 
common property resources especially tree planting and fodder development was very 
limited in relation to the multiple demands to which the common property resources
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were subjected. This probably explains the dualistic development paradigms of the times, 
which emphasised the rapid industrialisation of developing countries for their faster 
economic growth. However, the role of the primary sectors in the overall growth of the 
developing countries got a substantial boost with the coming of the Green Revolution.
In accordance with the trends of development policy, the policies adopted by the state 
towards the development of these common property resources has been modified to 
reflect the growing concerns of policy makers and the villagers and their changing needs 
and directions. Investment in the village common lands has several backward and 
forward linkages to a wide range of activities such as agriculture, industry, energy and 
soil conservation. Over the years many conservation and production oriented schemes 
have been implemented with mixed results.
The growing population pressure and the growing industry demands has meant that 
most of the primary forest tracts of the common lands have been converted into 
secondary and subsequently, degraded village forests. Since the 1980's there has been a 
marked shift in the policy towards conservation with the enactment of the Forest 
Conservation Act-1980 and the new National Forest Policy of 1988.
The recent policy shifts from the government changed the interventionist role in the 
development of these common property resources to a more decentralised and 
participatory approach involving the government organisations such as the Forest 
Department and the village subsistence users of these resources. The objective of the 
government investment in the development of common property resources is to meet 
the subsistence needs of the rural populations and the needs of conservation and 
rehabilitation. These initiatives have wide and varied influence on the economy with 
implications on sustainability through pecuniary externalities, property rights, pricing 
policy, equity and distributional consequences.
The research reported here examined the common property resources sustainable use 
and conservation and rehabilitation of the degraded common property resources through
3
institutional development at the village level. It also provides the scoping studies 
undertaken to forecast likely scenarios under different management options.
1.2 Hypotheses
The specific hypotheses addressed in this work were:
(i) it is possible to define specific circumstances wherein the common property protects 
the natural resource base effectively;
(ii) there exists a level of complimentarity between common property resources and 
private property resources in the case study area;
(iii) that socio-economic and cultural factors favour converting open-access regimes to 
common property rather than to private property.
1.3 Objectives
The general objectives of the research study were:
(i) to investigate the historic influence of socio-economic factors on the management of 
village common lands, with respect to planning and policies pursued;
(ii) to assess the extent of common property resource use, consumption patterns and the 
role of common property resources (CPR's) in the village economy;
(iii) to investigate the interventions and policy reforms necessary for improved utilisation 
and sustainable use of common property resources;
(iv) to encourage and develop appropriate institutional development in villages for better 
management of the common property resources;
and




The thesis is presented in 10 chapters. The contents of these chapters are briefly 
explained below.
Chapter-I: Introduction, background, objectives, hypotheses and theses outline are 
presented in this chapter.
Chapter-II: In this chapter a general view of India as a nation is presented in order to 
appreciate the national level situation. It’s strengths and weaknesses are examined. The 
geographical features, climatic factors, socio-economic indicators, demography, land 
use, forests, fuel and fodder demands are presented.
Chapter-Ill: In this chapter natural resource management in India is discussed with a 
historical perspective with a view to further explain how traditional management of 
common property resources was taken away from the village communities and after the 
dismal failure of state management how the communities are being encouraged to take 
over the management of their natural resources is discussed.
Chapter-IV: In this chapter a brief description of the Haryana state is presented. In 
addition the case study area is introduced, and information on its location, demography, 
socio-economic characteristics, the environment, common property resources (CPR) are 
presented. Further, factors responsible for the degradation of common property 
resources, legal aspects concerning the village common lands and the current 
management scenario are also discussed and analysed in order to frilly explain the 
current situation.
Chapter-V: In this chapter theoretical aspects of common property resource 
management are presented. Certain concepts relating to the CPR management are 
clarified. The theories that explain the theoretical issues in CPR management such as 
Garett Hardin’s Tragedy of Commons, Game Theoretic Models and Olson’s Logic of 
Collective Action are presented and discussed.
Chapter-VI: This chapter describes the approach and methods applied to generate the 
information required to test the hypotheses presented in Chapter I. Survey methodology 
and the methods used for analysing the village institutions and people’s participation are
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presented. A composite resource condition index is developed in order to measure the 
success of village institutions in managing their common property resources.
Chapter-VII: In this chapter the results of the case study, which show clear benefits 
deriving from common property regimes are presented. Mechanisms and processes 
involved in assisting local people to establish common property regime are also 
discussed.
Chapter-VIII: In this chapter the need for a mathematical programming technique for 
modelling the use of common property resources is explored. Linear Programming 
model construction is presented in order to conduct scoping studies, which would help 
in identifying the changes in the resource condition under different scenarios. Model 
validation/verification is also presented in this chapter.
Chapter-IX: In this chapter the linear programming model is used for conducting the 
scoping studies in order to determine the solutions under open-access and common 
property situations. Sensitivity analysis is also presented and the results discussed. 
Chapter-X: In this chapter the conclusions from this research and suggestions for future 
research are presented.
1.5 Summary
This chapter introduced the study proposal and described the background context in 
which it is set. In the next chapter the national level situation of India is presented in 
order to provide further contextualisation of the study.
6
Chapter II
India - the Land, People and its’ Natural Resources
In this chapter a general view of India as a nation is presented in order to appreciate 
the national level situation. It’s strengths and weaknesses are examined. The 
geographical features, climatic factors, socio-economic indicators, demography, land 
use, forests, fuel and fodder demands are presented.
2.1. Location
India is a union of 25 states and 7 union territories. The country is divided into 462 
districts, which are further subdivided into blocks and villages. India is a fast 
developing economy with growth rate of around 6% of GDP per annum. It has come 
of age in various fields of modem technology bringing the country self sufficiency in 
many spheres such as agriculture, science and technology etc. India has an area of 
3,287,782 sq. km. stretching from 8° 4' 28" to 37° 17' 53" north latitude and from 68° 
7' 53" to 97° 24'47" east longitude (see Figure 2.1). The country is endowed with a 
variety of types of forests. However her forests and village common lands are 
subjected to heavy biotic pressure; with less than 2% of total land area of the world, 
the country supports over 15% of the world's human population and 16% of the total 
livestock population (GOI, 1995).
2.2. Relief
India can be divided into five distinct regions, the Himalayas, the Indo-Gangetic plains, 
the desert region, the central highlands, and the peninsular plateau.
The Himalayas: The presence of this mighty mountain range in the north is mainly 
responsible for the tropical climate of India. They protect the country from the cool 
Siberian winds. The region can be distinguished by the greater Himalayas, the lower
7
Himalayas and outer Himalayas (the Siwaliks). The outer Himalayas are fragile and 
prone to severe soil erosion and earthquakes. The Karakoram range in the North has 
an average altitude of 6000 metres above mean sea level (GOI, 1995).
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Figure 2.1: Map of India showing it’s location, states and union territories
The Indo-Gangetic Plains: This region extends from Rajasthan in the West to West 
Bengal in the East covering almost half of the geographical area o f India. The plains
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lying between the rivers Ganges and Yamuna are the most fertile and densely 
populated regions in the world.
The Desert Region: Towards the west of Indo-Gangetic Plains lie the Indian Desert in 
the states of Rajasthan and Gujarat. The Indo-Gangetic plains are protected by the 
invading sand dunes of the desert by India's oldest mountain range, the Aravallis.
The Central Highlands: This region separates northern India from Southern India. The 
mountain ranges of Vindhya and Satpura present in this region support the best forests 
and great ravine lands.
The Peninsular Plateau: This region consists of the central Deccan plateau and eastern 
and western ghats mountain chains parallel to the eastern and western coasts of the 
peninsula. Coastal plains in the east are the fertile delta regions of Godavari, Kaveri, 
Penna and Krishna rivers.
2.3 Rivers
The rivers in India are of three types. They are the Himalayan rivers, the rivers of 
Peninsular region and the rivers of the inland drainage basin. The Himalayan rivers are 
perennial and snow fed, where as the other types are seasonal. The Himalayan rivers 
include the famous Ganges, Brahmaputra and Yamuna. The important peninsular 
rivers are Godavari, Krishna, Penna, Mahanadi, Tungabhadra and Kaveri. The Luni is 
the important inland drainage basin river. It is non perennial and subject to flash flows 
during monsoons. Rising in Vindhya-Satpura mountain ranges in Central India the 
Narmada river flows across the country westwards and joins the Arabian Sea on the 




The country's climate varies from desert conditions to that of alpine conditions. Much 
of the country is tropical with subtropical and temperate conditions confined to the 
regions of Himalayas, and with hot desert conditions prevailing in the north western 
regions. Two types of monsoons are mainly responsible for precipitation. They are the 
south-western monsoon (June to September) and the retreating north-east monsoons. 
The south-western monsoons account for ninety percent of rainfall in the country 
whereas the retreating north-eastern monsoons are responsible for the remaining 10%. 
The south-western monsoons cover the entire country and influence the cropping 
patterns. The north-eastern monsoons cover some of the eastern and north-eastern 
parts o f the country and provide rainfall during winter months.
Rainfall in the country varies from region to region. The desert areas in the north-west 
of India receive an annual rainfall as low as 250 mm and the north-east receives the 
highest rainfall with an average of 2500 mm. Rainfall in much of the country on an 
average varies from 500 mm to 2000 mm (GOI, 1993). The highest annual rainfall 
occurs in the north-eastern state of Meghalaya (Cherrapunji, 4500 mm). Ladakh 
region in the Himalayas is a rain shadowed region and a cold desert with an annual 
rainfall of less than 300 mm.
2.5 Socio-economic Characteristics
India has a rapidly increasing population of 947.9 million (1997 estimates). It is set to 
surpass the China's population by the year 2025 if the present growth trends continue 
over the first quarter of next century (World Bank, 1996). At present it is second to 
China in population numbers. The ever increasing population is the cause for 
continued poverty, unemployment, exploitation of natural resources and pollution etc. 
Table 2.1 shows the growth of population numbers in India since 1901. Barring a 
negative growth during 1911 to 1921 when a large number of people perished for 
variety of reasons such as famines, plague and other epidemics the population has been
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growing continuously. Of late a declining trend in the growth rates could be noticed on 
account of increasing adoption of family planning methods (GOI, 1994). Spread of 
awareness of family planning methods through mass media and other educational 
programmes has been showing positive results.
Table 2.1: Growth of Population in India - 1901 to 1991
Year Population Decadal Growth in 
Absolute numbers
Decadal Growth Rate in 
Percentage
1901 238396327 - -
1911 252093390 +13697063 +5.75
1921 251321213 -72177 -0.31
1931 278977238 +27656025 +11.00
1941 318660580 +39683342 +14.22
1951 361088090 +42420485 +13.31
1961 439234771 +77682873 +21.51
1971 548159652 +108924881 +24.80
1981 683329097 +135169445 +24.66
1991 844324222 +160995125 +23.56
Source: Census of India, 1991.
The birth rate fell from 33.9 per thousand people in 1981 to 28.5 per thousand people 
in 1993. At the same time death rate fell from 12.5 per thousand people to 9.2 over the 
same period. Infant mortality came down from 110 per thousand in 1981 to 74 per 
thousand in 1993 (Source: Registrar General of Births & Deaths, 1993) (Observer 
Research Foundation, 1995) (Table 2.2).
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Table 2.2: Economie and Social Indicators of India
Population, 1991 (in millions) 844
GNP per capita, 1992 (US$) 310
Purchasing power parity (PPP) estimates of GNP per capita, 1992 (US$) 1210
PPP estimates of GNP per capita, 1992 (USA=100) 5.2
Average annual growth rate of per capita GNP, 1980-92 3.1
Life Expectancy at birth, 1992 (years) 59
Crude death rate, 1993 (per 1000) 9.2
Infant mortality rate, 1993 (per thousand live births) 74
Proportion of low birth weight babies, 1990 (%) 33
Crude birth rate, 1992 (per thousand) 29
Total fertility rate, 1992 3.7
Adult literacy rate (age 15+), 1992 (%) 52
Males 64
Females 39
Female-male ratio (ratio of females to males in the population), 1992 (%) 93
Female share of the labour force, 1990-92 (%) 29
Gross domestic savings as proportion of GDP, 1992 (%) 22
Gross domestic investment as proportion of GDP, 1992 (%) 23
Average annual growth rates of export, 1980-92 (%) 5.9
Net present value of total external debt as proportion of GNP, 1992 (%) 26
Total debt service as proportion of exports, 1992 (%) 25
Source: World Development Report 1994 & Dreze et al, 1995.
The proportion of people living below the poverty line has been continuously falling 
with increasing growth rates. 29.9 percent people were living under poverty line in 
1987 compared to 37.4 in 1983 (Source: Planning Commission, Eighth Five-year Plan, 
1992). According to a recent publication of World Bank (1997) India will be able to 
eradicate poverty if the present Gross Domestic Product (GDP) rate of over 6 percent
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per annum continues until 2005. Another important aspect has been the increasing 
urban population. In 1901, 10.8 percent people were living in urban areas as against 
26 percent people in 1991. This is mainly due to the migration of rural population to 
urban areas in search of employment. Even though the proportion of rural population 
is decreasing in proportion the absolute numbers of population living in rural areas 
increased substantially posing grave threat to the natural resources, for the supply of 
adequate fodder, fuelwood, timber and employment etc.
2.6 Livestock Scenario
India supports 16 percent of the worlds' cattle population with an area less than 2 
percent of the world's land mass. The growth of livestock has been tremendous over 
the last four decades (Table 2.3).
Table 2.3: Livestock population in India, 1951-1982 (in million)
Category 1951 1956 1961 1966 1972 1977 1982
Cattle 155.30 158.65 175.56 176.18 178.34 180.14 190.79
Buffaloes 43.35 44.92 51.21 52.95 57.43 62.03 69.00
Sheep 38.43 39.42 40.02 42.02 39.99 40.91 48.07
Goats 47.08 55.41 60.86 64.59 67.52 75.62 94.72
Horses 1.51 1.48 1.33 1.15 0.94 0.91 0.93
Pigs 4.42 4.93 5.18 5.04 6.90 7.65 9.58
Camels 0.634.42 0.78 0.9 1.03 1.11 1.07 1.03
Others 1.30 1.10 1.15 1.15 1.11 1.21 1.82
Total 292.02 306.52 336.21 344.11 353.34 369.54 415.94
Source: NWDB, Government of India, 1990.
Most of the cattle and livestock are unproductive. Due to Hindu religious sentiments 
even if they are unproductive certain types of cattle are not culled. As a result these 
animals continue to increase in numbers and require feeding from already meagre
13
fodder resources. The increase in goat population in the recent years has been 
phenomenal. It has grown from 47.08 million in 1951 to 99.41 million in 1987. Goats 
are the most problematic animals as far as regeneration of forests is concerned. They 
trample and destroy young saplings and cause increasing environmental degradation in 
the country. With 16 percent of world’s livestock population and less than 0.5 percent 
of its grazing lands, India faces a severe fodder shortage. Many of the stray cattle 
venture into agricultural crops or regenerating forests for grazing and damage them. 
Approximately 12.5 million ha. of land is under pasture and grazing for communal use. 
The number of animals grazed in forests has risen from 35 million in 1958 to 123 
million in recent years.
2.7 Land Use
Since 1951 both human and livestock populations have been growing at an exponential 
rate. The sharp increase in human and livestock population, has put a great demand on 
natural resources and land. Consequently over exploitation has resulted in land 
degradation, which is estimated at 175 million ha. Although the area under agriculture 
increased to 56.76 percent of the total geographical area of the country as estimated in 
1990-91 (Figure 2.2). Vegetative cover on village common lands and village forests 
shrank by over 30 million ha. From 1951 to 1991.
The area under cultivation is 56 percent in India where as it is less than 33 percent in 
most of the developed as well as developing countries. Land area under agriculture is 
20 percent in USA, 10.8 percent in Japan, 29.2 percent in UK, 12 percent in China,
31.4 percent in Thailand, 31 percent in Italy, 4.8 percent in Canada, 5.9 percent in 
Australia and 14.3 percent in Nepal. (Singh, 1994).
The expansion of the cultivated area to more and more marginal lands, and the 
dependence of the people on the forest has increasingly changed the land use pattern in 
the country. Rapid urbanisation has also affected the land use. The urban population 
has been growing from 11 percent in 1901 to 25.6 percent in 1991. It is estimated that
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by 2010 India will have nearly 392 million people or 33.7 percent of the total 
population living in towns and cities making it the world’s largest urban population. 
(Source: Population Estimates, Planning commission, GOI, 1993). The fertile land 
becomes the casualty of industrialisation and urbanisation. Launching of mega projects 
and huge hydro-electric dams resulting in large areas under vegetation being 
submerged has also led to the shrinkage of area under forests.
Area Sow n more than 
once
Net Area Sow n 
Fallow Land 
Cutturable Waste
Land under tree crops




Land Under non- 
agricuitural uses
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Area in thousand hectares
Figure 2.2: Land Use in India (1990-91)
Source: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Ministry of Agriculture, (GOI, 
1991).
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2.8 Fuel wood demand
Fuelwood is the major source for cooking in rural as well as urban areas in India. 
Fuelwood demand in India and future projections from 1966-2005 were estimated by 
Natarajan (1989) and Kaul (1992) (Table 2.4).













Apart from fuelwood, dung cakes and agricultural crop residues are the major source 
of fuel for the rural populations. Use of these fuels was estimated for rural areas in 
1979 by the National Council for Applied Economics Research (NCAER). They were
93.3 million tonnes of fuelwood, 83.2 million tonnes of dung cakes and 36.7 million 
tonnes of crop residues respectively.
NCAER conducted a nation-wide survey of urban households 1978-79 and reported 
certain interesting facts. Households having an income of Rs. 18000 per annum used 
fuelwood for cooking and water heating. It was estimated that 90 percent of rural 
households and 75 percent of semi-urban households and 50 percent of households in 
the cities used fuelwood in traditional chulhas (wood burning stoves) for their day to
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day cooking. Assuming an average consumption of 400 kg fuelwood per capita per 
annum the total consumption of fuelwood was estimated at 265 million tonnes in 
1991. Out of this 39 million tonnes was used in urban areas. In India, large quantities 
of fuelwood are used during festivals and religious ceremonies. Fuelwood is also used 
for burning the dead bodies. Assuming that 400 kilo grams of fuelwood was required 
for burning a dead body a total amount of 2.7 million tonnes of fuelwood was required 
for cremation alone at the present crude death rates of 9.6 per thousand population. 
(Dwivedi, 1994).
2.9 Fodder Requirement and Availability
India has a large livestock population which is considered to be the root cause of most 
of the livestock related problems in the country. Almost half of India’s livestock 
population could be regarded as surplus in relation to the fodder supply and a majority 
of it is of poor quality (Singh, 1994).
The assessment of demand and supply of fodder depends upon a number of factors, 
such as the methods of animal rearing and feeding, population and type of livestock, 
economic status of the people, extent and type of areas available for fodder 
production, types of fodder raised and climate etc. Table 2.5, presents the estimates of 
demand and supply made by various committees from time to time.
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Table 2.5: Estimates of Demand and Supply of Fodder (in million tonnes)
Assessment Source Year of 
Assessment
Dry Fodder Green Fodder



















Committee on fodder 1985 780 441 932 250
and grasses (NWDB, 
1988)
* forecast based on projected livestock population
The fodder demand for the year 2000 estimated by the National Commission on 
Agriculture for the year 2000 are close to 2% body weight of the animal. Whereas the 
Committee on Fodder and Grasses took 3% of body weight as the maintenance ration 
in arriving at its estimates for 1985.
2.10 Forests
India is endowed with a wide variety of forests (Table 2.6). India’s recorded forests 
are 77 million hectares (23 percent of the geographical area), but the actual cover 
shrank to 64.2 million hectares (19.52 percent) in 1993 (FSI, 1993).
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Table 2.6: Forest Types of India
Type of Forest Area in Sq. Km. Percentage
Tropical Wet Evergreen 51249 7.94
Tropical Semi-Evergreen 26749 4.14
Tropical Moist Deciduous 236749 36.68
Littoral and Swamp 4046 0.62
Tropical Dry Deciduous 186620 28.91
Tropical Thom 16491 2.55
Tropical Dry Evergreen 1404 0.21
Sub Tropical Broad Leafed 2781 0.43
Sub Tropical Pine 42377 6.56
Sub Tropical Dry Evergreen 12538 1.94
Montane Wet Temperate 23365 3.62
Himalayan Moist Temperate 22012 3.41
Himalayan Dry Temperate 312 0.04
Sub Alpine and Alpine 18628 2.88
Total Forest Area 645321 100
Source: World Bank, 1993.
Large chunks of forests were diverted for non-forestry purposes by the government. 
These transfers normally took place to accommodate the demands of development 
projects. Realising the enormity of losing the forest cover the Government of India 
enacted the Forest Conservation Act-1980 making it mandatory for the state 
governments to obtain central governments’ clearance before ordering diversion of 
forest lands for non-forest purposes. This has brought about an increase in forest cover 
in the recent past. It was also made obligatory for the state governments to bring 
compensatory afforestation on the equivalent areas lost due to diversion of forest land.
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Forests form an important source of fuel and fodder for rural as well as urban 
communities besides meeting a range of other demands such as minor forest products, 
building materials and other artisanal raw materials etc. The increasing demand from 
them has put considerable strain on forests. The area under forests has been shrinking 
continuously since independence. Of late with an increase in efforts to green vast tracts 
of waste lands the forest cover in the country has been increasing (Table 2.7).
Table 2.7: Change in Forest Cover (in Square Km.) 1991-93
Category 1991 1993 Change
Dense Forest (Crown Density >40%) 385008 385576 +568
Open Forest (Crown Density 10-40%) 249930 250275 +345
Mangroves 4244 4256 +12
Total 639182 640107 +925
Source: Status of India’s Forests, Forest Survey of India, 1993
2.11 Summary
In this chapter a general overview of the resource use in India has been presented. An 
attempt has been made to introduce to the subject background and the problems that 
confront India. In the next chapter natural resource management scenario in India has 
been presented. The policies followed in the past and the present have been discussed 
in order to explain how the traditional management of these resources was taken 
away by the successive rulers and after the dismal failure how the local communities 
are being encouraged to manage their natural resources in a sustainable manner.
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Chapter III
India - Its’ Forest Resource Management
For several centuries forests in and around the villages in India have been managed by 
village communities, who were generally of the view that the forests belonged to them 
and that they belonged to the forests. Well being of forests and natural resources was 
considered as essential for the very existence of the communities. Forests and natural 
resources were revered and whatever was required was taken from them and the 
ecosystem was never disturbed permanently. When this symbiotic relationship was 
disturbed by the take-over of the management of these resources by the successive 
rulers then came the alienation of people from their natural resources and led to their 
degradation consequently resulting in an alround poverty.
In this chapter natural resource management in India is discussed with a historical 
perspective with a view to further explain how traditional management of common 
property resources was taken away from the village communities and after the dismal 
failure of state management (CSE, 1985) how the communities are being encouraged 
to take over the management of their natural resources is discussed. This chapter is 
presented in four phases, namely, ancient period, medieval period, colonial period and 
post-independence period.
3.1 Ancient Period
The ancient holy books such as Rigveda, Manusamhita, Mahabharata etc. mention the 
thick forests around which the ancient Indian culture flourished (Sen, 1966). In fifth 
century BC Lord Buddha exhorted in his preaching, " the forest is a peculiar organism 
of unlimited kindness and benevolence that makes no demands for its sustenance and 
extends generously the products of its life activity. It affords protection to all beings 
offering shade to even the axeman who destroys it". In order to prevent people from 
felling the living trees king Ashoka (fourth century BC) made the permission of the
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palace mandatory if living trees were to be felled. This was the first attempt at 
regulating the use of natural resources (Mobbs, 1941). There after the rulers 
encouraged people to clear forests for practising agriculture in order to increase their 
tax revenues by imposing tax on agricultural production.
3.2 Medieval Period
India's riches attracted successive invasions from central Asia during this period. The 
Muslim invaders were not interested in the conservation and management of forests 
(Sharma, 1990). Some of them had interest in raising some aesthetic plantations on 
roadsides. Since the rulers in this period were keen to extend the area under 
agriculture further forests were cleared. This process continued as successive Muslim 
rulers were interested in increasing their tax revenues. However, they never disturbed 
the forest and natural resources that were in the proximity to a majority of the village 
communities and that the rural populations enjoyed an unrestricted supply of forest 
produce and the people were better off because there was more forest and less 
cultivation (Moreland, 1920). As the mighty Mughal empire started weakening, in 
particular after Aurangzeb's rein several small kingdoms numbering approximately 
600 emerged. The rulers of these kingdoms never exercised any control over the 
management of natural resources even though forests and other natural resources 
remained the state property. They were never demarcated and no restrictions were 
placed on their usage, except reserving certain forests as game reserves for the kings 
(Tiwari, 1985). During this period certain trees were reserved and declared as royal 
trees. A royalty was collected from people, who wanted to fell them.
3.3 Colonial Period (1700 - 1947)
During this period the East India company, which began to control vast amounts of 
the country attempted further exploitation of forests. The former Inspector general of 
India, Ribbentrop (1900) wrote, "our early administrators, occupied with the building 
up of an empire, probably never thought of the important part the forest have played,
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play now and will forever play in the household of nature, or the immense influence 
they exercise on the physical well being of the country, while as a necessity for the 
people and as a revenue yielding property, they were considered insignificant". In 
general the earlier British rulers followed the native rulers policy of reserving certain 
valuable timber trees such as teak (Stebbing, 1921). They however never interfered 
with the local traditions, and the lifestyle of the village communities and were only 
interested in the expansion of their empire. They were least interested in disturbing 
the freedom of village communities in managing their natural resources.
As the empire began to expand, the need for timber for ship building also increased. 
With an intention to estimate the available teak timber the forestry commission was 
established in 1800 AD in the Malabar region. This commission was also entrusted 
with the mandate to make regulations for felling of trees. Accordingly unauthorised 
felling of teak trees was stopped and royalties for felling increased substantially.
In 1806, a serving police officer was appointed as the first Conservator of Forests of 
Malabar region in order to increase the supply of timber for the Navy. The 
conservator had wide ranging powers and interfered with the established customary 
rights of the local communities and eliminated their rights to use the forests. This 
process alienated the people from the natural resources they had been using and 
protecting from times immemorial to fulfil their basic needs. As the elimination of 
private rights of communities in the forests grew the discontent against the rulers 
spread across the entire region. The East India Company quietly abolished the post of 
Conservator of Forests in 1823 with a view to maintain cordial relations with their 
subjects. Thus the policy of one extreme of strict control to the other of no control 
resulted in people losing the trust and authority they had in managing the natural 
resources. Sir Dietrich Brandis (1897) wrote, "This first attempt at forest 
management was a dismal failure, an act of injustice which cannot be condemned too 
severely: originally started in order to secure permanent supply it degenerated into an 
attempt to establish, without regards to private property rights, a government 
monopoly".
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However, as the demand for timber increased the post of Conservator of Forests was 
recreated in 1847. In 1855 the first major policy document, known as the Charter of 
Indian Forestry was issued, this policy document laid down the principles of forest 
management and a notification issued by the then Governor General Lord Dalhousie 
declared that the timber standing in the forests was state property and that the village 
communities had no rights whatsoever in them.
In 1864, Sir Dietrich Brandis was appointed as the first Inspector General of Forests 
to implement "the Charter of Indian Forestry". Even though there was a mention of 
population pressure on forests the charter did not recommend any specific measures 
to meet the bonafide demands of the local people, who were dependent upon them for 
their basic needs. The first Indian Forest Act was enacted in 1865, subsequently 
replaced by a more comprehensive Indian Forest Act of 1878. Consolidation, 
demarcation and reservation of forests was provided for in the forest act. Forests 
were classified as Reserved Forests, Protected Forests and Village Forests. The 
ownership over the reserved forests rested solely with the government with very little 
rights and concessions to local people, which were recorded. Protected Forests were 
also the government property but there were rights and concessions given to local 
people in order to meet their bonafide demands for fuelwood, fodder and timber.
Village Forests were the property of local communities, the government only having 
rights over certain kinds of trees. The Indian Forest Act 1878 states " the local 
government may from time to time assign any village community the rights of 
government to or over any land which has been constituted as a reserved forest land 
may cancel such assignment - all forests so assigned shall be called village forests". 
Thus the customary rights of the people over their natural resources were 
extinguished and a portion of the common property resource was classified as village 
forests and a majority of the forests came under the sole proprietary control of the 
government. The Indian Forest Act 1927 placed even more stringent punishments for 
violators.
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With this the alienation of people from their common property resources became 
absolute and people started feeling insecure over the use of the resource. The loss of 
control over their common property resources brought about an indifferent attitude 
towards these very resources which people respected and cared for several centuries 
(Sharma, 1990). With stricter controls over the use of reserved forests and protected 
forests people were left with only the village forests to meet all their requirements of 
fodder, fuelwood and grazing of their cattle. This led to the degradation of village 
forests from primary forest tracts to secondary and subsequently to degraded waste 
lands in many parts of the country. Since not much could be extracted from the village 
forests, people started exploiting the Protected Forests and Reserved Forests owned 
by the government illegally. Thus the owner, protector of these common property 
resources became an illicit feller and poacher and when caught faced with penalties 
and imprisonment for meeting his basic needs.
3.4 Post Independence period
The post independence period was no different from the colonial era. The government 
went ahead with still more stringent controls extending the legal provisions of state 
laws to even the areas under private control prohibiting felling of certain types of 
trees standing on the private lands (Sharma, 1990).
National Forest Policy. 1952
The first national forest policy was adopted in 1952. It recognised the importance of 
forests and placed an emphasis with the national perspective rather than appreciating 
the needs of the local people. It specified forests as the foster mother of agriculture 
and placed more emphasis on agriculture and bringing more areas under reserved 
forests.
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The management of village forests was entrusted to panchayaths (an elected village 
council) in order to meet both present and future needs of the local people. Even 
though the National Forest Policy of 1952 recognised the concept of village forests 
the main thrust of it remained creation of reserved forests for national needs.
National Commission on Agriculture. 1976
National Commission on Agriculture (1976) was entrusted with the responsibility to 
look in to the forestry situation in the country and to come up with suggestions for 
meeting the multiple demands to which the forests were subjected to. The commission 




The protection forests were to protect the hills, river banks, sea shores and other 
important areas such as catchments of watersheds etc. The production forests were 
to be essentially commercial forests comprising valuable timber bearing stands and 
occurring in ecologically stable regions. The social forests were to be the village 
forests, canal sides, road sides and railway line sides meant to meet the demands of
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the local people, such as fuelwood, fodder and small timber. The emphasis was to 
bring the denuded areas and wastelands under tree cover so that pressure on reserved 
forests and protected forests was reduced.
Social Forestry
A number of social forestry projects were launched in the late 1970's and early 1980's 
by various states. The results of these projects have been mixed since the village 
communities were either ignored in their implementation or benefit distribution 
mechanisms could not be worked out properly. It was perceived as a programme 
thrusted on the people, who were also least interested in protecting these plantations 
since they were unsure of reaping the benefits from them. Nevertheless social forestry 
projects while meeting several basic needs of the local people certainly eased pressure 
on government forest to some extent and brought general awareness towards planting 
and protecting trees. The benefits of these social forestry projects could not be 
ploughed back into creation of further assets in the form of increased plantation 
activities since participation of local people was not ensured in the implementation of 
these projects.
National Forest Policy. 1988
A new National Forest Policy was adopted in 1988. It stated that the first charge on 
forest produce were the people inhabiting in and around the forests (GOI, 1988). 
Supply of fuelwood, fodder and small timber for the rural people was placed as one of 
the basic objectives. It also called for involving the village communities and non 
governmental organisations in the regeneration, management and protection of 
degraded forests. In order to ensure people's participation it also suggested sharing 
part of the proceeds with the village community from the sale of trees at the time of 
their maturity, as well as non timber forest products for subsistence use.
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Participatory Forest Management
The national forest policy 1988 brought a new era in forest management in India with 
the emphasis on people’s participation in afforestation of forests and common lands. 
This process is commonly known as Participatory Forest Management (PFM). All the 
lessons drawn from the strengths and weaknesses of the earlier social forestry projects 
formed the basis for designing these efforts. Apart from that non-governmental 
agencies were also involved in eliciting the people’s participation with a view to 
strengthen the joint management effort so that the scarcity of forest products (Table
3.1) is addressed and a solution to the demand and supply of forest products could be 
found.






Fuelwood 230 40 190
(million cubic metres)
Fodder (million tonnes) 882 434 448
Industrial Timber 27 12 15
(million cubic metres)
Source: Forest Survey of India, 1987.
The success of some of the participatory forest management efforts, which had 
substantial involvement of local populations, such as the Sukhomajri project, 
Haryana, the Arabari experiment in West Bengal and similar projects in Gujarat and 
elsewhere in India convinced both the people and the Forest Departments across the 
nation of pursuing the participatory forest management in the 1970’s and early 1980’s 
(SPWD, 1992). India’s 129.58 million hectares of wastelands can be brought under
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participatory forest management for improving the rural resource condition (Table
3.2).








Andhra Pradesh 7.682 3.734 11.416
Assam 0.935 0.795 1.730
Bihar 3.896 1.562 5.458
Gujarat 7.153 0.683 7.836
Haryana 2.404 0.074 2.478
Himachal Pradesh 1.424 0.534 1.958
Jammu and Kashmir 0.531 1.034 1.565
Karnataka 7.122 2.043 9.165
Kerala 1.053 0.226 1.279
Madhya Pradesh 12.947 7.195 20.142
Maharashtra 11.560 2.841 14.401
Manipur 0.014 1.424 1.438
Meghalaya 0.815 1.103 1.918
Nagaland 0.508 0.878 1.386
Orissa 3.157 3.227 6.384
Punjab 1.151 0.079 1.230
Rajasthan 18.001 1.933 19.934
Sikkim 0.131 0.150 0.281
Tamil Nadu 3.392 1.009 4.401
Tripura 0.108 0.865 0.973
Uttar Pradesh 6.635 1.426 8.061
West Bengal 2.177 0.359 2.536
Union Territories 0.889 2.175 3.604
Total 93.691 35.889 129.580
Source: National Wasteland Development Board, 1990.
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3.5 Summary
In this chapter the historical aspects of forest resource management in India were 
presented in order to explain the current management efforts at involving the people 
to manage their natural resources. As to how traditional management of common 
property resources was taken away from the village communities and after the failure 
of state management how the communities are being encouraged to take over the 
management of their natural resources has been discussed. With this national scenario 




Common Property Resource Management in Southern Haryana
In this chapter a brief description of the Haryana state is presented. In addition the 
case study area is introduced, and information on its location, demography, socio­
economic characteristics, the environment, common property resources(CPR) are 
presented. Further, factors responsible for the degradation of common property 
resources, legal aspects concerning the village common lands and the current 
management scenario are also discussed and analysed in order to fully explain the 
current situation.
4.1. Location of Haryana State
The state of Haryana is one of the 25 states of the Indian Union and was created in 
1966 when it was formed from the Punjab. Haryana encircles the union territory of 
Delhi from North, West and South. Haryana also has borders with Rajasthan in the 
South, South-West and West, Punjab on the North, Himachal Pradesh on the North- 
East and Uttar Pradesh on the East.
4.2. Socio-economic Characteristics of Haryana
With its 44,212 sq. km. area it is one of the smaller states of Northern India. The 
population according to the 1991 census is 16.464 million, of which 78% live in the 
rural areas. The population grew by 80.7% from 9.11 million in 1967-1968 to 16.464 
million in 1991. 75.37% people live in rural areas while 24.63% live in urban areas. 
Of the total rural population only 33% is literate and 19.75% belongs to the lowest, 
so called scheduled castes (GOH, 1995). Literacy rate in the southern area is as low 
as 5% among male adults and almost nil among the female adults, especially in the 
Mewat area. The state literacy rate was 55.85% as against the national average of 
52.21% in 1991. Of the scheduled caste population (3 .25 million) 20.15% are literate,
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which is slightly lower than the national average of 21.38% (Census of India, 1991) 
(GOI, 1994). The proportion of workers in the total population was 28.66% for the 
entire state as against the national average of 34.18% (1991). This includes main 
workers and excludes marginal workers. Population growth has been one of the 
major concerns in the state. It has been growing at an alarming rate but of late it has 
started slowing down due to the adoption of family planning methods, media 
campaigns and better education to limit the family size.
Table 4.1. Growth of Population in Haryana 1961 - 1991.
Year Population Absolute Growth Decadal Growth Rate
1961 7590500
1971 10036900 2446400 +32.22
1981 12922600 2885700 +28.75
1991 16463600 3541000 +27.40
Source: Census of India, 1991.
The per capita income of the state in 1991-92 is 3456 Indian Rupees at 1980-81 
prices. The per capita income of the southern Haryana is almost half of the average 
income of Haryana. The share of the agricultural sector, including forestry and 
fisheries, in the state income declined from 65% in 1970-71 to 41% in 1986-87. The 
state's endowment with the natural resources such as minerals and forests is meagre 
compared to the other Indian states. Haryana has the lowest proportion of its 
geographical area under the forest cover at 3.86%, which is significantly below the 
national average of 23%. Food grain production went up from 3.97 m. tonnes in 
1967-68 to 9.559 m. tonnes in 1990-91 while consumption of fertilisers went up from 
a mere 6.31 kg./ha to 114.39 kg/ha by 1991-92. The area under high yielding 
varieties of food grains increased from 0.141 m. ha to 2.673 m. ha between 1967-68 
to 1992-93.
32
Pressure of the population combined with the favourable agro-economic factors have 
led to the expansion of agriculture to areas formerly under the forest cover. 
Availability of fodder for the increasing livestock population and of the fuelwood has 
suffered as a result. However, in Haryana attention has been paid by the state 
government to improve the development of the forest resources right from the time of 
the creation of the state. The efforts of the government in raising trees on government 
and community owned land increased the percentage of forest area from 3.09 to 3.86 
between 1966-67 to 1987-88, adding some 350 sq. km. of the forest area (GOH, 
1995). Environmental considerations such as stabilisation of sand dunes, reclamation 
of saline and alkaline soils, soil conservation and increasing the tree cover in general 
have been major factors in the state's reforestation programmes. Other economic 
factors are also important factors during the reforestation efforts. These include: 
improving the availability of fodder for livestock, and fuelwood both for the 
household and industries and improving the availability of wood for construction and 
for the wood based industries like the paper mills.
4.3. Management of Common Property Resources
Common Property Resources are broadly defined as those resources in which a group 
of people have co-equal use rights, specifically rights that exclude the use of those 
resources by other people. Individual members in the group of co-owners is typically 
conferred by membership in some or other group, whose central purpose is not the 
use or administration of the resource, such as village or tribe etc. ( Magrath, 1989)
Common property resources such as village common lands covering 10% of the total 
geographical area of the Haryana state have a pivotal role in the subsistence economy 
of the state. They serve protection, production and conservation roles and most often 
these roles conflict with other activities of the growing population adversely affecting 
the sustainability of the resources. Sustainability assumes significance because of the 
dual economic problem i.e., costs of irreversible economic activity and the utility 
yielding roles of these resources.
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Historically these common lands were managed by the traditional management 
methods by the villagers coupled with state control. In the post - independence period 
development was seriously influenced by the theories of economic growth (such as 
the Harrod - Domar model) put forward in 1951 placing emphasis on savings and 
investment in the labour surplus economy. The planned investment in the common 
property resources especially tree planting and fodder development was very limited 
in relation to the multiple demands to which the common property resources were 
subjected. This probably explains the dualistic development paradigms of the times, 
which emphasised the rapid industrialisation of developing countries for their faster 
economic growth. However, the role of the primary sectors in the overall growth of 
the developing countries substantially got a boost with the introduction of the Green 
Revolution.
In accordance with the trends of development policy, the policies adopted by the state 
towards the development of these common property resources has been modified to 
reflect the growing concerns of policy makers and the villagers and their changing 
needs and directions. Investment in the village common lands have several backward 
and forward linkages to a wide range of activities such as agriculture, industry, 
energy and soil conservation. Over the years many conservation and production 
oriented schemes have been implemented with mixed results.
Public investment in the common property resources has been limited in comparison 
to other primary sectors like agriculture. The growing population pressure and the 
growing industry demands has meant that most of the primary forest tracts of the 
common lands have been degraded into secondary and subsequently, degraded village 
forests. Since the 1980's there has been a marked shift in the policy towards 
conservation with the enactment of the Forest conservation act -1980 and the new 
National Forest Policy of 1988.
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The recent policy shifts from the government changed the interventionist role of the 
public investment in the development of these common property resources to a more 
decentralised and participatory approach involving the government organisations such 
as the Forest Department and the village subsistence users of these resources 
(Poffenberger, 1990; Palit, 1991; SPWD, 1992; Malhotra et al, 1989 and Saxena, 
1990). The objective of the government investment in the forestry operations of 
common property resources is to meet the subsistence needs of the rural and urban 
populations, requirements of the industry and the needs of conservation and 
rehabilitation. The public investment initiatives have wide and varied influence on the 
economy with implications on sustainability through pecuniary externalities, property 
rights, pricing policy, equity and distributional consequences.
In the following sections the present case study area is described. The contribution of 
common property resources to the village economy, the factors responsible for the 
degradation of common property resources and legal aspects concerning the 
management of common property resources are discussed.
4.4. Location of the Case Study Area
The present case study area covers the five southern districts of Aravalli Hills area, 
which is the most backward region of the Haryana state. This area falls within the 
semi arid zone. Most of the basic needs especially fodder and fiielwood requirements 
are met from these hills by the people inhabiting this environmentally hostile region. It 
is an area comprising 146000 ha. of village common lands spread over 5 districts, 
Gurgaon, Faridabad, Rewari, Mohindergarh and Bhiwani.
4.5 Climatic Factors
The greater part of the Aravalli area falls in the semi arid zone. The climate falls 
under the drought class of hot, dry and tropical type. It is characterised by high 
temperature and moisture deficiency almost throughout the year except for a brief
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monsoon period from July to September. Even during monsoons, long spells of dry 
weather creates serious conditions of drought. The proximity of the Great Indian 
Desert (The Thar) adds to the already prevalent difficult climatic conditions in most 
parts of Bhiwani, Mohindergarh and Rewari Districts.
4.5.1 Temperature
There is a prolonged hot period lasting from March to middle of July. The hot winds 
from the adjoining areas of Rajasthan Desert cause further desiccation in the area. 
Temperature in June rises up to 47° Celsius. The average minimum temperature 
during winter is around 7° Celsius. During December and January the temperature 
falls still further to below freezing, the lowest recorded temperature is -2° C (HFD, 
1988). The low temperature causes damage to plants by frost, mostly in the low lying 
areas. The lack of soil combined with wide variation in the temperatures brings in the 
harsh climatic conditions for the survival of trees. Most of the trees endemic to this 
area shed their leaves during hot months and remain in a state of dormancy until the 
onset of monsoon rains.
4.5.2 Rain fall
The Aravalli area is characterised by low rain precipitation. The rainfall pattern shows 
wide variation from year to year and in a cyclic manner. A good rainfall may occur 
once in 3-4 years. Rains are extremely erratic in volume, place and time. The number 
of rainy days in a year is 23 to 56 in a year. Average annual rainfall varies from 337 
mm in Tosham in Bhiwani district to 781 mm in Faridabad District. Rain fall increases 
from south-west to north-east. 80% of the rainfall occurs during south-west monsoon 
(July to September) (HFD, 1988). Winter rains during February and March are also 




There is marked variation in the values of relative humidity of different months. The 
relative humidity is lowest (up to 39 percent) during the summer months and highest 
(up to 86 percent) during the monsoon months of August and September (HFD, 
1988).
4.5.4 Wind Velocity
The Aravalli area is subject to high velocity winds from March to August. The wind 
speeds vary throughout the year and dust storms up to 125 km. per hour have been 
recorded. These storms are responsible for severe wind erosion in the hills as well as 
for the formation of aeolian deposits in the vicinity of the hills. Mean wind velocity 
varies from 2.0 km per hour in January to 10.0 km per hour during the months of 
May and June (HFD, 1988). Hot winds and high velocity dust storms are quite 
common during the months of May and June and sometimes westerly wind velocities 
of more than 50 km per hour are recorded. The hills are subjected to severe 
desiccation by the dry winds and severe drought conditions prevail which inhibit plant 
growth.
4.6 Physiography
The Aravalli Hills extend as a continuous range in Gurgaon and Faridabad districts 
and in the form of isolated and detached hills in Mohindergarh, Rewari and Bhiwani 
districts. The hills can be divided into the following four physiographical forms based 
on their erosion.
a) Eroded hill slopes
b) Table lands on hill tops
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c) Alluvial deposits in the foot hills
d) Aeolian deposits
The relative distribution of the extent of various topographic zones varies in different 
parts of the area. For example, the table lands are more or less absent, in 
Mohindergarh, Rewari and Bhiwani districts. Their occurrence is more predominant 
in Faridabad and Gurgaon districts. The physical characteristics of different 
physiographical forms are described below.
a. Eroded Slopes
About 70% of the total area of the hills are badly eroded lands with slopes varying 
from 15% to 70% or more. There are vertical rocky cliffs at certain places. 
Uncontrolled grazing and removal wood has resulted in the loss of vegetation on 
these slopes which accelerate the run-off. There is hardly any infiltration of rain water 
most of it being carried away as surface run-off. Soil depth varies from 5 cm to 15 
cm. The crystalline rocks are hard to disintegrate. The dry climate coupled with low 
water table is responsible for slow rate of weathering. Deposits of deep soils are met 
with between bouldery outcrops or in depressions. The high degree of erosion and 
poor cover do not permit any improvement in soil conditions. Almost 20% of the area 
is covered by bare rocks. Natural tree and grass species struggle to survive by sending 
their roots through rock crevices. The table lands on hill tops provide soil conditions 
more favourable for tree growth. The aeolian deposits are largely stable having a 
partial vegetation cover. Fresh sand deposits are met with on tops of these sandy 
hillocks. Deep alluvial loamy deposits are met with in some areas of Gurgaon, 
Faridabad and Mohindergarh districts at the foot of the hills.
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b. Table Lands on Hill Tops
Along the longer hill ranges in Faridabad and Gurgaon districts, and very rarely in the 
isolated hills of Mohindergarh, Rewari and Bhiwani districts flat lands or rolling table 
lands occur. Rocky outcrops are frequently found in the area. Natural depressions in 
the area are used to collect water for the use of animals. Soil condition in these table 
lands is better and these support vegetation and grasses. Soil depth varies from 20 to 
60 cm. with a mixture of partially decomposed parent material and boulders.
c. Alluvial deposits in the Foot Hills
The process of erosion and water action created alluvial deposits in the foot hills. 
These formations are frequent in the Faridabad and Gurgaon districts. These are at a 
higher level than the adjoining plains but merge with them. The land is undulating 
with slopes varying from 10% to 30%. with a fair quantity of rocky out crops at 
places. The excess run-off from the hills passes through these deposits resulting in 
deep gully formations. The soil is fairly deep and contains calcium carbonate nodules 
at lower levels.
d. Aeolian Deposits
The presence of arid sandy plains in the vicinity of the hills combined with high 
velocity of the winds has resulted in the formation of aeolian deposits. The wind 
borne particles of silt and sand settle near the hills due to the reduction in velocity 
brought out by the physical obstruction of the hill ranges. Aeolian deposits, are 
frequently found on the leeward side but occasionally on the windward side also. 
Most of these deposits are now in a stabilised form, but there are fresh deposits 
present on some older formations.
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4.7 Geology
The Aravalli ranges are the oldest mountain range of India and are supposed to have 
come into existence during the close of the Dharwar era (Archean system) by ridging 
up the marine sediments by an upheaval. Renewed upheaval occurred in the mountain 
chain during early Palaeozoic period (HFD, 1988). The ranges rise to the level of 
1200 - 1500 metres above sea level. In Haryana the Aravallis extend from the borders 
of Delhi extending further in Faridabad and Gurgaon districts to the border of 
Rajasthan state in the south-west and rise up to 652 m above mean sea level. The hills 
are discontinuous often surrounded by sandy or alluvial plains. In the districts of 
Mohindergarh, Rewari and Bhiwani the hills are more isolated and extend up to 
Khanak village in Bhiwani, which is the western limit of the Aravallis in Haryana. The 
Haryana Aravallis are a combination of Delhi and Alwar systems in geological terms. 
Rock formations comprise Alwar quartzites constituting quartzites and granite, 
ferrugeneous quartzites, slates, lime stones and marble. The Delhi system is 
characterised by a great variety and abundance of igneous intrusions and more intense 
grade of metamorphosis than older Aravallis. They contain 50% brown tourmalines 
besides an appreciable quantities of colourless mica and limonite.
The geological formations in Aravallis contain minerals of economic importance. 
Valuable building materials like marble and sand stone are available. Mining of marble 
and slates on commercial scale is being carried out in Mohindergarh and Rewari 
districts. In almost all the districts quarrying of building stones has been going on 
with damaging effects on the environment. The total area of quarries is about 2950 
ha. (HFD, 1988).
4.8 Soil
The soil depth and texture varies according to the topographic zone. On the hill 
slopes, soils are eroded, shallow and marked with conspicuous bare rocks. Soil 
texture varies from sandy loam to sandy. The clay content is slightly high (18-20%) in
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geological formations containing slates and lime stones in Mohindergarh districts. pH 
varies from 7.2 to 8.4, while the organic carbon content in the soil varies from 0.02% 
to 0.47%. The availability of Phosphorus varies from 4.5 kg/ha. to 56 kg/ha. 
Electrical conductivity of the soils varies from 0.11 to 0.47 milli mhos/cm (HFD, 
1988).
4.9 Hydrology
There are no permanent rivers in and around Aravallis. The most important seasonal 
river is Sahibi which rises in the Jaipur district of Rajasthan state and passes through 
Rewari and Pataudi areas. During rains the river comes down with great force often 
flooding the sandy banks. The river bed is 1 km wide. Kasavati river also rises in 
Jaipur district of Rajasthan and passes through Rewari. The Indori rises near Nuh and 
joins the Kasawati. The streams occurring in this area are characterised by flashy 
flows with heavy movement of sand and silt. The flood waters of Sahibi river spread 
over a vast region of Gurgaon, Mohindergarh, Rewari and Rohtak districts often 
causing heavy damage to crops. These floods also recharge the underground water 
table and help irrigate the crops in rainfed area. Kotla lake in Ferozepur area is the 
biggest natural lake having a total area of 20 sq. km. During rains water accumulates 
in many low lying areas of Gurgaon district because of poor drainage caused by 
calcium carbonate pan formation near the surface. The water in these lakes and ponds 
is often found to be saline.
Ground water in the foot hills is generally found at more than 15 m depth. In 
Faridabad water is found at lesser depths (6 m-10 m). The quality of the ground 
water is generally good in Faridabad and Gurgaon districts. Saline and sodic-saline 
waters are found in Mohindergarh, Rewari and Bhiwani districts.
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4.10 Forest Types
The natural flora of the case study area has been classified as Northern Tropical 
Thorn Forests (Champion and Seth, 1968). This type is further divided into Northern 
Tropical Dry Deciduous and Northern Tropical Moist Deciduous Thom Forests. At 
certain places in the hills soil variations give rise to edaphic climax types of Northern 
Tropical Dry Deciduous Thom Forest type and its degradation stages. The Northern 
Topical Moist Deciduous Forest type is absent in this area.
The Northern Tropical Thom Forests contain almost pure patches of Acacia Senegal 
in association with Acacia leucophloea, Salvadora oleoides, Zizyphus species, 
Capparis species etc. This type often merges with the degradation forms of Northern 
Dry Deciduous Thom type or degradation forms like Zizyphus scmb.
The Northern Tropical Dry Deciduous Thom type of Forests have pure Anogeissus 
pendula stands and are found on quartzites along the slopes of hills or flat table lands. 
The degradation stage of this type mostly contains Acacia Senegal and shrub type of 
Anogeissus pendula due to excessive grazing by goats. This is considered to be the 
last stage of this species before the complete elimination from this locality. Other tree 
species include Acacia leucophloea and Wrightia tinctoria.
Anogeissus pendula forests still survive in a few patches in Gurgaon, Mohindergarh, 
Rewari and Bhiwani districts. In other areas there are scattered or malformed trees of 
the degradation stage in mixture with Acacia Senegal. The climax type vegetation 
stand of Anogeissus pendula are found in shallow reddish brown soils in quartzite 
formations on hill slopes or ridges.
Anogeissus pendula form pure crops (90%) with 0.8-1 density, with average height 
of about 6 meters, branching at a height of 1.5 metres from the ground level. Main 
associates in the first and second stories are Acacia Senegal, Acacia leucophloea, 
Butea monosperma, Bauhinia resimosa, Holoptelia integrifolia, Wrightia tinctoria,
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Cassia fistula (rarely), Salvadora oleiodes (fringes), Cordia myxa and Ehretia leavis. 
Along the banks of streams, species like Syzigium and Phoenix sylvestris are 
occasionally found. Among small trees/shrubs are Grewia tenax, Grewia flavescens, 
Rhus mysorensis, Maytenus emarginata, Diospyros cordifolia, Zizyphus mauritiana, 
Zizyphus numularia, Capparis decidua, Capparis zeylcmica, Adhatoda vasica, 
Nerium odorum (along streams). Tephrosiapurpurea, Indigophera species. There are 
very few climbers found in the area. The most important climber is Mimosa hamata, 
while Vallaris heyni is found in climax vegetation. Important species of grasses are 
Cenchrus ciliaris, Cenchrus setigerus, Dicanthium annulatum and Erianthus species. 
Tree species like Sterculia urens, Mitragyna parviflora have also been noted in more 
moist situations in Faridabad and Gurgaon districts. Azadirachta indica, Ailanthus 
excelsa and Acacia nilotica are found where soil depth is better, mostly on the foot 
hills.
4.10.1 Vegetation types on the eroded hill slopes
Anogeissus pendula (shrub form) along with Acacia Senegal, Acacia leucophloea, 
Wrightia tinctoria, Butea monosperma and Salvadora olieodes are the common 
species. Prosopis juliflora (introduced or run in wild) is found in pure patches on the 
lower hills.
Among the shrubs are Grewia tenax, Capparis zeylcmica, Lantana indica, Zizyphus 
numularia and Adhatoda vasica. Opuntia species are found occasionally in Gurgaon 
and Faridabad districts. Among the annuals / herbs are Achyranthes aspera and 
Ocimum americcmum. Important grass species found include Cenchrus ciliaris, 
Dicanthium annulatum and Heteropogan contortus. In the Aravalli hills of 
Mohindergarh and Rewari districts metamorphic rock formations viz. marble and 
slate are found along with quartzites. The slopes of the hills are steeper and 
weathering of rocks is slower due to the arid conditions. The main difference in 
vegetation is the presence of Euphorbia caducifolia, and Commiphora wightii on 
ridges especially on calcium containing soils.
43
In Bhiwani district, the distinct feature is the absence of Anogeissus pendula, Acacia 
Senegal and Commiphora wightii. Other associates are Acacia leucophloea, 
Azadirachta indica and Salvadora oleiodes. The density of vegetation is 0.1-0.3. The 
height of the trees varies from 2-3 metres.
Important shrubs include Grewia tencoc, Maynetus emarginata, Capparis decidua 
and Lcmtana indica. Important grass species are Cenchrus ciliaris, Cenchrus 
setigerus, Iselima laxum, Aristida adensionis, Heteropogon contortus and 
Andropogon Icmiger.
4.10.2 Vegetation on Aeolian deposits
Common trees occurring on stabilised sand deposits are Acacia Senegal, Acacia 
leucophloea, Azadirachta indica, Strehelus asper, Holoptelia integrifolia, Salvadora 
Oleiodes, Balanites aegyptica, Tecomella undulata, Ailanthus excelsa and 
occasionally Prosopis juliflora, Anogeissus rotundifolia are found on the foot hills. 
The tree density is very low. Important species of shrubs are Acacia jacquemontii, 
Zizyphus mauritiana, Zizyphus numularia, Maytenus emarginatus, Lycium 
barbatum, Ricinus cummunis, Calligonum polygonoides, Ephedra foliata, Aerua 
tomentosa, Aeruva javanica and Capparis species.
Creepers belonging to cucurbitaceae are quite common. Aristolochia bracheata and 
Cuscuta reflexa are the climbers found in this type of lands.
Important grasses are Erianthus munja, Cenchrus ciliaris, Cenchrus setigerus, 
Heteropogon contortus, Andropogon Icmiger and Cynodon dactylon.
44
4.11 Extent of Common Lands
The present case study area is an area of 146000 ha. of common lands belonging to 
293 villages bordering the Aravalli Hills in the districts of Faridabad, Gurgaon, 
Mohindergarh, Rewari and Bhiwani. The low Aravalli hills, the oldest mountain 
chain in India, reach from Rajasthan into the southern Haryana. The destruction of 
the vegetative cover of the communal lands of these villages by humans and livestock 
has caused accelerated erosion and contributed to the poverty of the rural population 
(Kaul and Srivastava, 1993). The common lands of the area belonging to these 
villages provide most of the fuel and fodder requirements of the cattle and live stock 
numbering 278,423 in an area of 40,335 ha. The average stocking rate is estimated to 
be 1 Tropical Bovine Unit (TBU) for 0.3 ha., which is much higher than the 
prescribed levels of 1 TBU for 3 or 5 ha in a year with average annual rainfall 
(Haryana Forest Dept., 1988).
According to a recent survey conducted by Bokil (1993) the proportion of common 
lands to total area of the villages ranges from a low of 2% to a high of 81%, with the 
average being 26%. The average person to common land ratio is 17.3 with the ratio 
widely fluctuating between 1:1.4 to 1:127. This clearly indicates the existing pressure 
of population on most of the common lands.
4.12 CPR’s and their Contribution to the Village Economy
Common property resources are an important natural resource for rural communities 
in developing countries such as India because they continue to be a significant 
component of the land resource base of these communities. This is more prominent in 
the semi-arid and arid tropical areas of India (Jodha, 1992).
In the arid areas of Haryana common property resources contributions are mainly 
employment, income generation, food supply, water, fibre, fuel wood, fodder, grazing 
by the cattle and live stock and several other associated backward and forward
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linkages such as development of handicrafts and other cottage industries etc. and 
other social and economic contributions include drainage, recharge of the ground 
water, improvement of micro-climate in the village and sustainability of the farming 
systems etc. Though traditionally common lands have provided a number of products, 
at present they are mainly used as a source of fuelwood and fodder. The proportion 
of poor depending on the common property resources for fuel, fodder and food items 
ranges from 40% to 80% in the villages of Haryana. A survey reported by Bokil 
(1993) shows that the poor and landless families (about 30%) were more dependent 
upon the common lands for fuelwood. The other sections of the population, 
especially farmers collect fuelwood from their own lands and in addition use cow 
dung cakes for their fuel needs. The distance travelled for collecting fuelwood varied 
from 1 to 6 km.
4.13 Degradation of Common Property Resources
Despite their significant contributions to the rural community common property 
resources have been undergoing severe degradation, continuous erosion and are 
becoming transformed into the open-access resources (Jodha, 1992). Although CPR's 
contribute greatly to rural populations, the potential of involving these people in the 
equitable and participatory development has been continuously ignored by the policy 
makers, researchers, planners etc. There have been some development interventions 
in the village common lands but in the main these have been half hearted and did not 
involve systematic planning for participatory development. This has meant that 
although these areas have received technological inputs and financial support they 
continue to be degraded. The tragedy of the commons is used to justify the adoption 
of incorrect methodology. In Haryana's, village common property resources include 
village forests, pastures, waste lands, thrashing grounds and dumping grounds for 
agricultural crops and for storing cow dung etc., village ponds and small streams and 
rivers and their banks etc. Common property resources play an important role in 
assuring the livelihood of the rural poor. The breakdown of the traditional common 
property resource management systems not only causes environmental harm as the
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resources are severely degraded under open-access regimes, but social harm because 
the poor can no longer depend on them. For many villages in the semi-arid and arid 
zone of Haryana this has increasingly turned out to be the common tragedy of 
environmental collapse and pauperisation of the already poor. Further conversion of 
the common property resources into open-access regimes is profoundly detrimental to 
socio-economic development and environmental enhancement.
4.14. Causes of Degradation
Three major factors can be identified as contributing to the degradation of common 
property resources in Haryana. These are:
i. Decline of Productivity: Due to continuous management under an open-access 
regime the common property resources have become degraded because villagers have 
exploited them without considering maintaining their asset. This has been 
compounded by increasing demands from a rapidly increasing human and livestock 
population.
ii. Weakened Social Organisation: Traditional village-based authority systems have in 
the past regulated user access to the common property resources and enforced users' 
obligations relating to investment for the conservation and development of the village 
common property resources. Villagers used to respect their village elders and 
contribute to the upkeep of the common lands and other natural resources. Any 
violations of restrictions were met with stiff penalties. The advent of the modern law 
and courts has destroyed the authority village organisations had in dealing with 
abusers of communally accepted distribution mechanisms. The success of the 
traditional common property regimes in the past in many cases was due to the result 
of low levels of demand for resources, i.e., in the absence of economic scarcity. 
Although elected village councils, named village panchayaths still exist they seldom 
exercise their authority in dealing with the common property resources mainly
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because they are neither authoritarian nor bold enough to take measures which would 
anger their constituents (Jodha, 1992).
iii. Privatisation: The introduction of land reforms after independence initiated
changes in the status and management pattern of the common property resources. 
Some of the common lands were distributed to the landless people, who converted 
them to agricultural use(Jodha, 1992). Informal partitioning, and in some cases 
encroachments by some powerful individuals also contributed to the decline in area 
under common ownership followed by appropriation and formal privatisation. Again 
most of this land has been put under agriculture but because these lands were already 
poor in nutrients, yields from these lands have been very poor. Another form of 
privatisation has been the acquisition by other agencies such as public works 
department and irrigation departments in the name of public interest.
4.15 Rehabilitation of Common Property Resources
In a way, rehabilitation of common property resources is less of an investment and 
technological problem and more of a resource management problem. Impacts of 
investment and technology may prove short lived unless management and usage 
aspects of the common property resources are effectively handled. In most areas, 
even natural regeneration itself can make common property resources more 
productive, provided it is permitted through the controlled and regulated use of the 
resources. However, this cannot happen unless common property resources are 
converted from open-access to true common property regimes. In practical terms, 
this means re-establishing and enforcing usage regulations and user obligations.
At an aggregate policy level, this could be facilitated by legal and administrative 
provisions which would give not only legal sanction to adequate usage practices, but 
would also empower local communities to implement such provisions. Some of these 
provisions in terms of a mandate to village panchayath already exist. These provisions 
concerning legal and administrative aspects have been discussed in the following
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sections. Still there are certain elements which could be integrated into workable 
strategies for management. The focal point of such strategies can be the organisation 
of the common property resource user groups, who have a stake in them. This means 
establishing participatory development and planning processes aimed at reversing the 
degradation of these common lands.
4.16 Legal Aspects of the CPR Management and the Current Management 
Scenario
The basic requirements of any democratic society is the existence of strong, 
decentralised local self government systems, which can control the use of resources 
for the good of the local communities. A characteristic feature of the agrarian 
situation in India has been the existence of village panchayaths functioning as local 
self governments as an integral part of the rural communities. Realising this, and also 
the requirements of a democracy, the founders of the Indian constitution made it a 
duty of all states to sustain and encourage the functioning of the panchayathiraj 
system in all rural areas (through Article 40 of the constitution); they also mandated 
that the common material goods of the villages be used for the common good 
(through Articles 39(b) and (c) of the constitution). These are the most general and 
basic guidelines defining the legal policy as regards to the village level community set­
ups.
As a sequel to the article 40 of the constitution all the states passed panchayath acts 
assigning important functions and resources to the panchayaths so as to make them 
proper self-sufficient units for the development of villages. The Punjab Gram 
Panchayath Act, which applies to Haryana, was enacted in 1952 with the same 
motivation. The Punjab Gram Panchayath Act states that:
Section: 16. It shall be the duty o f the panchayath to: (w) plant and preserve trees 
(on common land).
49
Section: 22. The Gram panchayath may by general order to be published in the 
manner prescribed: (i)regulate such matters as may be necessary for the general 
protection o f standing crops and trees on common lands and the planting o f such 
trees.
Section: 80. There shall be a Gram Fund for each panchayath and the same shall be 
utilised for carrying out the duties and obligations imposed on the panchayath.
The Punjab Village Common Lands(Regulation) Act similarly prescribes:
Section: 2. The panchayath may make use o f the land in shamilat deh (common 
lands) vested in it under the act, either itself or through another, for any one or 
more o f the following purposes:
(vii) Tree plantation or any other purpose related to the forestry.
Section: 14. Utilisation o f the income from the shamilat deh: The income derived by 
a panchayath from the occupation o f land in shamilat deh vested in it shall be 
utilised for the benefit o f all inhabitants o f the village, as laid down in the Punjab 
Gram Panchayath Act, 1952 and for the improvement, maintenance and 
management o f the shamilat deh.
The legislators of the acts have realised that special functional committees or groups 
will be required for tasks at the village level. Panchayath Acts of every state provide 
the legal framework for such functional committees, and also special powers to the 
panchayaths to regulate the work and income of such committees. This framework is 
specified in the Punjab Gram Panchayath Act in the following section:
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Section: 33.
(1) The gram pcmchayath shall for the discharge o f its administrative functions and 
other duties appoint functional sub-committees and local committees.
(2) The functional sub-committees shall strengthen the panchayaths by assisting 
them with suggestions at the stage o f planning cmd help in the execution o f 
development work.
(3) In case a sabha area is constituted o f more than one village shall have a local 
committee consisting o f panches o f the village and co-opted members o f the village, 
which will look after the development o f the village and will be considered as the 
functional sub committees for the purposes.
The institutional rules in the village panchayaths are influenced by the Punjab Gram 
Panchayath Act, 1952. This statute together with the Punjab Village Common Lands 
Regulation Act, 1961 forms the framework for the rules that villagers devise to 
manage their village common lands.
Land tenure is not a major problem in Haryana. Common lands, as panchayath lands 
are clearly delimited under these acts and their title of ownership is also clear due to 
the fact that mutation* of all such lands has been completed in favour of the 
panchayaths by the Government of Haryana in 1966. The village common lands are 
managed by the village forest committees, which act as the executive committees of 
the village panchayath.
The land use and benefit sharing amongst the users rests with the panchayath (vide 
sections 4(1) and 4(2) of the Punjab Village Common Lands Act, 1961). The 
administrative control over this asset, in terms of external inputs belongs to another
Mutation is a process by which changes in the title of ownership of a particular property are 
altered.
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party. The Revenue Department through the Block Development Officer, Sub- 
divisional Officer and the Collector; (Sections 7 of the Punjab Village Common Lands 
(Regulation) Haryana amendment Act, 1991.
Section 3(2) of the Punjab Village Common Lands Rules, 1964 gives panchayaths 
powers to lease out the common land for agricultural and cultivation purposes. The 
panchayath has also the power to pass a resolution to allow a legally bonafide agency 
like the Forest Department to enter into an agreement for management and 
development of its village common lands (vide section 22(1) of the Punjab Gram 
Panchayath Act, 1952). The net effect of the operation of these two types of rules has 
been that under the resolutions passed by the panchayaths for afforestation purposes 
the land is temporarily transferred for afforestation and management by the Forest 
Department.
The Forest Department has provided the institutional framework for the constitution 
of the village forest committees by the panchayath entrusted with the sole objective of 
management and development of village common lands. The assumption is that the 
smaller committees with the specific job of undertaking the assigned tasks will be 
administratively easier to handle than the larger panchayath bodies, which are already 
busy with number of other works concerning the village. The Forest Department has 
no locus standi to impose any such committees on the panchayath or the village 
people. Legally this can only be done by the village panchayaths themselves, the 
Revenue Department and the Governor. As such the Village Forest Committee’s 
(VFC) can neither generate nor keep village funds independently, nor take rural 
credit, bank loans or other development funds from the Government unless 
authorised by the Panchayath.
This non-statutory status of the committees raises various legal questions about their 
social relationship with the panchayath bodies. The committee cannot dictate terms to 
the panchayath for benefit sharing from the common lands. The lands are vested in 
Panchayaths and they have the powers for distribution, and moreover since all the
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villagers have rights to share from the commons, under the law, the committee cannot 
exclude benefits to free riders or to those who are deemed to have worked less than 
the work allotted to them. The relationship of the panchayaths with that of VFC’s can 
be expected to be cordial since the sarpanch (chairman) of the panchayath is also the 
chairman of the VFC and most of the panches (elected members of the panchayath) 
are members of the VFC. Though legally all decisions are taken by the panchayath 
with regards to enforcement, management and development of the village common 
lands, the VFC’s aid the village panchayath in fulfilling these objectives.
4.17 Summary
In this chapter the socio-economic characteristics of southern Haryana are presented 
along with the details of natural resources, vegetation, geology, climatic and other 
factors responsible for the degradation of common property resources, the efforts of 
the government in providing an institutional framework in order to re-establish 
community regulated access management system in place of an open-access situation 
have been discussed along with the legal aspects that govern the management of the 
common lands. Some of the theoretical aspects relating to the common property 
resource management, which explain various aspects of CPR management are 
presented in Chapter V for conceptual clarity and analysis.
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Chapter V
Theoretical Aspects of Common Property Resource Management
In this chapter theoretical aspects of common property resource management are 
presented. Certain concepts relating to the CPR management are clarified. The 
theories that explain the theoretical issues in CPR management such as Garett 
Hardin’s Tragedy of Commons, Game Theoretic Models and Olson’s Logic of 
Collective Action are presented. These three theories have defined the ways at 
viewing the problem.
5.1 Concept of Common Property
'Property', as applied to natural resources, is a primary social institution both because 
of its own importance and also because several important secondary institutions, 
including taxation, credit and tenancy, are derived from it. 'Property', refers to a 
bundle of rights in the use and transfer (through selling, leasing and inheritance etc.) 
of natural resources. Different rights may be distributed in various combinations 
among natural and legal persons, groups and several publics, including the many units 
of the government (Ciriacy-Wantrup, 1975).
The term 'common property' as defined by Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop (1975), refers 
to the distribution of the property rights in resources in which a number of owners are 
co-equal in their rights to use the resource. This means that their rights are not lost 
through non-use. It doesn't mean that the co-equal owners are necessarily equal with 
respect to the quantities of the resource they use over a period of time. This definition 
refers to the right to use the resources, but not to transfer them. Heirs of a common 
owner become co-owners themselves only through their membership in the group, 
tribe or village. Common property is not 'everybody's property'. The concept implies 
that potential resource users who are not members of a group of co-equal owners are 
excluded. The concept 'property' has no meaning without this feature of exclusion of
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all who are not either themselves or have some arrangement with owners to use the 
resource in question.
All common property resources share two important characteristics. First, exclusion 
(or control of access) of users to these resources. Secondly, each user is capable of 
subtracting from the welfare of other users. Hence common property resources are 
defined as ‘a class of resources for which exclusion is difficult and joint use involves 
subtractability’ (Feeny, 1990). Use of the term ‘common property’ has been 
controversial. This is because of the differences at the philosophical basis of 
traditional views as opposed to the western scientific resource management. The 
contemporary western view is that property is either private or it belongs to the state. 
In this view resources which are not amenable to private appropriation are called 
'common property'. Common property in this sense does not mean that the resource is 
owned collectively by a group; it means that it is not owned by anyone but belongs to 
everyone as defined in US law in 1985 (Stevenson 1991). This definition states that 
such resources are basically open-access and freely available to any user. According 
to another view, common property should be restricted to communally owned 
resources - that is, those resources for which there exist communal arrangements for 
the exclusion of non-owners and for allocation among co-owners. The concept of 
common property in this second sense is well established in formal institutions such as 
the Anglo-Saxon common law and the Roman law (Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop,
1975). It is also well established in the many informal institutional arrangements based 
on tradition and custom.
The distinction between the two concepts is crucially important with regard to the 
'tragedy of the commons' model proposed by Hardin (1968) (see section 5.2). 
According to Hardin's model, common property resources are really open-access and 
resources held in common are doomed to over exploitation since each resource user 
places immediate self interest above the community interest. Thus they eventually 
become villain and victim of resource depletion. The Hardin model leads to the 
conclusion that common property resources should be either privatised or controlled
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by the central government authority to ensure sustainable use. Hardin depicted the 
solution as 'mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon', and referred to governmental 
control and made no mention of the communal management. Many case studies 
indicate that resource users can, and in fact do co-operate. Valuable natural resources 
in many instances are never open-access but are managed under traditional rules 
governing use.
Differences over the use of the term 'common property' are likely to persist. One 
solution to this impasse over the use of the term 'common property' is to distinguish 
between the resource and the regime. This distinction between the resource itself and 
the property rights regime under which it is held is critically important (Bromley, 
1985). In general, common property resources may be held within the three property 
rights regimes namely open-access, communal property or state property. Under the 
open-access regime access is free for all; resource use rights are neither exclusive nor 
transferable; these rights are owned in common but freely available to everyone (and 
therefore property to none). Under state property ownership and management control 
is held by the nation state or crown. Under communal property use, rights for the 
resource are controlled by an identifiable group. The defined group develops a series 
of rules concerning who may use the resource, who is excluded from using the 
resource, and how the resource should be used.
Ever since Garrett Hardin's influential article in 'Science' (1968) was published, the 
tragedy of the commons has become a common phrase amongst the economists and 
others concerned with environmental problems. Wherever there are multiple users of 
a natural resource this phenomenon has been applied and solutions were given as if 
the resource degradation in all the cases is due to over exploitation of the resource. 
Be it fisheries, grazing, air and water pollution, misallocation in oil and natural gas, 
abuse of village common lands and other public lands, ground water decline, and 
wildlife decline, population problems and other problems of resource misallocation. 
The tragedy of commons is explained below.
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5.2 Garrett Hardin's Tragedy of Freedom in a Commons
The phrase 'tragedy of the commons' originated from a paper in 'Science' in 1968 
written by the ecologist, Garrett Hardin (1968), but the argument behind it is derived 
from debates within the discipline of economics. Hardin drew his illustration from a 
pamphlet published by an English clergy-man Lloyd in 1833 during the Malthusian 
debate on the checks to population. More recently, very similar arguments have been 
put forward by Demsetz (1967) and others.
According to Garrett Hardin the tragedy of the commons develops in this way. In a 
pasture open to all it is expected that each herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as 
possible. Such an arrangement worked reasonably satisfactorily for centuries because 
population growth rate, tribal wars and poaching kept population levels of both men 
and animals below the carrying capacity of the land. While these factors remained in 
balance there was no problem but as pressure comes on the resource the inherent 
logic of the commons remorselessly generates the tragedy.
As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximise his gain. They ask, "What is 
the utility to me at adding one more animal to my herd". This utility has one positive 
and one negative component. The positive component is a function of the increment 
of one animal. Since the herdsman receives all the proceeds from the sale of the 
additional animal, the positive utility is +1. The negative component is a function of 
the additional overgrazing created by one more animal. Since, the effects of 
overgrazing are shared by all the herdsmen, the negative utility for any particular 
decision making herdsman is only a fraction of -1.
Adding the component partial utilities, the rational herdsman concludes that the only 
sensible decision is to add another head of cattle; and another, and another.... and so 
on. However if this is the conclusion reached by each and every herdsman sharing the 
commons, therein lies the tragedy. Each herdsman is locked into a system that 
compels him to increase his herd without any limit in a situation where the resource
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endowment is limited. Ruin is the destination towards which all humans rush, each 
pursuing their own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of commons. 
Freedom in a commons invariably brings ruin to all.
This free rider problem results when an individual shirks responsibility to the 
community. It is often argued that the incentive for this behaviour is logical from the 
point of "self interest". The tragedy of the commons is often used to describe this 
behaviour in which the private benefit of grazing an additional head of the cattle on a 
common range exceeds the private cost, because the costs of maintaining range 
quality can be shifted to the group as a whole (Hardin, 1968). The tragedy of over 
grazing results from each persons incentive to free ride regardless of the expected 
actions of others. Even if an agreement is reached that specifies that all will refrain 
from further grazing, the strict dominance of a free rider strategy makes such a 
contract unstable.
Hardin (1968) explicitly identifies the commons system he describes with that 
prevailing in England until the enclosure of common fields in the 18th and 19th 
centuries. He argues that enclosure was a necessary response to overgrazing. 
Hardin's description of the commons paints a picture of extreme instability and 
immediately raises the question of how such a system could last for a great length of 
time (around a thousand years in much of the Northern Europe) without leading to 
irreparable degradation. The actual commons were never open to all comers but were 
the property of a defined group, known collectively as 'commoners'. Within this 
group, there were clearly defined limits on the number of cattle each individual could 
graze on the common fields. These limits were varied in response to the changing 
seasonal conditions, a process known as 'stinting'. A detailed description of the 
operation of this common property system is given by Tawney (1912). Dahlman 
(1980) points out that common property was the preferred form of land management 
for grazing across northern Europe for centuries during the middle ages. Dahlman 
argues that this was not due to the ignorance of the peasants who used the land, but 
that it was economically rational. Then the question arises as to how these examples
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are reconcilable with Hardin's "tragedy of commons". The common property systems 
of Switzerland, Austria, Germany, Irrigation systems of south Indian villages (Wade, 
1987) have been successfully operating for centuries. The survival of common 
property institutions in all these above areas is linked to the limitation of entry. The 
inputs to Hardin's commons may increase until economic exhaustion of the resource 
occurs. In the common property systems that have survived, people have learned to 
limit use through co-ordinated management. There is no co-ordinated management in 
Hardin's commons because no identifiable group has been distinguished as the 
managers.
The class of resources that has been labelled "common property" should more 
accurately be divided into two subsets. The subset that experiences overuse should be 
labelled "open access resources", for it is the unlimited access that causes the tragedy. 
The subset that has succeeded in limiting the access and employed the joint co­
ordinated management is true "common property resource". Authors like Demsetz 
(1967) and Anderson (1978) launching their reasoning from the assumption that all 
the commonly used resources are overexploited and conclude that there was only one 
solution i.e., private property. Private property, of course, is one solution to the 
open-access problem. A secure, exclusive right to resource extraction imparts the 
incentive to the user to utilise the resource at an optimal rate. The private property 
rights holder not only reaps the benefits but also incurs all the costs of additional 
resource extraction, and a balancing of these benefits and costs leads the user to an 
optimal extraction rate. Common property in which the group control over the 
resource leads to the balancing of benefits and costs, might also be a solution. The 
private property advocates refuse to recognise this possibility because of the belief 
that individual incentives to cheat will ruin the group solution. This position, of 
course, ignores the incentive that individuals have to collude. Through collusion the 
group can increase the size of the joint product that they divide. It is important to 
recognise that common property might provide a solution to the open access 
problem, because certain resource characteristics or social institutions may require a 
common property solution, whereas a private property solution might fail or be sub-
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optimal. Runge (1981) has pointed out that some traditional societies have long 
depended on group use of a natural resource.
Open-access is an undesirable regime under which to exploit a natural resource, when 
extraction levels become intensive. The solution often given is to vest property 
rights. Common property also possess a set of property rights relationships designed 
to eliminate open access exploitation. The number of users is limited, each user 
understands how much of the resource to extract, and decisions about resource 
allocation are made by some group process. Property rights have been vested in this 
situation, and they may be adequate to prevent the Hardin's tragedy. In these 
situations there are enforcement mechanisms with which to punish those exceeding 
agreed extraction levels.
Thus, although private property can provide the incentives to attain proper resource 
allocation, it may not be the solution towards which all the allocation systems must 
move. Open access and common property are generally confounded with one 
another and common property is subsequently condemned as inferior to private 
property. The open-access and common property situations are discussed below in 
detail in the subsequent sections.
5.3 Open-access in Common Property
An open-access resource is a depletable fugitive resource characterised by rivalry in 
exploitation. It is subject to use by any person who has the capability and desire to 
enter into harvest or extraction of it and its resource base. Such extraction results in 
negative externalities.
The depletability of an open-access resource reflects not only that there is rivalry in 
exploitation but also that some use rate exists that reduces resource supply to zero. 
This is true both of strictly exhaustible resources, such as oil and minerals, and of 
renewable resources, such as fish and trees. Simple physical or economic exhaustion
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can reduce the former's supply to zero and sufficiently high use rates can drive the 
resource to extinction by simply extracting faster than its capability to reproduce 
(Ciriacy-Wantrup, 1975 and Dasgupta, 1979).
There are two types of externality; symmetric and asymmetric. The symmetric 
externality is present in an open access resource in which each entrant to resource use 
imparts a negative externality to all producers, but similarly these other producers 
have negative externality effects on the new entrant. The externality is reciprocal or 
symmetric. Common examples include fisheries, wildlife, open grazing land, ground­
water, unregulated woodlots and forests, and common oil and gas pools. The 
asymmetric externality occurs when production or consumption decisions of the 
economic actors enter the production or utility functions of others while the recipients 
of the externality do not cause any reciprocal effects: e.g. a smokey factory dirtying a 
nearby laundry.
5.3.1 Over Use
The common, non-economic definition of overuse is exploitation of the resource 
beyond carrying capacity or equivalently beyond its maximum sustainable yield 
(Hardin, 1968). According to Hardin an open-access grazing area can operate 
satisfactorily for centuries if it is used below its carrying capacity. That means social 
and economic problems arise only when use exceeds this level. However a number of 
neo-classical economists have been trying to substitute another definition for over 
exploitation. They point out that social policy should be to maximise net economic 
yield, which in general is not synonymous with maximising output, that is, it is not the 
same as utilisation at carrying capacity. Economists argue that any level of inputs 
beyond that which would maximise net return from the resource is over use. Game 
theoretic models, which explain the group behaviour under different scenarios are 
described below.
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5.4 Game Theoretic Models
In this section the Prisoner’s dilemma, the assurance game and the multi-person 
repeated games are presented in order to understand the group dynamics and to 
explain how individuals behave when confronted with different situations.
5.4.1 The Prisoner’s Dilemma
The prisoner's dilemma can be shown to represent open access if we imagine two 
cattle owners who use a grazing area that is at its maximum economic yield. The 
assumption of a constant number of herdsmen (i.e., two) confines this model to the 
situation of limited user open access, i.e., a limited number of firms but open access 
towards inputs. Each grazer has a choice of either adding a head of cattle or not 
adding a head, and the grazers may not collaborate. Assume that the marginal 
revenue product for the grazing area is -£2 per animal, and that this is composed of - 
£6 in reduced output from other animals in both grazers' herds and +£4 in value from 
the animal added. Here we assume that the marginal revenue product to the grazing 
area -£2 and the value of the additional animal +£4 are net of costs of providing the 
animal, e.g., purchase price, supplementary feed costs, veterinary costs, etc. Assume 
identical players and individual herds, so that the loss in value of outputs from the 
existing animals from adding a head divides equally between grazers (i.e., -£3 each).
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For simplicity assume these values are constant for the first two animals grazed 
beyond the optimum. Given these assumptions then Figure 5.1 gives the payoffs for 
the game.
If both herdsman '1' and '2' decide not to add an animal there will be no loss to either 
one; both payoffs are zero. If herdsman T  adds, but herdsman '2' does not add, the 
former will gain the value of the additional animal less the costs he imposes on the 
rest of his own herd (£4-£3 = £1). Herdsman '1' enjoys a net gain, which is necessary, 
for otherwise he would not make this move in the absence of Herdsman '2's adding an 
animal. Herdsman 2's loss is greater here than in any other scenario, because he has 
not added an animal to offset costs imposed on him (£0-£3=-£3). This is the upper 
right hand box in the game. Reverse payoffs occur if Herdsman '2' adds a head while 
Herdsman T  does not. This is the lower left hand box in the game; Herdsman '1' 
incurs his greatest loss while Herdsman '2' faces his sole chance for gain. Finally if 
both add a head of cattle, losses to each are moderate because they are offset by the 
value each herdsman gains from the additional animal he grazes (£4-£6=-£2), but the 
total loss to the grazing area is greatest. Playing the game without collusion results in 
both Herdsmen choosing to add a head of cattle, even though it causes losses to both 
of them and their mutual restraint would have resulted in losses to neither. If we 
consider the problem from the Herdsman 'l's  point of view, if the Herdsman '2' adds a 
head of cattle (first column), herdsman ‘ 1 ’ finds that he minimises losses by adding a 
head of cattle: In absolute value terms -£2 is less than -£3. Considering his 
possibilities if Herdsman '2' does not add a head of cattle (second column), Herdsman 
T  still decides to add a head of cattle , since +£l>£0. That is he stands to gain rather 
than staying with no loss. Thus, Herdsman T"s dominant strategy is to add a head of 
cattle no matter what Herdsman '2' does. Since the game is symmetric, Herdsman '2' 
will make the same choice. Both add a head of cattle and the tragedy of open access 
occurs. More over after each has added a head, if the private gains and losses from 
adding a head of cattle shift only slightly from those assumed here, the herdsmen will 
add more cattle in future plays of the game. This will continue until private gains and 
losses shift enough to reach an open access equilibrium.
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Runge (1986), however argued that the representation of prisoner’ dilemma does not 
clearly explain the important considerations. He suggested that community 
management involves the strategic interdependence between all the villagers to 
manage their natural resources. Instead of prisoner’s dilemma it is the co-operative 
game such as the “assurance problem” that clearly presents the appropriate 
representation that individuals co-operate with each other and achieve a common 
interest and improve the resource management even though there exist incentives to 
cheat the agreement.
5.4.2 The Assurance Problem
The assurance analogy to the prisoner’s dilemma is “the battle of sexes” in which a 
couple face the choice of entertainment and companionship (Magrath, 1989). One 
partner prefers the dog races to the ballet, the other the reverse. Both, however, 
prefer to accompany the other rather than go to their preferred event alone. A battle 






Figure 5.2: Battle of Sexes
In contrast to the prisoner’s dilemma this game has two stable equilibria. That means 
both go to either dog races or ballet together. Once an agreement is made there is no 
incentive to defect, unless a new agreement is made with the other partner. The 
problem is assuring other players actions. Runge argues that conceiving of
1, 2 - 1, -1
- 1, -1 2 , 1
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community resource management as an assurance game has several advantages. It 
displays that co-ordinated action can arise between the players without being imposed 
from outside. It emphasises interdependence of the players and the possibility of 
multiple stable outcomes. The structure of assurance problem is also such that once 
an agreement has been made, defection is no longer possible. Runge (1981) uses the 
assurance game to support the argument, made by others without reliance on game 
theory justification (Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop, 1975), that community 
management of natural resources is a viable institutional arrangement.
5.4.3 Multiperson and Repeated Games
Single play, two person games predict the outcome in the absence of other players. 
But in reality it is a multiperson repeated game that best explains the group 
interactions within themselves. Resource use almost always involves groups 
significantly larger than two, and users generally interact over extended periods of 
time. Theoretical, experimental and empirical studies of multiperson games and 
repeated games suggest that co-operation can emerge under a wide variety of 
circumstances (Magrath, 1989). These circumstances differ from place to place and 
region to region. Most important of all is the existence of an institution within the 
community, that can take care of the natural resources use and the legal set-ups that 
permit such an institution to come up. The rules governing various aspects of 
resource use also are to be designed. Rule making, monitoring the behaviour of 
individuals within the community and sanctioning the rule breakers are essential for 
establishing a common property regime.
5.5 The Logic of Collective Action
"The logic of collective action" developed by Mancur Olson (1965), explains the 
difficulty of getting individuals to pursue their joint welfare, as contrasted to 
individual welfare. Olson summarises the accepted view in his own words:
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"The idea that groups tend to act in support of their group's interests is supposed to 
follow logically from this widely accepted premise of rational, self-interested 
behaviour. In other words, if the members of some group have a common interest or 
object, and if they would all be better off if that objective were achieved, it has been 
thought to follow logically that the individuals in that group would, if they were 
rational and self-interested, act to achieve that objective." (Olson 1965). Olson (1965) 
further emphasises that unless the number of individuals is quite small, or unless there 
is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common 
interest, rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or 
group interests.
5.6 Investment in Common Property under Open-access
There is always a tendency to over invest in the private inputs necessary to extract the 
resource leading to the dissipation of the economic rent attributable to the resource 
under the common property open-access situation. In addition, investment in 
commons improvement is generally lacking since no user in an open access situation 
can be assured of reaping the benefits of improvements to the resource before others 
do so. For example if a herdsmen fertilises an open-access grazing area, there is 
nothing to prevent other herdsmen's animals from consuming much of the increase in 
grass. As a consequence, there is insufficient motivation to invest in the improvement. 
The lack of incentive to invest in the resource results from a divergence between the 
party who incurs the costs and those who reap benefits. Under-investment in the 
commons improvement is mainly due to lack of assurance of reaping the benefits. An 
individual investing in resource improvements may receive some of the benefits from 
the investment but may not be able to capture all the benefits. The leakage of benefits 
destroys the incentive to invest. This means that even if any individual invests in the 
resource, that investment may result in a positive externality. This means that from 
the social perspective private individuals under invest in activities although such 
investment might generate positive externalities. No individual will be willing to
6 6
contribute to the investment unless some arrangement is devised by which all 
contributing share the improvement costs.
According to Scott (1955) the economic objective for the jointly exploited resources 
should not be to maximise the single period resource rent but rather to maximise the 
return from the resource over present and future periods. In order to do this, users 
must take into account the effect of current resource extraction on future extraction 
possibilities. Therefore, for both physical and financial reasons, users should consider 
the balance between extraction and conservation of the resource. In an open access 
situation, however, competition for the resource causes users to ignore the so called 
user cost; the present value of foregone future extraction benefits or increased future 
extraction costs caused by current resource exploitation. Under investment in the 
commons improvements in addition to over exploitation of the resource is a primary 
problem, which must be tackled by any joint resource management system.
5.7 Common Property Externalities
Externalities lead to non-optimal market allocation. The literature is filled with 
examples of 'market failure' arising from the divergence of private from social cost 
(Stevenson, 1991). The tragedy of the commons arising from grazing too many cattle 
on a given area of land has been widely noted as an important representative case of 
symmetric externality. The private benefit of grazing an additional head of cattle on a 
common grazing range exceeds the private cost, because part of the cost is incurred 
by the entire group engaged in grazing. As a result individuals have an incentive to 
'free ride' and resource over-exploitation results (Hardin, 1968).
In much of the developing world, common property provides a complex system of 
norms and conventions over individual grazing rights, closely resembling the 
traditional, common property institutions of pre feudal Europe.
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In the past many economic consultants and planners have called for the imposition of 
private property rights to halt this tragedy of commons (Johnson, 1972, Picardi,
1976). Following the tradition of enclosures of common grazing lands, efforts have 
been made to impose private property schemes to "internalise" a common property 
externality. Many have failed seriously. Not only have they failed to stop over 
grazing, they also have contributed to further inequality in situations where there was 
already unequal distributions of wealth. Lands formerly held in common are being 
transferred to individuals such as high ranking bureaucrats, who can exercise 
influence in the allocation of use - rights. These individuals often fail to protect the 
quality of the common property (Hitchcock, 1980).
5.8 Need for Institutional management of CPR's
Common property rights are a special class of property rights which assure individual 
access to resources over which they have collective claims. Common property is 
created when members of an interdependent group agree to limit their individual 
claims on a resource in expectation that the other members of the group will do like 
wise. Rules of conduct in the use of a given resource are maintained to which all 
members of the inter dependent group subscribe. If individuals fail to contribute to 
the management of a collective good when they expect that others will, they are 
behaving as 'free riders'. Free riders respond to incentives to shirk responsibility to 
the group to which they belong (Runge, 1981).
Resources are managed as common property by rules for user group behaviour when 
their continuing use is conditional on the inter-dependent behaviour of the group 
members. Common property regimes provide assurance that the resources on which 
all persons collectively depend upon will be available sustainably. The same 
assurances would not be provided by the adoption of private or state property rights 
since the consequences for productivity, sustainability and equity would be different. 
For people in the developing world, who are directly dependent on the availability of 
renewable resources, common property regimes can provide equitable and sustainable
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access to the resource at minimal cost. Rules or norms for the interdependent use of 
collective goods develop in the face of uncertain or limited resources availability. 
These rules originate within the group, are mutually accepted by the group, and 
contain their own means for resolving conflicts.
For resources such as forests, grazing lands and fisheries on which whole communities 
may depend and where the potential for free riding exists, questions of efficiency, 
equity and sustainability are inextricably bound together. In situations of uncertain 
resource availability, common property regime members prefer to trade off some of 
the individual benefit generated by a system of private use-rights for the collective 
assurance that the resource will be used equitably and as a consequence sustainably.
A well functioning common property regime may be distinguished by the following 
features (Bromley, 1985):
(a) Efficiency - a minimum of disputes and limited level of efforts necessary to 
maintain compliance;
(b) Stability - the regime has the capacity to cope with the progressive changes 
through adaptation, such as the arrival of new production technologies;
(c) Resilience - the regime has the capacity to accommodate surprises and sudden 
shocks; and
(d) Equity - there is a shared perception of fairness among the members with respect 
to inputs and outputs.
Using these four criteria, efficiency, stability, resilience and equity the institutional 
performance of such regimes can be appraised and their value as foundations for 
institutional innovation can be assessed.
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In order to meet these criteria and to guide the use of collective resources, numerous 
variables must be defined by the group implementing the management of the common 
property resource. They are determining:
(a) What constitutes membership of the group having access rights to the resource 
with the duty to respect the rights of members;
(b) What constitutes agreement;
(c) On what basis will the right apply over time i.e., annually or seasonally;
(d) How rights are transmitted between generations;
(e) Where control resides;
(f) How compliance with agreed rules and conventions is to be maintained;
(g) How departures from the rules are to be corrected and sanctions imposed; and
(h) How disputes are to be settled.
Institutional arrangements, such as rules and conventions, are clearly important 
elements in resource conservation. They translate claims on the resource into 
property rights for some, and duties for others. In western society property rights 
have become centred on the state and the individual in the belief that common 
property is inherently unstable, subject to inevitable pressure from free riders, and 
bound to be degraded in the tragedy of commons. Many case studies from developing 
countries suggest that common property regimes not only can be viable but are 
essential. Common property regimes have the capacity to manage rural resources in 
ways that meet the multiple criteria (efficiency, equity and sustainability) are 
important to rural people.
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5.9 Common property and Collective action
Many forests and natural resources have been managed for several centuries as 
common property regimes by communities all around the globe. Some may have 
disappeared naturally as communities opted for other arrangements, particularly in the 
face of technological and economic change, but in most instances common property 
institutions seem to have been legislated out of existence (McKean, 1995). The 
justification often provided for eliminating the communal ownership of common 
property resources is that individual or public ownership of common property 
resources would offer enhanced efficiency in resource use and greater long-term 
protection of the resource base.
Although common property has proved a stable form of resource management in 
some traditional societies, the combination of population growth, technological 
change, climate and political forces has de-stabilised many existing common property 
institutions (McKean, 1995). In Sahel and South Africa, serious misuse of resources 
has been alleged to be the direct result of traditional common property institutions 
(Hitchcock, 1980; Picardi & Seifert, 1976). In response to this, western economic 
consultants and planners have called for the imposition of private property rights 
(Johnson, 1972; Picardi, 1976).
The boundaries of the resource must be well defined legally and physically for the 
creation of common property institutions at the village level. The criteria for 
membership in the resource user group must be clear. Common property resources in 
Indonesian villages are under stress because the community opens membership in the 
user group not only to all the village residents but also to all their kin in the 
neighbouring villages (Vondal 1987). Stevenson (1991) notes that many Swiss 
villages limit eligibility to persons, who five in the village and purchase shares. New 
residents must find shares to buy and share owners who leave the village find that it 
is in their interest to sell their shares because they are unable to exercise their village
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rights elsewhere. Japanese villages usually confer eligibility and shares of harvest in 
households rather than individuals and may also limit membership to long established 
main households rather than "branch" households (McKean, 1992).
In India, traditional village-based institutions have, in the past, regulated user access 
to the common property resources and enforced users' obligations relating to 
investment for the conservation and development of village common property 
resources. Villagers used to respect their village institutions and contribute to the 
upkeep of the common lands and other natural resources. Any violations of 
restrictions were met with stiff penalties. The advent of the modem legislative system 
has largely destroyed the authority that village organisations had in dealing with 
abusers of communally accepted distribution mechanisms. This is unfortunate as 
practice and theory alike suggest that real benefits may accrue from the allocation of 
common property rights in many situations.
It is the creation of a village level institution, which brings people together, and 
ensures protection and development of the common property resource base. 
Management of the natural resource base of a village is not possible without an 
effective village-level forum for finding common solutions and resolving disputes. 
Common property resources may support the economic growth of the village through 
supply of food, fuel, fodder, and artisanal materials for development. Village 
institutions need some financial help in order to arrest the resource degradation. This 
is where the role of government funding is crucial.
Similarly motivated private property schemes have been attended throughout the 
developing world. Many, perhaps most, have failed to stop over use, and in many of 
the cases may have contributed to even more rapid degradation of resources and to 
increased inequality in already unequal distributions of the wealth. Not unlike 
European lands that were enclosed, areas formerly held in common are often 
transferred to individuals (such as high ranking bureaucrats) who can exercise
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influence in the allocation of use rights. These individuals then fail to manage these 
resources effectively.
The common property may be as viable as private property on the grounds of both 
efficiency and equity (Bromley, 1985). In many cases common property institutions 
may play a key role in the effective management of the scarce natural resources, 
complementing and combining with the private property rights. What follows is thus 
neither an attack on the private property nor wholesale endorsement of the common 
property. It is an argument in favour of institutions that are well adopted to the 
particular resource constraints facing the villages and community groups in the 
developing countries.
5.10 Summary
In this chapter some of the concepts relating to CPR management have been 
discussed. Different property rights sets have been examined critically in order to 
weigh the merits and demerits of different property rights. Common property rights 
provide a solution to the rural resource management problems under specific 
circumstances. These circumstances have been specified. In the next chapter the 
survey methodology in the case study area is presented in order to examine the 




This chapter describes the approach and methods applied to generate the information 
required to test the hypotheses presented in Chapter I. The survey was undertaken in 
1995-96 in southern Haryana state. This survey sought to verify or deny the 
information pertaining to the region and to facilitate the data analysis concerning the 
key issues in CPR management currently in practice in this region. Survey 
methodology and the methods used for analysing the village institutions and people’s 
participation are presented.
6.1 Objectives of the Survey
The main objectives of the survey were:
(a) to identify key issues concerning CPR management;
(b) to explore the parameters helpful in institutional development;
(c) to elicit people's opinion with regards to government's attitudes, their preference
and choice of species to be planted;
(d) to explore the traditional management and indigenous knowledge on management 
of common lands;
(e) to identify the factors of socio-economic and cultural importance which influence 
the CPR management;
(f) to inquire interdependence of people in meeting their basic needs;
(g) to understand the current participatory process and to identify the issues such as,
conflict resolution, product sharing/distribution;
(h) to understand and appreciate different household level attributes concerning 
strengthening of village institutions;
(i) to explore the level of people's participation in CPR management;
(j) to evaluate the institutional performance in different case study villages.
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6.2 Survey methods
Both primary and secondary data were collected as part of the survey. Primary data 
was collected from 196 households belonging to 15 case study villages. Initially pilot 
studies were conducted across the region and it was found that the formal method of 
preparing the questionnaires and interviewing was more useful rather than informal 
meetings, which elicited little data of quantitative information. The participatory rural 
appraisal (PRA) methods can sometimes miss out valuable information and are prone 
to bias and are time consuming. PRA techniques are known at first to omit people 
such as minority groups and out castes who live on the finges of the village 
(Chambers, 97). The formal approach is less vulnerable to interviewer's bias and 
inconsistency and allows for more sophisticated statistical treatment (Gardner, 1978). 
To elicit the expert opinion government officials' were interviewed with the help of a 
well structured questionnaire.
Secondary data was collected from village panchayath records, village forest 
committee meetings minutes, revenue records maintained by the village patwari, data 
from the districts' statistical offices, central statistical organisations' records, forest 
department's records, natural resource data management systems (NRDMS), 
agricultural and livestock departments' records and Haryana Agricultural University 
records, government of India's publications, etc. Both primary and secondary data 
formed a significant attempt to seek solutions which could help in identifying many 
aspects of CPR management and to suggest further improvements in institutional 
building to manage the village common lands in a sustainable manner.
6.3 Village Selection
A project for the rehabilitation of the common lands has been in operation in the 
southern Haryana region since 1990. This entire area is divided into 5 divisions such 
as, Ferozepur Zhirka, Sohna, Rewari, Namaul and Dadri respectively. The divisions
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were further divided into 14 sub divisions from the operational point of view by the 
Forest Department. A list of the villages in each of the five divisions was obtained 
from the local Divisional Forest Office. Three villages were selected in each of the 
divisions as part of a stratified sampling procedure. Thus 15 villages were selected out 
of the total 293 villages in the case study area (Figure 6.1).
Village selection was carried out on the basis of the survival rate of the forest 
plantations. This formed the preliminary basis for the village selection. Survival rates 
of the plantations were provided by the Forest Department. These data showed a 
large variation in the survival rates of the plantations, with all other technical 
parameters, such as climatic and edaphic factors being similar for the entire area.
Since the Forest Department did not have any legal control in regulating access to 
these plantations success of the plantations was probably dependent upon some other 
socio-economic factors. The amount of ‘Social Fencing’, provided by the village 
community in preventing the cattle grazing in the plantation areas is one such potential 
factor. While survival rate of the plantations was itself a measure of success, it could 
not fully explain the successful growth of these plantations. Hence a Success Index 
(SI) was developed (see section 6.4).
Three classes of villages were identified on the basis of the Success Index of their 
forest plantations. In the first class all villages had a Success Index greater than 60%, 
in the second the Success Index varied between 30 and 60%, while in the third the 
Success Index was less than 30%. The form of management pertaining to these village 
common lands in each of the three classes was measured from information pertaining 
to the formation and management of village forest committees.
76
CHANDIGARH'
> Y AMULAN AGAft
PUNJAB Kt’RUKSHEl H
K AIT H a l
«  HiSAR
ROHTAK
n iD A |3 A D
O I
M AHEMein AG ARM * 13
t o g A  H A U L  ,1 n S P s l
RAJASTHAN
Surveyed Villages: 1. Madhogarh 2. Sonkh 3. Baroji-Gundawas 4. Rajgarh 5. Nayan 6. Bhond 7. 
Mohammadbass 8. Khol 9. Budin 10. Zerpur 11. Kotla 12. Kultazpur 13. Pachnota 14. Thekri 15. 
Bawana Gujjar
Figure 6.1: Map Showing Case Study Area in Haryana State
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6.4 Household Selection
Household selection was on the basis of the stratified random sampling with strata being 
the land holding capacity and caste. The advantage of stratified random sampling is that 
it offers the possibility of greater accuracy in comparison to either simple random or a 
systematic sample by ensuring that every group was represented in the sample. A list of 
households was prepared in each of the sample villages. A minimum of 5 percent of 
households were interviewed through the structured questionnaires (Table 6.1).









% of sampled 
households to total 
households
Baroji-Gundawa 73 4 5.47 2.04
Sonkh 157 8 5.09 4.08
Bawana Gujar 142 7 4.92 3.57
Rajgarh 439 22 5.01 11.22
Nay an 752 38 5.05 19.38
Madhogarh 360 18 5 9.18
Bhond 175 9 5.14 4.59
Mohammadbaas 100 5 5 2.55
Khol 468 24 5.12 12.24
Budin 350 18 5.14 9.18
Zerpur 200 10 5 5.10
Kotla 176 9 5.11 4.59
Kultazpur 260 13 5 6.63
Pachnota 180 9 5 4.59
Thekri 28 2 7.14 1.02
Total 3860 196 5.07 100
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Usually the head of the household, who normally takes all the decisions concerning 
the farm as well as village common land management, was chosen for the interviews. 
No explicit consideration of gender of the respondent was considered since the 
interviews were conducted on the basis of the head of the household irrespective of 
whether it was male or female. Since most households owned agricultural land, land 
holding capacity became the criteria for selection. The strata was divided into four 
classes on the basis of land holding capacity. They are large farmers (owning more 
than 4 ha), small farmers (owning more than 2 ha but less than 4 ha), marginal farmers 
(owning less than 2 ha) and land less (Table 6.2).








Baroji-Gundawas 16 32 20 5 73
Sonkh 5 45 90 17 157
Bawana Gujar 6 32 72 32 142
Rajgarh 28 0 324 87 439
Nayan 30 228 260 234 752
Madhogarh 6 26 178 150 360
Bhond 4 6 125 40 175
Mohammadbaas 2 66 20 12 100
Khol 0 327 45 96 468
Budin 5 48 215 82 350
Zerpur 6 2 166 26 200
Kotla 25 35 60 56 176
Kultazpur 0 80 102 78 260
Pachnota 15 13 112 40 180
Thekri 5 17 0 6 28
Total 153 957 1789 961 3860
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Then the number of households selected from each strata was determined 
proportional to the total number of households in the village, but not exceeding 5% of 
the total households in order to maintain this ratio equally for all the villages.
In order to capture the social dynamics of the households the next strata was the caste 
of the households. A list of all households based on caste for each of the land holding 
classes was prepared. Then the number of households selected from each caste group 
was determined in proportion to their total number with every household in each of 
the landholding classes having equal probability of selection.
The questionnaire designed for officials was used to conduct interviews of government 
officials connected with the implementation of the project in order to capture the 
expert knowledge accumulated by their experiences. In all 196 households were 
interviewed with the help of the questionnaires. The ratio of sampled households to 
total households was maintained in order to ensure equal sampling levels.
6.5 Questionnaire Preparation
Two types of formal questionnaires were designed. One for interviewing the villagers 
(Appendix 6.1) and the other for the officials of the Forest Department and other 
Departments (Appendix 6.2). The collation of these data enabled the degree of CPR 
management to be ascertained for each village. The experience and knowledge of the 
researcher concerning the area was beneficial in designing the format of the 
questionnaires. There were no problems with the questionnaires designed for the 
officials since their literacy level was quite high, but the problem was significant in 
dealing with a large number of illiterate villagers, who participated in the process. To 
avoid difficult questions and to standardise the questionnaires pilot studies were 
conducted in five villages.
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The questionnaires were tested on the site and suitable modifications were made 
before conducting the formal interviews of the villagers in case study villages. The 
formal questionnaires so prepared were used to interview villagers in the sampled 
villages at the household level. Since this is the basic unit in any village. A household 
was defined as all those who stayed, worked and ate in the same house. The 
questionnaires were designed addressing the two main issues prescribed by Converse 
and Stanley (1988). One is the presumption that the questions will generate the right 
kind of information and the other being the respondent will be able to answer the 
questions correctly. The questions were designed to be straight forward and 
unambiguous. The questions included open-ended, closed and dichotomous consisting 
of attitudinal, quantitative and qualitative information.
6.6 Development of Methods used for Institutional Analysis
This section is presented in three parts. The first concerns the determination of people’s 
participation level, while the second and third are concerned with the development and 
use of the Success Index (SI) and the Resource Condition Index (RCI), respectively. 
The development of these three parameters was essential in analysing the strengths and 
weaknesses of the common property resource management in force in the surveyed 
villages.
6.6.1 Estimation of Success Index
In order to calculate the success of plantations raised on the village common lands the 
following procedure was adopted. Sampling of the plantation sites was carried out 
keeping in mind the area of the plantation in the sample villages. Since it was 
practically impossible to find out the condition of each and every plant in the entire 
plantation it was essential to restrict the sampling intensity to achievable limits within 
the available time and the scarce resources at the disposal of the researcher. However, 
this was found that the overall results of the procedure adopted gave satisfactory 
results. Based on the extent of the area the sampling intensity was adopted (Table 6.3).
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Table 6.3: Plantation areawise Sampling Intensity
Area Sampling Intensity
Less than 10 ha. 10%
10-20 ha. 5%
Above 20 ha. 2.5%
Though this estimate did not give precise results species-wise as planting was neither 
in pure blocks nor regular mixtures, but provided a sound overall estimate of the 
quality of the plants.
The procedure for selecting the transect was:
a. The plantation map of the site was examined to see the size, shape and distribution 
of blocks.
b. Each block was sampled and a base line was laid out using the ranging rods. If the 
configuration of the block and terrain permitted the base line was laid along the 
contour line so that the sample transects were at right angles and followed the slope of 
the terrain. Alternatively, such base lines were also taken along the foot hills, ridges or 
any where in the midway.
c. The available area of the plantation was divided into transects of 5 metre width since 
it was convenient and wider than the 3x3 metre spacing of the planted seedlings. The 
length of the base line divided by 5 gave the total number of transects. If the sampling 
intensity was 10% then each sampled transect was 50 metres apart. Where as, the 
transects were 100 metres and 200 metres apart in the case of 5% and 2.5% sampling 
intensities.
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d. In order to avoid the personal bias in choosing the transect location, the position of 
the first transect number was chosen from the random numbers, selecting any number 
between 5 and 50 and subsequent ones being 50 metres apart for 10 percent sample 
size.
e. Using a compass, transect lines were set out in both directions at right angles to the 
base line. The 5 metre wide transects were marked temporarily by stretching a pair of 
ropes on either side of the offset line, checking at intervals to maintain a 5 metre 
width.
f. Plants on the transects were enumerated and recorded on a prepared worksheet 
listing the transect number and recording the type of different plants in three different 
categories, such as fully grown plants, partially browsed or damaged and dead or 
missing plants.
The survival percentage was calculated by:
Sum of the plants (fully grown + partly browsed)
Survival percentage = -----------------------------------------------------------  X 100
Total number of plants planted in the transect
The Success Index (SI) of plantations raised on the common lands is a measure of how 
successfully the plantations are being raised. In order to measure the Success Index of 
the plantations on the common lands, plants within sample plots were given different 
weights indicating their growth levels. All other technical parameters were assumed to 
be equal in all plantations since all of them fall under the same Aravalli ecosystem which 
has very little variation with respect to climatic and edaphic factors. The Success Index 
of the plantations is measured by the following equation.
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Nixl+N2x0.5+N3x0 
Success Index = __________________
N!+N2+N3
Where:
Ni is the number of plants fully grown according to their age. This includes all the plants 
which are totally unbrowsed and undamaged by cattle trampling. These plants are given 
a weighting of ‘ 1’.
N2 is the number of plants half browsed or half damaged by the cattle trampling but 
surviving. These plants are given a weighting of ‘0.5’.
N3 is the number of plants dead or missing or totally struggling to survive. These plants 
are given a weighting of ‘O’ since they will eventually fail to grow into a full grown tree. 
(Although one can eliminate N3 x 0 since it has no meaning in the equation its presence 
shows that it was also taken into consideration by eliminating the dead and missing 
plants).
The Success Index demonstrates the importance villagers place on protecting the 
plantations raised on the village common lands. If full protection is accorded by the 
villagers then this is reflected in the increased success index of the plantations.
6.6.2 Resource Condition Index (RCI)
While the Success Index of the plantations itself is a measure of success, it cannot fully 
explain the holistic resource situation in various villages because it relates only to 
plantations. Hence, a more comprehensive index, the Resource Condition Index (RCI) 
was developed to take into consideration the proportionate areas of village common
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lands under plantations and natural village forests (including pastures). The Resource 
Condition Index was calculated for each village by;
S.I. x Area Under Plantation Crown Density of Village Forests x Area Under Forests
RCI= ------------------------------------- +  x 100
Total Common Land Total Common Land
Where:
RCI = Resource Condition Index.
S.I. = Success Index of the Plantations raised on common lands.
6.6.3. People’s Participation Level
People’s participation in this joint management effort at improving the resource 
condition of the villages is crucial if any such effort is to succeed. Without involving the 
users of these resources any top down approach by the government to control the 
resource degradation is likely to fail as has happened in the past (SPWD, 1992). People's 
Participation was evaluated by using the formation and management of the Village 
Forest Committees (VFC) as an indicator. Specifically, the frequency of meetings of the 
VFC and recording of the proceedings, the actual tasks undertaken / completed by the 
VFC's, attendance in the VFC meetings and the resolution of conflicts by the VFC's
(Table 6.4, explains the procedure adopted for calculating the people’s participation 
level for Nayan village as an example). People’s participation level is used as an indicator 
in determining the success of the institutional building at the village level.
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Table 6.4: Evaluation o f People's Participation Level for Nayan Village
Item Score 
(Range 1-10) 
with 1 being the 
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The criteria adopted in calculating the people’s participation level is by assigning 
different points to different aspects. On a 1-10 scale the individual aspects listed in the 
Table 6.4 were given a score. Care was taken in assigning the scores. Records of the 
village forest committees were scrutinised with care and the perceptions of people 
towards the functioning of the VFC’s formed a useful tool in ascertaining the 
correctness of the scores. Each aspect involved in calculating the people’s participation 
level is discussed and the scoring pattern is explained below.
(Af Formation and constitution of the VFC: Presence of a democratic organisation or an 
agency, which has the legitimacy and capability to manage the village common lands for 
the benefit of local people is a fundamental aspect as far as CPR management is 
concerned. However formation alone does not provide the capacity to function 
effectively. The efficiency is dependent on a number of factors. But it is a step forward 
in creating institutional framework so as to enforce an order to an otherwise freely 
exploited resources. A weighting of 20 out of 100 points is considered as sufficient for 
this aspect. The range of the score given to it varies on different levels of the formation 
and constitution of VFC. A score of 10 out of 10 indicates that it is a well structured 
and well designed body, whose constitution is an ideal one. The constitution of the 
committee is truly representative and takes care of the interests of all the sections of the 
village community. On the other hand a score of 5 could be given if there was laxity or 
lacunae on the part of the formation and constitution of the committee. But even in this 
case there is an organisation, that can at least start functioning and that there is a scope 
for it’s improvement. If a score of 1 or 2 indicates that either the VFC was not properly 
formed or it was not constituted properly. The scoring was according to the observation 
of field circumstances, the records of the village and the frequent interactions with the 
people.
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(B) VFC meetings and the attendance in them: The frequency with which the VFC meets 
in a year and the members attending it and taking interest in its’ proceedings is very 
important for the successful functioning of the VFC. A weighting of 5 out of 100 is 
given to this aspect. Though it cannot be said that the frequent meetings alone can 
reflect participation of people in the VFC functioning, it definitely shows the interest 
generated by the activity amongst them. If the VFC met at least once a month and that 
all its’ members attended it then a score of 10 out of 10 can be given. A meeting at least 
once in a month was considered sufficient since weekly or very frequent meetings are 
not very useful. If frequent meetings are arranged the essence of having a meeting is lost. 
The lower scores indicate the lesser frequency of meetings and also the lack of interest 
of members in attending the meetings.
(Cl Maintenance of Records: It is an essential feature of a successful organisation to 
maintain the records properly. In this case it is the land records, meeting minutes, 
constitution and formation of VFC records, the plantation records, records showing 
number of violations by villagers and the cases pending in the courts, etc. If all the 
records were properly maintained then a score of 10 out of 10 can be given. If some 
records are not properly maintained then a score of 5 or so can be given. If the record 
maintenance was extremely poor then a score of 1 or 2 can be given. A weighting of 5 
out of 100 points was considered to be sufficient for this aspect.
(D! Formulation of Rules: Rules are essential for an organisation to function properly. In 
order to guide it’s day to day functioning, successful design of the rules is an essential 
feature. Rules relating to the access, exclusion and their efficacy are considered for 
giving the scores. However, a subjective judgement had to be applied in assigning a 
particular score. A score of 10 out of 10 is given for the successful design of the rules of 
access and exclusion. If they were too lax or there was scope for avoidance then a score 
of 1 or 2 was given. If any VFC was falling in between these extremes then a score of 
five or more or less was given. Since this was an essential part of the successful 
functioning of the VFC a weighting of 20 out of 100 points was given.
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(El Evolution of Product Distribution: Most conflicts in CPR management arise due to 
the incentive to free ride and reap benefits out of self interest and against the community 
interest. If a just and equitable product distribution can take place of the common land 
products, then there shall be co-operation from all corners. A score of 10 out of ten was 
considered in an ideal situation. Where as, a score of 5 was given if these were lax and if 
there were no rules then a score of 1 or 2 was given depending on the circumstances. 
The rules relating to fodder and fuelwood extraction, and distribution of the produce 
amongst the individual households was considered under this aspect. A weighting of 10 
out o f 100 was given to this, which was considered sufficient.
(FI Tasks undertaken by the VFC: It is important that there exist certain tasks or targets 
to be achieved. In the absence of any specific tasks even if there are elaborate and well 
designed rules they become meaning less. The setting up of targets by the VFC and their 
achievement was considered as an important aspect for the successful management of 
common lands. The tasks of different VFC’s set out for them were reviewed and the 
evidence of fulfilment of these tasks was evaluated and a score was given according to 
the number of the tasks and the achievement level. The range of the scores given were 
from 1-10 with one being the least and 10 being the best. Care was taken to take in to 
consideration the type of tasks and whether they were relevant or not. A weighting of 20 
out of 100 was given.
fG) Conflict Resolution: It is imperative to expect that in such a fragmented, caste 
ridden, democratic society having conflicts to use a resource held in common was quite 
normal. Through conflicts, debates and resolution the VFC’s can become mature 
organisations. The number of conflicts and their resolution level formed the basis for 
assigning the scores from 1 to 10, with 1 being the worst and 10 being the best. A 
weighting of 15 out of 100 was considered sufficient.
(H) Co-ordination between VFC and the Forest Department: In this participatory 
process co-ordination between the Forest Department and VFC is an essential feature in 
providing the frame work for the institution building. The Forest Department is also
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providing financial support in the form of undertaking the plantations on village common 
lands for the benefit of villagers with the help of the VFC. Though this co-ordination in 
the beginning is very useful but once the VFC’s become mature in taking care of their 
common lands even government’s help can be dispensed with. That is why a weighting 
of 5 out of 100 was given for this aspect.
Though calculating the people’s participation level in this way can be termed as 
subjective and prone to bias on the part of the researcher, but it is a step forward in 
quantifying the different parameters that are essential for the institutional building at the 
village level. It was not possible to include all the minute aspects but major aspects 
concerning people’s participation were included.
6.7 Limitations of the survey data
A number of villagers could not provide accurate data on what was harvested, stored, 
consumed or bought or sold. Most of the figures were approximations. Their 
estimations were based on volumes rather than in kilo grams or quintals. Almost all of 
them did not maintain any records of day to day transactions. However care was taken 
to ascertain the factual position from knowledgeable persons in the village.
6.8 Data analysis
The data was transferred on to spread sheets and analysed using the SPSS (statistical 
programme for social sciences) and Microsoft Excel 5. The statistical analysis of the 
data provided the information concerning CPR management, such as people's 
participation level, enforcement mechanism, institutional building, product sharing 
mechanism and sanctioning the rule breakers. It has also provided the information 
pertaining to the household dynamics. The primary data combined with the secondary 
data provided the information required for constructing the linear programming 
models presented in Chapter VIII. These data enabled the calculation of coefficients 
used in this models to conduct scoping studies on CPR management.
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6.9 Summary
In this chapter, the survey methodology, data collected and methods of data collection 
were presented. The data was required to test the hypotheses. The aim of the survey 
was to verify and or to deny the information concerning the region, in order to analyse 
the key issues in CPR management and household dynamics. In the next chapter 
survey results are presented with an in depth analysis of the strength of the institutional 
development at the village level. The development and use of Resource Condition 




Survey Results and Discussion
In this chapter a brief description of the participatory afforestation process and the survey 
results are presented and discussed. The results of the case study, which show clear 
benefits deriving from common property regimes, will be used to examine institutional 
development at the village level. A composite resource condition index developed in 
Chapter VI when used in conjunction with people’s participation level enables the 
determination of the strength of the village institutions in converting open-access regimes 
into common property regimes. Mechanisms and processes involved in assisting local 
people to establish common property regimes are also discussed. Important aspects of 
socio-economic and cultural factors, which influence the institutional building at village 
level are presented.
7.1 The Participatory Process: Institutional Development at the Village Level
Realising the enormity of the problem of destruction of the vegetative cover of the 
common lands in the Aravallis the Government of Haryana started a participatory 
afforestation project in 1990 for the rehabilitation of 33000 ha. under common lands. In 
order to re-establish community participation in the management of common lands by 
villagers, the Forest Department provided an institutional framework for the formation of 
village forest committees (VFC). In each village a 9-15 member VFC with the Sarpanch 
(Chairman of the Panchayath, an elected village council) as its head was constituted. The 
VFC includes the Sub-Divisional Forest Officer/Ranger and the concerned Forest Guard 
as its members from the Forest Department. The rest of the members come from the 
village community with at least 3 being women. Adequate participation of the members 
of the scheduled castes was also provided at the time of the constitution of the VFC. The 
VFC functions as an executive committee of the village Panchayath. All other villagers in 
the village are the general members of the VFC. VFC's meet as frequently as necessary
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for the purpose of taking decisions on the use of village common lands and distribution of 
the produce from the village common lands.
Through a participatory rural appraisal process taking due consideration of the villagers' 
expectations and choice of species, an agreement is signed between the Panchayath and 
the Forest Department for handing over a part of the village common land for the 
purposes of tree planting and seeding of grasses and legumes. The villagers agree not to 
graze livestock in the afforested village common lands until the trees become mature. In 
the mean time, villagers are encouraged to cut and carry the grasses and legumes to stall 
feed their cattle from the areas under plantations. The Forest Department, after three 
years of maintenance, will handover the land to the VFC for further maintenance and 
management.
The labour required for plantation activities is drawn from unemployed labourers of the 
village. In the meantime, all efforts are made by the Forest Department to train the VFC 
and the villagers in all aspects that require a smooth functioning of the VFC and taking 
over the management of the village common lands. The VFC functions as an executive 
committee of the Village Panchayath: an elected body of the village. All other villagers in 
the village are the general members of the VFC. The VFC meets at least 4 to 12 times 
each year or as frequently as necessary for the purpose of taking the decisions on the use 
of the village common lands and the distribution of the produce from the village common 
lands. The VFC members are in constant contact with the villagers and the Forest 
Department. Figure 7.1 shows the importance of this joint management effort to replace 
open-access system by a community controlled common property resource management 
(also see photos presented in Appendix-7.1).
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Figure 7.1: Participatory Process (Coming together of Forest Department and the 
Villagers resulting in a regulated access management system).
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Incentive Scheme
In order to motivate and to strengthen the participatory process the Forest Dept, has 
provided a scheme of incentives for those villages whose plantations are very well looked 
after by the villagers and reach a success index of 60. The villages that qualify are given a 
cash incentive of Rs. 250 per ha. at the end of the first year, Rs. 200 per ha. at the end of 
second year and Rs. 150 per ha. at the end of the third year. The VTC's are encouraged 
to make use of these funds for establishing a sewing centre, which trains other villagers in 
sewing activities or a drinking water facility for the village or a school building or a fish 
farm. There has been much discussion in the VFC's on usage of incentive money. This 
induced motivation through incentives has made it possible for the establishment of a 
successful community regulated access system in place of an open-access system.
Components of a typical village ecosystem of southern Haryana are presented in Figure
7.2, which shows the interdependence of the people and their interactions within the 
society and with their common property as well as private property resources .
Interactions between the people and their natural resources are typical of any village 
ecosystem in India. People depend extensively on their natural resources for their 
sustenance. This is more so in the semi-arid regions of the country. Dependence on 
common lands for grazing, fuelwood and fodder is essential for the day to day basic 


































Figure 7.2: Typical Village Ecosystem of Southern Haryana
7.2 Survey Results and Discussion
7.2.1 Composition of Households
83.2 percent (163 households) of the sample were Hindus, whereas, 16.8 percent 
households (33) were Muslim households in the surveyed villages. The Meo community 
belongs to the Muslim religion. They inhabit the Mewat region of Gurgaon and Faridabad 
Districts. Meos were notified as criminal tribes by the then British Indian Government for 
their habit of plundering the cities and hiding in the Aravalli hills. After the independence 
the Indian Government de-notified them as criminal tribes and helped them to overcome
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their poverty by setting up a special development agency called the Mewat Development 
Agency (MDA).
Population figures for both human and livestock are given in Table 7.1.
Table 7.1 Population numbers of both human and livestock in surveyed villages.
Village Total
Population
Buffaloes Bullocks Cows Goat/Sheep Camel
Baroji-Gundawas 610 151 0 71 75 0
Sonkh 620 148 0 75 575 0
Bawana Gujar 1209 300 0 50 2000 2
Rajgarh 2956 205 18 50 175 28
Nayan 3533 1000 40 361 3600 161
Madhogarh 2550 250 0 56 904 60
Bhond 1800 400 0 150 1100 0
Mohammadbaas 1000 200 0 25 150 0
Khol 5325 245 0 150 230 35
Budin 2750 250 0 100 1500 100
Zerpur 1500 250 0 40 500 60
Kotla 1100 100 25 200 2300 8
Kultazpur 2300 250 0 50 2300 15
Pachnota 1400 150 50 70 3500 30
Thekri 380 70 0 45 150 50
Source: Census of India (human population) 1991 and Livestock Census, 1987. 
Government of India.
In the rest of the case study area almost all the villages are inhabited by the Hindus only. 
The Hindu religion comprises various castes (Table 7.2). Caste is also a major issue as far 
as management of common lands are concerned. It was found that a majority of Gujjar
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dominated villages do not prefer to have any sort of regulation of access to common 
lands. Basically this community was a nomadic cattle rearing community, but now a 
settled one. Still pastoralism is a common practice amongst them. Even though they see 
reason in community regulated access management they would still prefer to have no 
regulation at all. As such they do not oppose planting a part of the village common lands, 
but are not interested in the protection of these plantations.
Table 7.2: Caste wise composition of Households amongst the Hindus












Amongst the surveyed households 136 (69.4 percent) were headed by males and 60 (30.6 
percent) were headed by female households.
7.2.2 Education Level
A majority of individuals surveyed were illiterate (85 households). This shows the 
backwardness of these villages in terms of the human resource. Even amongst those 
reaching up to primary level there were huge drop outs by the time they reached high
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school level (Figure 7.3). Hardly any body could reach the graduate level. Education level 
was not an impediment in establishing the common property institutions. This can be 
clearly seen from the level of RCI in the surveyed villages. RCI was less in some of the 
better educated villages compared to the villages having large number of illiterates. 
People see reason in coming together in order to take care of the common lands 
management.
Figure 7.3: Education level amongst the surveyed households.
7.2.3 Village level attributes
The ownership of land is classified as two types. They are private lands comprising farms 
and panchayath lands comprising village common lands (Table 7.3). The extent of 
common lands and its ratio to total land varies from village to village. The common lands 
meet the fuel and fodder requirements of most of the villages.
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Table 7.3: Extent of Common land, Farm Land and the ratio of Common lands in the 
case study villages.
Village Cultivated Common Total Ratio of Common Land to
(PR)in ha. Land in ha. Land Total Land in Percentages
Baroji-Gundawa 81 455 536 84.88
Sonkh 147 64 211 30.33
Bawana Gujar 238 200 438 45.66
Rajgarh 507 231 738 31.30
Nayan 936 836 1772 47.17
Madhogarh 760 479 1239 38.66
Bhond 593 147 740 19.86
Mohammadbaas 150 100 250 40.00
Khol 745 586 1331 44.02
Budin 541 325 866 37.52
Zerpur 874 159 1033 15.39
Kotla 656 563 1219 46.18
Kultazpur 500 80 580 13.79
Pachnota 800 500 1300 38.46
Thekri 60 122 182 67.03
It was observed from the survey that large farmers (owning more than 4 ha.) were less 
dependent on common lands for their fodder requirements than small farmers (2 ha. to <4 
ha.), marginal farmers (<2 ha.) and landless. As the land holding level increased 
dependency on common lands decreased.
With regards to fodder utilisation from various sources by different households it was 
found that the requirements of the fodder by the livestock according to the standard 
feeding schedules were not being fulfilled. A huge gap in the supply exists especially for 
the small, marginal and landless households (Figure 7.4). Average requirements of fodder
100
per household was 35.75 tonnes, 33.105 tonnes, 31.575 tonnes and 22.51 tonnes by the 
large farmer, small farmer, marginal farmer and landless households respectively.
Fodder (in tonnes)
I I  Gap
□  Total Requirement
□  Purchased 
■  Farm lands
E3 Common lands
Figure 7.4: Utilisation of fodder from different sources by different households and 
fodder demand and supply.
A simple linear regression analysis (Figure 7.5) was conducted using land holding level 
and the level of income of the households. It suggested a significant relationship between 
the two. As the land holding level increased income of the households increased 
substantially (R2 = 0.80, P <0.0001, n = 147). Landless households were excluded from 
the analysis.
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Figure 7.5 Regression Line Fit Plot between, Income of the Household and Land Holding
Rainfall in the case study area dictated the production levels of different agricultural 
crops. Rain fall levels are greater towards the East compared to the West (figure 7.6). 
Low levels of precipitation combined with extensive usage of underground water is 
resulting in lowering of groundwater levels. Extensive usage of ground water for 
irrigating the agricultural crops also turned many fresh water reserves into brackish 
waters. Pumping of these brackish waters to irrigate agricultural crops is reducing the 
productivity levels of the cultivated land and impairing the soils permanently.
Figure 7.6: Average annual rainfall (in mm) in surveyed villages
Women were primarily engaged in fuelwood collection. Households were categorised 
into 3 groups according to income [High Income Strata (HIS) annual income of more 
than 27,500 Rupees, Middle Income Strata (MIS) annual income of 11000 to 27500 
Rupees) and Below Poverty Line (BPL) annual income of less than Rs. 11000], All 
economic groups showed a substantial dependency on common lands for fuelwood 
collection. Compared with the High Income Strata and the Middle Income Strata, those 
who live under the poverty line were more dependent (84.7%) on common lands for their 
fuel requirements (Figure 7.7). The minimum distance required for fuelwood collection
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Figure 7.7: The percentage of households in each of three income groups (high income, 
middle income and below poverty line) who made some use of common lands and private 
lands as a source of fuelwood.
A large proportion of positive responses to CPR's were recorded. These are essential if a 
common property regime is to replace an open-access regime. There was a high level of 
awareness of the commonly agreed restrictions and their enforcement by the 
VFC/Panchayath. 97 percent of villagers were willing to accept the take over of the 
management of their common lands by the VFC/Panchayath once the Forest Department 
had handed-over the plantations at the end of the three years of maintenance.
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Table 7.4. Percentage of responses which were positive in respect of selected indicators 
of attitudes to common property resource management regimes
Indicators Percentage of Responses
Awareness of Village Forest Committee 83
Willingness to protect the plantations 94
Awareness about Commonly Agreed Restrictions wit 76
regards to entry into the common lands
Awareness about the Publicity & Extension efforts of 95
the Forest Dept.
Friendly attitude of Forest Dept, staff as perceived b 98
villagers
Villagers perception about the future management of 97
the common lands by the VFC/Panchayath
7.2.4 Household level attributes
53.6 percent households (105) reported that the agricultural production from their farm 
lands met their consumption requirements and part of the produce which was surplus to 
their requirements was sold in the market at the support prices announced by the 
government or even at a higher price. 20.9 percent households (41) felt that agricultural 
production from their farms was just sufficient to meet the household needs, where as 3.1 
percent households (6) felt that the agricultural production from their farms was 
insufficient to meet their demand. 22.4 percent households (44) did not own any farm 
land (landless households) and hence they had to depend upon market purchases for their 
food consumption.
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52 percent of the households (102) were owners of the farm lands, while 3.6 percent 
households (7) were tenants and 21.9 percent households (43) were owners as well as 
tenants.
63 percent households did not own any goats. 24.5 percent households owned 3 or less 
goats. Those, who owned and reared goats in large numbers were mainly landless people. 
Goat rearing was considered to be very beneficial by them because of the benefits such a 
such system provided. The goat owners take them to the common lands for free grazing. 
Since they have to incur no feed costs they can reap greater benefits from the sale of 
goats for meat in the market. According to a study conducted by the Tata Energy 
Research Institute, Delhi (1994) it was found that the return on investment in free grazing 
scenario was 348 percent on investment in 10 years.
75.5 percent households (148) felt that the government should rehabilitate the degraded 
village common lands by carrying out tree plantations on village common lands since they 
did not have adequate resources to arrest the degradation of village common lands. 20.9 
percent households (41) felt that the VFC's were in a better position to undertake 
planting and protection of trees provided the Forest Department trains them in technical 
aspects and finances the plantation costs. 3.6 percent households (7) were indifferent.
Even though a large number of households were aware of the VFC’s they failed to 
distinguish between the two in terms of management of village common lands. Since it 
was a joint management effort some even felt that it was the VFC and the Forest 
Department who were responsible for managing the village common lands (Table 7.5).
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Table 7.5: Agency wise responses for managing the common lands amongst the surveyed 
households.
Agency Number of Households 
Responded
Percentage of total 
households
Village Forest Committee 104 53.1
Gram Panchayath 17 8.7
Forest Department 21 10.7
VFC and FD 16 8.2
VFC and Panchayath 36 18.4
Don’t know 2 1
A majority of the households (76 percent) felt that they did not think of having a sharing 
mechanism for distribution of the produce from the village common lands. While 37 
percent felt that they were yet to decide on the strategy for distribution of produce but 
were hopeful that given the co-operative mood of the villagers and the interest shown in 
VFC meetings would lead them to a proper and just distribution of produce amongst the 
households.
34.2 percent of the households had an annual income of less than Rs. 11000. Incidentally 
this category of people were below the poverty line prescribed by the Government of 
India, Planning Commission. 58.7 percent households had an annual income of Rs. 11000 
to 27500. 7.1 percent of the households reported an income of more than Rs. 27500. 
Most of the households in this category owned more than 4 hectares of land.
There appeared to have been an excellent co-operation between the villagers and the 
officials of the Forest Department. Almost 95 percent of the households were in touch 
with the officials of the Forest Department (Forest Guard, Deputy Ranger/Forest Ranger 
and Sub-Divisional Officer). Only 5 percent of the households reported that they never 
communicated with the officials of the Forest Department.
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39.5 percent of the land holding households(60) felt that their farm was fully productive 
where as, 60.5 percent (46.9) felt that it was less productive. Those, who felt that their 
lands were fully productive had irrigation facility while the rest of the households cited 
lack of irrigation as the main reason for low productivity of their farm lands.
88 percent of the households (173) felt that the marketing facilities for forest produce 
were inadequate where as the rest felt that they were adequate.
7.2.5. Re-investment of the proceeds from the final harvest of plantations
91.8 percent households (180) were ready to re-invest part of the proceeds from the 
current plantation final harvests for undertaking plantations on a recurrent basis so that 
they continue to get benefits from the plantations. Only 16 households, representing 8.2 
percent were categorical in saying 'no' to this proposition. A majority of such cases came 
from the villages, which had lower level of peoples’ participation. This sort of attitude is 
quite remarkable since this shows that continuity of plantations on the common lands and 
plantation maintenance under common property can be assured so that resources 
continue to be available in future. This opinion comes from almost all the villages.
Those, who were willing to reinvest part of the proceeds from the final harvest stated that 
the preferable agency for undertaking tree plantations on common lands was the Forest 
Department (Table 7.6). This expression of preference in favour of Forest Department 
for executing tree plantations is some what disturbing and shows that either the villagers 
do not have adequate knowledge of undertaking plantations or they are interested to 
leave it to the agency, which specialises in such activity.
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Table 7.6: Agency wise Households’ preference for undertaking afforestation




Forest Department 120 66.7
VFC & Forest Department both 21 11.7
VFC & Panchayath 3 1.7
Panchayath & Forest Department 5 2.8
Total 180 100
Most of the people do not procure any small timber from the village common lands any 
more, where as in the past they used to get this timber from them. The reason given for 
changing their behaviour was that the common lands were so degraded that only small 
trees were left on these lands, and these only fit to be fuel wood for cooking purposes 
rather than of any timber value.
194 households felt that tree planting was good and that it created assets for the village 
community, where as only two individuals opposed it. Those opposed did not give any 
specific reasons. Since their number was quite small (1%) it did not matter on the over all 
situation. Nevertheless, the entire community across the case study area felt that it was 
good to plant trees. This realisation was a very positive one if proper CPR management 
were to be established.
185 households (94.4 percent) felt that the tree planting was linked to religious 
sentiments. The interesting fact is that even amongst the Muslim community many felt 
that it was linked to religion. The negative responses came from only 5.6 percent 
households, who are resident in those villages which have very low level of people's 
participation.
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Planting trees on farm lands was considered as an income generating activity by 3.1 
percent (6 households) of the households. Whereas 68.4 percent households (134) 
expressed that it would meet the household needs of fuelwood, small timber and timber, 
while the rest of the households did not express anything. 140 households (71.4 percent) 
had at least some trees planted, or naturally regenerating on their farm lands. Tree density 
was found to be 6 to 13 trees per hectare of farm land. This ratio was greater in the 
western districts of Bhiwani, Rewari and Mohindergarh. In these districts, Jand (Prosopis 
cineraria) trees grow naturally, a characteristic feature of desert areas. Jand is a 
multipurpose tree, whose every part is used by humans or their livestock. The other most 
important tree was Keekar (Acacia nilotica). Which, was a valuable fuelwood tree 
besides being a good source of fodder for goats. Many people use it as a small timber for 
agricultural implements and some use it as a source of timber. However, most people 
were not interested in planting this species since it depletes nutrients very fast and does 
not allow growing of agricultural crops under it's shadow.
A majority of 151 households representing 77 percent of the surveyed households 
responded that the afforestation of village common lands should be done by the Forest 
Department. This also indicates the continued dependence on the Forest Department. 
Many felt that the lack of training to raise seedlings and establishing the plantations were 
the reasons for preferring FD to plant trees. While some others felt that political 
differences amongst the villagers made them prefer FD.
Choice of the species for planting stemmed from the need for meeting their basic needs. 
Mostly endemic species were preferred. In order of preference these were, Zyziphus 
mauritiana, Acacia leaucophloea, Cassia siamea, Cordia myxa, Holoptelia integrifolia, 
Ailanthus excelsa, Bamboo, Butea monosperma, Acacia Senegal, Anogeissus pendula 
and Dalbergia sissoo were preferred respectively. Where as, Prosopis juliflora, was the 
least preferred.
176 households (89.79 percent) responded that the conflict resolution was taken care of 
by the VFC and the panchayath together. Where as, the rest said it was the Forest
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Department that was responsible for conflict resolution. Issues of conflict could not be 
identified in clear cut terms. Responses varied from household to household. Many even 
responded that there were no conflicts at all. Some felt that the conflicts were of political 
in nature. Many (177 households) were willing to co-operate with the VFC for enforcing 
the commonly agreed restrictions and help it in the management of common lands (Table. 
7.7).
Table 7.7: Reasons for co-operation with the VFC amongst the responded households
Reasons for co-operation Number of households responded percentage
I like co-ordinated management 116 59.2
I was motivated by the panchayath 7 3.6
Degradation under open-access 49 25
VFC and FD's publicity efforts 2 1
I will get employment 3 1.5
I cannot say 19 9.7
7.2.6 Perceptions of officials about the participatory development of common 
lands
The current participatory development of common lands involves the Forest 
Department officials and the villagers. In order to capture the expert knowledge 
accumulated through their experiences interviews of the Forest Department personnel 
were conducted. Some officials of the Animal Husbandry Department, the Revenue 
Department and the Agriculture Department were also interviewed. In all 42 officials 
at various hierarchical level were interviewed. Out of this 10 officials belonged to the 
Animal Husbandry, Revenue and Agriculture Departments, the rest were from the 
Forest Department.
I l l
A large number of officials (88%) were enthusiastic about the success of the current 
participatory process. While, the rest apprehended that the political differences 
existing at various levels in the village were sufficient to destabilise any institutional 
development. Caste factor was suggested as another impediment to proper 
institutional building at the village level. Caste, political differences, weak 
panchayaths, poverty and illiteracy were suggested as the major reason for the 
degradation of village common lands. Almost all of them were concerned about the 
degradation of common lands. 78% believed that the participatory process would 
empower the village communities and encourage the VFC’s to acquire sufficient 
skills in managing the village common lands.
92% officials felt that the training programmes meant for the village communities 
would result in a dynamic local institutions that would take care of their natural 
resources. 47% officials felt that the distribution of produce would be a bigger 
problem when the current plantations would come to maturity at the end of their 
rotation period, while the rest felt that by that time the VFC’s would be mature 
enough in handling even the distribution problems as well. 95% officials suggested 
that rewarding the lower staff for their good work was essential for improving their 
performance and involvement in enlisting peoples’ participation. They felt that the 
Forest Guards and Foresters who do good work in a particular village should be 
suitably rewarded in order to encourage others. Table 7.8 shows the contributory 
factors for the success of the participatory process.
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Table 7.8: Officials responses for various contributory factors for the success of the 
current participatory process.
Item Low Medium High
Villagers are enterprising/rational 2 16 24
Villagers are co-operative 10 4 28
Sincere, receptive and well trained staff 5 15 22
Villagers get employment 0 20 22
Villagers get additional income 0 5 37
Presence of active panchayath 3 11 28
Availability of land for plantations 9 20 13
Involvement of women 7 12 23
7.3 CPR Management and Institutional Analysis
The analysis focuses on the effect of institutional mechanisms with respect to 
enforcement. Successful management of the common lands depends on agreed rules that 
can solve the appropriation and provision problems related to the use of the common 
lands. The most important rules are, who can use the village common lands?, how much 
and what type of products can be extracted and the conditions of such resource 
extraction? and the rules relating to enforcement. The creation and enforcement of these 
rules is the most important aspect of common property resource management. If these 
rules are too lax or overly restrictive, the capability of the resource to continue generating 
resource units is threatened. If too restrictive, users may be forced to violate prescribed 
rules due to their extreme need for products from the common lands. Behaviour in 
violation of prescribed institutional rules creates higher order CPR dilemmas that require 
a solution to problems associated with monitoring and sanctioning. The costs of 
monitoring and enforcing rules that are not perceived as equitable are higher than 
enforcing rules that participants consider to be equitable. In addition, failure to sanction 
rule violators, or mistakenly sanctioning those who did not violate the rules, encourages
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further rule violations or promotes resentment among users against existing institutions. 
The analysis of fifteen villages common lands shows that the success and failure of the 
institutions that manage the village common lands is crucial for the improvements in 
resource conditions.
7.3.1 Functioning of VFC’s
VFC’s day to day functioning is conducted by rules and regulations, which the VFC has 
designed with the help of the Forest Department. In most instances the Village Forest 
Committee (VFC) elected by the villagers designed the rules. In others, they were aided 
by the Forest Department officials. Since all the study villages are situated in the same 
state of Haryana and in the same Aravalli ecosystem, their resource management 
institutions have been subject to the same administrative and bureaucratic regulations. 
Government regulations are not responsible for variations among the study villages. The 
variation in the resource conditions of the three sets of the villages can be explained best 
by examining the rules for using the resource, monitoring the use and sanctioning of rule 
violators.
There are mainly two types of products which most of the village common lands provide 
for the day to day sustenance of the villagers. They are, fuelwood and fodder. The fodder 
regulations permit the removal of fodder from the village common lands. They also 
indicate the extent of removal, the manner in which fodder can be extracted, and the 
obligations users must fulfil to remain beneficiaries. Cattle and livestock cannot graze in 
the common lands where the young plantations are growing. Villagers can harvest only 
for a duration of three months following first monsoonal rains. While extracting leaf 
fodder from the trees villagers must leave 75% of the leaves to remain on the tree. In 
different villages different procedures are adopted for the removal of fodder and 
fuelwood.
In almost all the villages, villagers have equal rights without regard to their contribution 
in maintaining the upkeep of common lands. In most cases, institutional rules not only
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specify who has the right and how the right can be used but they also state as to how 
much of the resource can be extracted. Fodder and fuelwood from the village common 
lands constitute a renewable resource. In order to ensure regular supplies of both fodder 
and fuelwood and the continued health of the village common land, it is therefore 
essential to match the extraction levels to regeneration. Villagers are assigned as to how 
many bundles of grass can be cut from the common lands. The plantation watchers 
(guards appointed by the VFC) maintain a strict vigil over violators of the commonly 
agreed restrictions and report violations to the VFC or panchayath. There are villages 
where the panchayaths or the VFC’s have not designed any rules relating to fodder or 
fuelwood extraction from the common lands. Fodder and the fuelwood removal from the 
village common lands by villagers is measured by the no. of headloads. Each headload 
usually varies from 25-30 Kg. in weight. The regulations for the fuelwood collection 
indicate that villagers can extract only the dead, dry, deceased and fallen trees but not the 
green trees or trees with smaller girth. Certain types of trees cannot be extracted at any 
cost owing to religious purposes or other reasons (for example the Pipal tree, which is 
worshipped by most of the Hindus and Buddhists as sacred tree and the trees present in 
sacred groves*).
From the above it can be inferred that there are cases of successful design of rules and 
regulations amongst the VFC’s to use resources and to use them sustainably and 
equitably. Some of the VFC’s have succeeded in the design of rules that limit extraction 
of fodder and fuelwood and the distribution of the produce on an equitable basis among 
the villagers. In three of the villages surveyed the panchayaths or the VFC’s failed to 
create rules that would promote sustainability and equity. The next most important issue 
in CPR management is monitoring in order to ensure the compliance of the rules designed 
by the VFC.
Sacred Groves are the tree groves present around the Hindu temples.
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7.3.2. Monitoring
In most of the surveyed villages, rule violations occurred frequently (Table 7.9). In the 
three villages that maintained detailed records, minor violations occurred almost 
everyday.
Table 7.9: Village wise number of violations and cases compounded and cases pending 
in the courts
Village No. of Violations Compounded by the No. of cases in
VFC/Panchayath the court
Madhogarh 7 7 0
Sonkh 12 9 3
Thekri 12 12 0
Kultazpur 14 14 0
Mohammadbaas 15 11 4
Baroji-Gundawa 22 22 0
Rajgarh 23 23 0
Zerpur 38 4 1
Pachnota 79 12 5
Khol 85 37 14
Budin 95 13 0
Bhond 117 10 2
Kotla 148 33 16
Nayan 169 34 11
Bawana Gujjar 263 41 0
To detect all the violations monitoring mechanisms have to be in place. But it is a 
prohibitively expensive proposition to undertake policing the common lands. It is 
important to understand that a resource system need not deteriorate, however, if the
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violations are minor and a significant proportion of violators are discovered and 
penalised. The exact frequency of rule violations and the probability of detection 
depended upon the benefits from breaking the rules, the effectiveness of monitoring, the 
costs of getting caught and the cost of monitoring. Therefore, it is only when rules are 
not enforced or monitored and violations not sanctioned that formal rules become 
meaningless.
In some of the villages panchayaths and the VFC’s took great pains to monitor both the 
violators as well as those guards who are appointed to monitor the violations and spent 
efforts to minimise the resource abuse by the violators. This has kept the number of 
violations to a minimum. But such villages spent substantive amounts of money in 
monitoring and sanctioning. They attempted to improve the efficiency of monitoring, 
increased the hours spent on monitoring, and tried to improve the sanctioning mechanism 
so as to deter people from violating the commonly agreed restrictions.
7.3.3. Sanctioning and Arbitration
In all the successfully operating villages, VFC’s have designed the sanctioning mechanism 
for sanctioning violators of the commonly agreed restrictions. The VFC’s employ a 
variety of mechanisms to increase the effectiveness of the sanctions they have imposed. 
They ask the offenders to render written apologies, confiscate cutting implements, ban 
further usage rights in the village common lands, impose fines, report the violations to the 
Forest Department officials, and sometimes seek redress in the courts. The sanctions they 
impose depend upon a number of factors, such as the severity and nature of the offence, 
whether the person is a known trouble maker and the attitude of the violator towards the 
authority of the VFC. In some extreme cases, the panchayaths and the VFC’s have 
decided to expel and excommunicate or socially boycott the most serious violators 
although this extreme step has not yet been resorted to. In many cases even the 
panchayaths excuse repeat violators from paying fines imposed on them, if the offender is 
willing to tender a written apology. Such an apology reinforces the authority of the 
panchayath/VFC to manage the village common lands and to punish other violators.
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Most of the panchayaths also act as arbiters over disagreements that arise about the 
imposition of sanctions on violators. In this capacity they often reduce or excuse fines, 
resolve disputes between village users and the guards monitoring them. Even though the 
panchayaths and the VFC’s have no formal powers to punish violators most people 
respect their sanctions rather than pursuing the cases in the courts of law since it is an 
expensive proposition. Unless the user, who violated rules is influential and wealthy, he 
or she will find it worthwhile to pay the small fine rather than go to the court. From the 
analysis of the amount of expenditure spent on monitoring and sanctioning it was 
observed that the panchayaths that spent more efforts and funds in monitoring and 
enforcing the commonly agreed restrictions have succeeded in strengthening the resource 
management situation in their villages.
Discussions with VFC’s and villagers revealed wider differences between VFC’s, not 
only in homogeneity of caste but also in their general attitudes towards the poorer 
sections of the community. Their perceptions also differ from village to village on other 
issues such as women participation. In some cases, for e.g., Khol, the VFC is dominated 
by richer members of the community who showed no interest in improving the lot of the 
landless and of the women who used the common lands. The landless and poor comprise 
a third of the village population on an average. They are more dependent on the common 
lands for meeting their fodder and fuel requirements. In contrast, richer sections of the 
society meet most of their needs from their own farm lands. It was observed during the 
survey, that no access to village common lands was normally permitted in the plantation 
areas. This has also put hardships to the landless and other poorer sections of the society.
There has been no difficulty in sharing grass fodder which all VFC’s allow to be cut and 
carried freely. This was much appreciated by the women grass collectors. Difficulties may 
arise with the yields of fuelwood, poles and timber as the plantations grow towards 
maturity. It was observed during the survey that most of the VFC’s were unanimous in 
dealing with the produce from the final harvest. It was an established custom to auction 
the produce and use the proceeds for general community works. This process benefits the
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village rich and the poor alike, and puts the landless and poor at a disadvantage and may 
eventually alienate them from the management of the common lands.
The resource base of the fragile Aravalli ecosystem is vulnerable to rapid degradation and 
has a low regenerative capacity. The land is much less productive than the lands in the 
irrigated plains (Srivastava et al, 1994). Mainly these lands can generate fodder, 
fuelwood, medicinal plants and some raw materials for handicrafts etc. With proper 
protection and improvements in resource situation the availability of munj grass 
(Saccharum munja) and the leaves of Dhak (Butea monosperma) will increase. Munj 
grass is used for making cane furniture and Dhak leaves are used for making leaf plates. 
Development of such small scale industries could provide more employment and 
additional income to the poorer sections of the society.
In the next sections the use of Success Index and Resource Condition Index is attempted 
in order to evaluate the institutional success in managing the common lands and 
replacement of open-access regime by the common property regime.
7.4. Success Index and People’s Participation
There was a strong correlation (+0.89, n=15) between the people's participation level and 
the Success Index of plantations raised on the common lands (Figure 7.8), and this is 
discussed further for each of these success categories.
119
 >
Villages From Open Access to Common Property
Figure 7.8: Relationship Between Success Index and People's Participation for each 
village.
7.4.1. Villages falling between 0-30 percent Success Index(Open-access)
The lowest level of people's participation was seen in Bawana Gujjar village, which had a 
majority of the population (80%) belonging to the Gujjar community (now settled but 
previously a nomadic cattle rearing community) (Table 7.10). This was primarily on 
account of their unwillingness to impose any restriction on their entry into the village 
common lands. In some other villages it was observed that the lowest level of people's 
participation was due to the fact that there were severe political differences amongst the 
residents of the village with regards to regulated access to the village common lands. 
69% of the respondents in this category believed that the situation would be better if the 
government took over the management of the common lands forever and imposed stiff
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penalties on violators as they believed that it would not be possible for them to manage 
on their own.
Table 7.10: Villages Falling Between 0-30 Percent Success Index (Open-Access)
Name of the Village Level of People's 
Participation
Success Index of 
Plantations





7.4.2. Villages falling between 31-60 percent Success Index (In between Open-access 
and Common Property)
In this category a transition stage from open-access to common property could be 
observed with the success index of the plantations increasing in proportion to the level of 
people's participation (Table 7.11). In some villages this proposition was slightly at 
variance with the rest. Even though there was a high level of people's participation, the 
success index of plantations is not rising proportionately on account of illegal grazing by 
the villagers of the bordering Rajasthan state.
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Table 7.11: Villages Falling Between 31-60 Percent Success Index
(In between Open-Access and Common Property)
Name of the Village Level of People's 
Participation




Baroji Gundawas-Gaber 77 54
Nayan 66 59
Jerpur 52 58
7.4.3 Villages falling above 60 percent Success Index (Common Property)
In this category establishment of proper common property institutions could be observed 
in villages which had a high level of people's participation (7.12). This was reflected in 
high levels of the Success Index of the plantations. In some villages people had come 
together to establish truly participatory common property institutions since most of the 
villagers were convinced that resource abuse in the past was the result of lowering 
agricultural production, resulting from the depletion of the underground water table. 
They had even decided to expel and excommunicate violators of the commonly agreed 
restrictions on the access to village common lands. In response to a suggestion made by 
the Forest Department to the VFC's, villagers in a Muslim dominated village 
(Mohammadbass) had sold their native goats and replaced them with less problematic 
Berberi goats. Berberi goats are stall fed and do not climb hills and browse trees.
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Table 7.12: Villages Falling Above 60 Percent Success Index
(Successful Common Property)
Name of the Village Level of People's 
Participation







7.5 Resource Condition Index and Enforcement
It was found that the Resource Condition Index was directly proportional to the number 
of violations committed by the villagers (Figure 7.9). As the number of violations per 
thousand population increased the RCI was decreasing substantially. There was a 
negative correlation (-0.489, n=15) between number of violations recorded and the 
resource condition index, which indicates that the villages that have maintained a strict 
vigilance over rule breakers have succeeded in improving the resource condition of the 
villages. This explains the extent of the efficacy of the management of village common 
lands in these villages. In order to arrest the degradation and improve the RCI in these 
villages stricter enforcement of entry and access to the common lands has to be ensured.
In Bawana Gujjar highest number of violations per thousand population (217) were 
recorded. Due to lack of proper sanctioning mechanism these violations continue to be 
committed. More over, it has something to do with the cultural factors as well. This 
village is predominantly inhabited by the Gujjar community, who are opposed to any 
retractions and interested in free access to common lands. On the other hand villages that 
had less number of violations committed reported an excellent resource condition index.
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Figure 7.9: RCI and number of violations committed per thousand population.
The proportion of panchayath expenditure spent on enforcement (monitoring, sanctioning 
and arbitration) appeared to have a significant relationship with RCI (linear regression, R 
= 0.917, P < 0.0001, n = 13) (Figure 7.10). Two villages, which did not maintain records 
of expenditure were excluded from the regression analysis. This statistical evidence 
suggests that there is a strong positive relationship between the proportion of resources 
committed to and the success in maintaining common property resources.
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y =0.5312x + 13.337 
R2 = 0.917
Percentage of Expenditure on Enforcement
♦  Resource Condition Index
Figure 7.10: Regression - Line Fit Plot Between Percentage of Expenditure on 
Enforcement and RCI.
The level of people’s participation was also significantly related to RCI (R2 = 0.474, 
P=0.0045, n = 15) but the fit was less good than for panchayath expenditure on 
enforcement. In some of the villages even though there was a high level of people’s 
participation, the RCI did not rise substantially owing to illegal grazing by the villagers of 
neighbouring Rajasthan state (Figure 7.11). This implies that without effective ‘Policing’ 
of common land by committing resources, participation itself is unlikely to guarantee 
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Figure 7.11: Regression Line-Fit Plot between RCI and People’s Participation Level
Multiple regression of percentage of expenditure on enforcement and people’s 
participation on RCI was carried out but the coefficient for people’s participation was not 
significant. The best relationship remains the simple linear regression of percentage of 
expenditure on enforcement on RCI as described above.
Although RCI appeared to be dependent on percentage of expenditure on enforcement 
and people’s participation level, the possibility exists that RCI may also be related to 
other variables. In order to explore other potential relationships simple linear regression 
analysis was repeated between RCI and population density of the village, livestock 
numbers, ratio of common land to total land of the village and rainfall as the independent 
variables. As can be seen from Figure. 7.12, none of these variables explained a 
significant amount of variation in RCI.
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Ratio of Common Land/Total land 
(in ha.) Rainfall (mm)
(a) (b)




Figure 7.12: Regression Line-Fit Plots between RCI and
a) Ratio of common land/total land (y = - 0.48.012x + 57.247, R2 = 0.34)
b) Rainfall (y = - 0.0236x + 49.03, R2 = 0.03)
c) Population / hectare (y = 7.492x + 18.22, R2= 0.28)
d) Livestock numbers (y= 0.0006x + 36.71, R2 = <0.001)
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This clearly indicates that those villages that have committed substantial resources to 
enforcement are more likely to achieve high quality common property.
Common property provides adequate protection to the natural resource base of the 
village communities and ensures that the open-access situation can be reversed provided 
that there is adequate participatory planning and implementation on the part of the village 
communities. Money on protection is more important. Many villages in which a total 
open-access policy on natural resources could be seen until the recent past are fast 
changing towards the common property resource management in order to increase their 
welfare. Figures 7.13, 7.14, 7.15 explain the RCI and money spent on enforcement in the 
three category villages.
Resource Condition Index — ■ —  Percentage of Expenditure on Enforcement
Figure 7.13: Resource Condition Index and percentage of money spent on enforcement 
(villages under common property)
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Figure 7.14: Resource Condition Index and percentage of money spent on enforcement 
(villages under transition from open-access to common property)




The survey results indicate that all aspects relating to social, economic and cultural 
factors are crucial for the establishment of common property institutions. From the above 
results it can be inferred that the empowerment of village institutions for managing their 
common property institutions is essential for arresting resource degradation. Provision of 
technical and financial support from the Government and its role as "enabler" rather than 
"doer" is important in the context of the participatory development process. The key 
factor in Aravallis has been the institutional development at the village level for managing 
the common property resources and the involvement of all the sections of the society in 
evolving commonly agreed restrictions and their enforcement at the village level. 
Participation is important but probably not enough on its own. In the next chapter a 
mathematical programming model was applied to a village incorporating all the 
households dynamics and their interactions with their farm lands as well as the common 
lands with the objective of maximising the net village income and to analyse how effective 
the management would be under different management options.
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Chapter Vili
In this chapter the need for a mathematical programming technique for modelling the 
use of common property resources is explored. A single objective linear programming 
model application is presented in the present context in order to analyse the effect of 
CPR management under different management options. Model development and 
construction is presented in order to conduct scoping studies, which would help in 
identifying the changes in the resource condition under different scenarios.
8.1 Linear Programming technique for CPR management
There are number of mathematical programming techniques available for 
incorporating complex information pertaining to resource management. Single 
objective linear programming (LP) is recognised as a powerful and versatile computer 
based aid to decision making at farm planning, since it provides valuable insights into 
the nature of resource allocation (Dent et al., 1986). LP has been applied to a wide 
range of allocation problems in resource management including forestry (Beneke and 
Winterboer, 1973; Barnard and Nix, 1979; Hazel and Norton, 1986; Bell, 1977; 
Mendoza, 1987; Dykstra, 1984; Rae, 1984; Nhantumbo, 1997). In an LP framework, 
the decision maker wishes to maximise or minimise an objective function, subject to a 
number of linear constraints. Usually the objective function represents profit 
maximisation or cost minimisation. LP formulation assumes that all the underlying 
relationships are linear, and parameters have single value expectations (Romero and 
Rehman, 1989).
However, single objective LP can accommodate multiple objectives in the form of 
constraints. The constraint method optimises one objective while all other objectives 
must be satisfied by linear inequalities and the procedure determines minimum or 
maximum values for those objectives. This reduces a multi-objective problem into a
Development and Construction of a Mathematical Model for CPR Management
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single objective formulation, which can then be solved by LP algorithms. The shadow 
prices of those objectives which are not optimised, will indicate the rate and limit of 
trade-off between the optimised and other objectives. This process can be repeated 
for all objective functions treating remaining objectives as constraints.
The mathematical basis of a single objective LP problem is stated in the form of the 
following equation: 
n
Maximise Z = Z  cj xj 
j = l
n
Subject to: Z  a j j x j <b j  i = 1,2,3.............m
j = l
and x j > 0  j = 1,2,3.
Where;
‘Z ’ denotes the objective function value
‘c / is the forecasted net revenue of a unit of j th activity
‘xj’ is the level of j th activity
‘n’ denotes the number of activities
‘m’ denotes the number of constraints
‘ay’ is the quantity of the i th resource required to produce one unit of the j th activity 
‘bp is the amount of the i th resource available
The main advantages of the LP formulation include the generation of many 
management alternatives that may aid conflict resolution in the VFC's with regard to 
efficient management of common property resources of the village, evaluation of 
management strategies and forecasting likely scenarios under open-access and 
common property regimes. The main disadvantages of LP include: (i) it may be 
difficult to decide which of the several objectives are fulfilled in different strategies
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when so many management alternatives are presented to the decision maker, (ii) the 
technique is not truly multi-objective but rather single objective with associated 
constraints, (iii) there are situations when some of the activities may take a zero or a 
very high level. This problem can be overcome by assigning lower and upper bounds 
to the objectives to be maximised or minimised. The main limitations of an LP model 
are divisibility of variables, linearity of constraints, additivity, and non-negativity of 
activities (Pannell, 1997). However, Dent, et al (1986) observed that, “the limitations 
imposed by the assumptions of linear programming are more perceived than real; 
given sufficient time and ingenuity it is possible to achieve a high degree of realism in 
representing a complex situation.”
Despite these limitations and weaknesses, LP is a useful tool in representing a 
complex system in a single matrix. Unlike humans, an LP model is free to consider all 
strategies without preconceptions or prejudices. The LP model allows the modeller to 
put technical and biological information into an economic context and to quantify the 
economic, technical, and biological trade-offs in the system (Panned, 1997). Often the 
amount of information available about a system may be so complex that managers 
may not be able to make coherent management decisions. The LP model fids this need 
wed for large problems and is a valuable tool for developing an understanding of the 
subtleties and interactions of a complex management system (Panned, 1997).
8.2 Objectives
In order to deal with the hypotheses suggested in Chapter I, section 1.2 the LP model 
was developed to achieve the following objectives:
(i) to optimise the use of private property resources as wed as the common property 
resources of the village;
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(ii) to integrate the private property resources and common property resources and 
the different households interactions with these resources into a simple and useful 
model;
(iii) to analyse the likely impact of different open-access and common property regime 
scenarios;
(iv) to study the impact of open-access and common property regimes on different 
households, such as, the large farmer, small farmer and landless households;
(v) to achieve overall economic efficiency in resource allocation of a village in a 
particular scenario;
and
(vi) to forecast the likely patterns of agriculture and common land use under different 
scenarios.
8.3 Model construction procedure
The LP model was constructed at the village level and was applied to one of the 
surveyed villages. Rajgarh village of the Rewari district was chosen for this 
application.
A single objective LP model (incorporating multiple objectives as associated 
constraints) was developed and solved by using the software package LENDO (Linear 
Interactive Discrete Optimiser - version 5.3). This model was constructed with the 
objective of maximising the net income of the village. The entire society was 
considered in terms of three land holding classes: large farmers (those owning more 
than 3 hectares of land), small farmers (those owning less than 3 hectares of land) and 
landless households, for model construction.
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The assumptions for model construction were:
a. Production technology in agriculture is constant at the level of the year of survey 
(1995-96) (although some of the coefficients can be changed to reflect a change in the 
production process). The technology is assumed to be linear meaning that the 
production relationships in the model are constant irrespective of the scale of 
production;
b. Input-output prices are assumed to be constant at 1995-96 prices (time of the 
survey);
c. Different households were considered as homogeneous, even though the 
characteristics of different caste groups differ from each other. The composition in 
each household (males, females and children) was considered as fixed at certain level;
d. All land was assumed to be of homogenous capability since the entire region has 
only one class of land, sandy loam;
e. There is free flow of goods within the village and outside the village. Buying and 
selling of goods from within and outside the village is allowed. Each household can 
sell their surplus produce and buy according to their requirements;
f. The basic needs of the people, such as, fuelwood, fodder and food items are 
satisfied in the model. Expensive items such as consumption of liquor, buying of fruits 
and spending on festivals and social functions were considered luxury items and not 
considered. The basic aim of the model is to satisfy the basic needs of individual 
households and then to maximise the net cash generated from the resources at their 
disposal in order to meet certain essential items of living, such as buying of clothes, 
tea, coffee, power, medicines, leisure and entertainment. The general structure of the 
model is given in Table: 8.1.
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8.4 Activities Considered in the Model
8.4.1 Production Relationships involving agricultural land
From the land holding point of view three types of households were identified. Those 
households owning more than 3 ha of agricultural land have been categorised as large 
farmers, those households owning less than 3 ha of land have been categorised as 
small farmers and the rest of the households having no land have been categorised as 
landless households.
Cropping activities of the different farmers were decided on the basis of the field 
survey. Since little distinction was recorded across soil types, the entire area was 
treated as having same type of soil conditions with little or negligible variations. The 
soil type is uniformly sandy loam with minor variations in the organic matter content 
and phosphate content. Based on the field survey, land was treated as homogenous 
since the farmers did not express any appreciable differences in soil conditions. 
Almost any crop could be grown suitable for the sandy loam conditions on any farm 
without appreciably affecting the production levels. However, land of small and large 
farmers was treated differently since both of them have different access to resources 








































































Intensive crop production often allows more than one crop per year to be produced 
from the same piece of land. The land held by individual farmers is under intensive 
cropping. The year is divided into two seasons, the Rabi season (dry season) and the 
Kharif season (wet season). The Kharif season is from July to October, where as, the 
Rabi season is from November to March. No production activities are possible from 
April to June, owing to hot, dry and desiccate winds from the Thar desert. During 
Kharif, Jowar (Sorghum), Bajra (pearl millet), Onions and Gram are grown, where as, 
in Rabi season more varied crops such as Wheat, Mustard, Peas, Tomatoes and 
Barley are grown. Due to the need to have balanced production of crops some crops 
are bound by land constraints.
Since subsistence farming dominates in this area, usage of fertiliser in crop production 
is not very common. Very rarely can one see fertiliser being applied by a farmer to his 
growing crops. Most people apply very little amount of fertiliser to small vegetable 
plots. Since there exists no pattern of fertiliser applications to agricultural crops, 
production of crops involving fertiliser is not considered in the model. However, dung 
usage in place of fertiliser is quite common. It provides a much needed nutrient 
replenishment for the soil and also provides dung cakes for fuel purposes. Hence, an 
option to produce crops using dung and without dung is provided in the model where, 
dung application to agricultural crops increases marginal crop production.
Agricultural crops provide grain, straw and crop residues. Grain is used for meeting 
the household food energy requirements, whereas, straw is used as dry matter feed for 
livestock. Crop residues, such as mustard sticks are used as fuel for cooking food for 
household consumption. The produce from the farm can be sold, bought, or stored 
for later use, according to convenience and profitability. The input-output coefficients 
used in the model were derived from the field survey and various other sources 
including field observations (GOH, 1995, NRDMS, 1994 and DSO, 1994). The 
annual rainfall in this village is fairly stable (425 mm) (HFD, 1989). It was therefore 
anticipated that crop yields would not vary significantly from year to year since the 
climatic factors remain stable from year to year. The average crop yields provided for
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various crops in the model adequately represent the actual situation. The grains, straw 
and crop residues can be bought, sold, stored and, or consumed by the large and small 
farmers, where as, landless households have to buy and consume in order to meet 
their requirements. Food grains are converted into kilocalories and fodder is 
converted into kilograms of dry matter to meet the fodder requirement of livestock.
8.4.2 Crop Storage
Storing crops is a necessity for the households in order to meet the food requirements 
for the next season. Storage of crops naturally leads to certain storage costs as well as 
certain storage losses. Therefore, grain losses from one season to another are 
incorporated in the model, as are storage costs (Table 8.2).
Table 8.2: Crop storage losses and storage costs
Crop Storage losses Storage costs per kilogram 
(in Rupees)
Wheat 15% 0.30




8.4.3 Sale of agricultural produce
The average sale prices of agricultural produce are given in Table 8.3. The cash 
generated from the sale of crops grown meets the input requirements for the next 
cropping season besides meeting several necessities of the household. The sale prices 
provided in the model are the prices prevailing at the time of data collection (1995- 
96). Price fluctuations were analysed and are presented in Chapter - IX.
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Table 8.3: Average sale price o f different crops











8.4.4 Purchase of food grains
Purchase activities for buying the food grains is provided for in the model, so as to 
facilitate supply of food grains needed by the households. The average purchase 
prices of food grains were much higher compared to the sale price in 1995-96. Table
8.4 provides the purchase prices prevailing at the time of field survey.
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Table 8.4: Purchase price o f major crops (1995-96)










8.4.5 Household consumption of food energy
The model satisfies the requirements of food energy demands of various households, 
thus fulfilling one of the basic needs of the household. The annual kilocalorie 
requirements by adult male, adult female and children of southern region of Haryana 
were specified by the National Institution of Nutrition (1991). No distinction in terms 
of kilocalories for different types of households was considered, however. The 
average food energy requirements are constrained to atleast be met in the model by 
every household. Seasonal food energy requirements are given in table 8.5. In the 
model, energy is defined in terms of kilocalories and proteins in terms of kilograms.
Table 8.5: Energy and Protein Requirements (Season wise)








Male 294000 7.08 600250 14.45
Female 252000 6.24 514500 12.74
Children 210000 5.28 428750 10.78
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Food energy requirements are normally met from cereals, pulses, milk, vegetables and 
fruits etc. Calorific supply from different types of foods is explained in detail in Table 
8.6. Meat, being a costly source of energy (and also because it is consumed very 
rarely by a small section of the population) was excluded and not considered in the 
model.
Table 8.6: Energy and Protein supply from different types of food
Type of food Calorific value (Kcal) per 
Kg of food











Source: National Institute of Nutrition, Hyderabad, 1991
8.4.6 Common land
The common land products are mainly fuelwood and fodder. The outputs that are 
extracted by different land holding classes was taken into consideration in the model. 
Raising of plantations was not considered in the base model but was a potential 
common land activity that could be brought in to increase the output of fuelwood and 
fodder. This step allows for the analysis of the effect of a joint management effort.
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Estimated production yields from raising the plantations are provided in the model. 
No costs of raising the plantations was provided since these are currently being 
provided by the Forest Department at no cost to the village. Outputs that accrue at 
regular intervals from these plantations was provided (Table 8.7).
Table 8.7: Estimated production of fuelwood and fodder from the plantations.
Fuelwood 6 th year (first thinning) 4.5 tonnes/ha.
11 th year (second thinning) 7 tonnes/ha.
21 st year 42 tonnes/ha.
Fodder 2 nd year - 6 th year 1.7 tonnes/ha/year
7th year - 12 th year 3.6 tonnes/ha/year
13 th year - 21 year 4.6 tonnes/ha/year
8.4.7 Livestock
Different types of livestock such as cows, buffaloes, goats, sheep and camels were 
treated as Tropical Bovine Units (TBU) for making the model structure simple and to 
keep it in manageable limits. The conversion factors used to calculate the number of 
TBU in each household type were adopted from the SETA report on rehabilitation of 
common lands in Aravalli Hills (1989). Table 8.8, provides the TBU conversion 
factors.
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Table 8.8: Conversion o f Livestock into Tropical Bovine Units (TBU)






A fodder demand study was conducted extensively by the Haryana Forest Dept, 
through a series of surveys by an agrostologist (Dauley, 1994). Livestock feed 
demand was also ascertained during the field survey from different households and 
animal husbandry department officials. All these studies indicate the similar figures of 
fodder demand by different types of livestock. Fodder requirement in terms of 
kilograms of dry matter per livestock type was separately calculated and was provided 
as required by a TBU (20 kg Dry matter/TBU/day) in the model. However, the 
fodder requirement of different livestock types calculated by Dauley (1995) does not 
correspond with the conversion factors of TBU presented in Table 8.8 (Table 8.9).
Table 8.9: Per Day Fodder Requirement and Dung Production by different livestock
Type of animal Fodder Requirement 
(Kg. of Dry matter/Day)








Fodder from farms and village common lands was converted into dry matter 
equivalent. Livestock provide milk and dung and both these products are utilised in 
meeting the agricultural crop requirement as manure, and for meeting the household 
energy needs and have been separately provided in the model.
8.4.8 Labour
Available labour resources were calculated in each of the households and were 
incorporated in the model. The resource units have been distinguished as adult males 
and adult females. Though children working as farm labourers can been seen quite 
often on the farms, their labour was not separately considered in the model as child 
labour is legally prohibited by the government.
There are two types of labour. One is domestic labour i.e., supply from one's own 
family/household and the second one is hired labour. In addition to its own supply, a 
household can hire labour as and when the demand for such labour becomes 
necessary in meeting the crop requirements. Different labour activities include farm 
requirement, domestic requirement and livestock requirement. Though there is no sex 
discrimination of labour in terms of wages paid to the hired labourer as every hired 
labourer has to be paid a minimum wage determined by the government from time to 
time on the basis of the prevailing inflation under the Minimum Wage Act. However, 
certain activities are performed by female labourers only. Hence, there is differential 
requirement of hired labour for different crops. Similarly, quarrying can be done by 
males only.
Labour availability is considered in terms of man days only. There exists no system of 
working in terms of labour hours. Normally a manday is considered to extend from 
morning 8 am to 5 pm with a two hour lunch break. In most of the households, 
domestic work such as cooking food, taking care of livestock, collection of fodder 
and fuelwood and other household tasks are done by women. Hence the number of 
mandays provided by women to the farming labour pool is less. All the available
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labour in various households has been pooled together for model purposes. Labour is 
drawn from the pool by the different households as and when it is required for their 
farm activities. In the model, provision has also been made to utilise the available 
labour from within the household and then hire the labour from outside the household 
since labour supply from within the household involves no cost but hiring of labour is 
certainly a costly proposition. Labour requirement per crop and other activities such 
as livestock rearing, working for forest and other public works department was 
provided in the model. Hiring of labour from outside the village is not provided since 
there is generally plenty of available labour from within the villages. Being an 
economically backward area, no such labour shortages could be anticipated. The 
average cost of hiring of labour is forty rupees per man day, at 1995 prices.
8.5 Constraints provided in the Model
8.5.1 Land
Land is a major constraint and is a fixed resource which can be utilised or remain 
slack. Land was considered to be of homogenous quality and to be distributed 
between the different types of household equally. Large farmers and Small farmers 
were provided at 4.2 hectares and 1.2 hectares respectively.
8.5.2 Production
Crop yields provided in the model are average yields mentioned in the survey by 
various households. Since no publication mentions crop yields with the application of 
dung and without the application of dung, the yields provided in the model are also 
based upon the survey of households (Table 8.10). However, the figures provided 
with dung application were almost the same as the figures published in official 
documents, such as the Statistical Abstract of Haryana, 1995 with minor variations. 
The purpose of dividing the activities into with dung and without dung application 
was to see how the energy requirements of the family are met by different households.
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Dung has an important role in enhancing the crop productivity as well as meeting the 
household energy requirements for cooking food in the form of dung cakes. Under 
this constraint, the demand (for crops as manure and as dung cakes for cooking 
purposes) and supply (from the animal excretions) was specified as less than or equal 
to Zero, i.e., dung could not be imported into the household system.
Table 8.10: Average crop yields from the village survey
Crop Name Yield in Kg./ha. 
(with dung)











Chick Peas 1440 920
8.5,3 Labour
Labour is in great demand especially during harvesting, weeding and land preparation 
periods. In addition to labour supply from within the family, hiring of labour is 
allowed in order to meet the short fall in labour requirements. Labour requirements of 
each crop was calculated and provided for in the model.
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8.5.4 Household Food supply
The households have a choice of either producing food on their own farm or 
purchasing from the market, depending on the requirements. This constraint is 
concerned with the seasonal food consumption demand.
8.5.5 Household composition
The household composition is different for each land holding class. Based on the 
survey household composition of different land holding classes was incorporated in 
the model.
8.5.6 Fuelwood
Fuelwood can be purchased from the market or collected from the common land or 
from the farm land by individual households owning farms. Landless households have 
to either purchase from the market or collect fuelwood from the common lands. The 
other alternative to meeting the fuel supply is from the burning of dung cakes or 
mustard sticks. These three sources of fuel energy provide most of the cooking needs 
of the households. The annual requirements of the households are forced to be met in 
the model. Household fuel requirements provided in the model are based on the 
survey of the different households. There are no published surveys of the energy 
requirements of the households. The amounts of fuelwood, mustard sticks and dung 
cakes utilised by different households were converted into Mega joules and are 
provided in the model. Conversion ratios were, 12.368 mega joules/kg fuelwood, 
11.255 mega joules/kg. crop residues and 8.753 mega joules/kg dung cakes 
respectively. The annual demand of the households was the same for small farmer and 
landless households at 36588 mega joules of energy, where as for large farmer 
households it was slightly higher at 48784 mega joules. No supply of alternative 
sources of fuel was considered in the base model, but in the scoping studies (Chapter 
IX) these alternatives were considered.
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8.6 Model Validation / Verfication
Validation is a process of checking whether the matrix is consistent with the real 
world (Pannell, 1997). In other words, it is a process by which a model is determined 
to be a valid portrayal of the system modelled. Model validation refers to activities to 
establish how closely the model mirrors the perceived reality of the model 
user/developer team (Gass, 1983). However, a model cannot represent all of the 
perceived reality, so attention should be narrowed down to that part of the reality 
which the model is intended to represent (McCarl, 1984). The validation procedure 
involves comparing the performance of the model either against recorded data for the 
system or against a subjective judgement of what the output should be, given a broad 
understanding of the system or type of system which the model represents (Dent and 
Blackie, 1979). Many of the difficulties in validating a model arise from the data it is 
being validated against (Hazell and Norton, 1986). A model can also be validated by 
assumption, with or without comparing the results with the recorded data (McCarl, 
1984). In order to judge if a model is valid, the optimal values of the decision 
variables, the dual prices and the objective function should be systematically validated. 
This validation of the model can be by construct or by results (McCarl and Apland, 
1986). Validation by construct relies on the procedure believed to be appropriate by 
the model builder. These are based upon experiences, precedence, and or theory, 
using scientific estimation or real world data. Validation by construct means the 
validity of the model is assumed. Validation by results usually follows validation by 
construct and consists of a comparison of model solutions with corresponding real 
world outcomes. Virtually all models go through a validation by assumption stage, 
which involves a judgement of validation through expert opinion, antecedent, theory, 
data or logical structure.
In this study, model validation relies on the logical framework with which the model 
was built. Most of the data was either collected during field survey or taken from 
published sources. Efforts were made to make the model realistic and logical. The
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experience of the researcher of having worked and lived in the area for over ten years 
also strengthens the presumption that the model is valid / verified.
8.7 Summary
In this chapter the development and construction of a single objective linear 
programming model has been presented along with model validation/verification. The 
activities and constraints specified in the model are discussed. This enabled the 
undertaking of scoping studies in order to forecast the likely patterns of changes 
under open-access and common property scenarios. In the next chapter the results of 
the scoping studies, sensitivity analysis and the model validation are presented.
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Chapter - IX
Analysis of the Scoping studies Results and Discussion
In this chapter the single objective linear programming model developed in chapter- 
VIII is used for conducting the scoping1 studies in order to determine the solutions 
under open-access and common property situations. The solution runs that were 
undertaken under different scenarios are presented and the results are discussed. The 
model validation is also presented.
9.1 Scoping studies
The main purpose of this research is to understand the likely scenarios if the current 
open-access situation continues and to forecast the likely benefits that would accrue 
to the different households under a common property situation. This study should 
help the village communities and their advisers to decide as to which one of these is 
beneficial for them to pursue.
The studies are conducted with the sole objective of maximising the net income of the 
village under both open-access and common property, while fulfilling the basic 
household needs. The different scenarios under which the scoping studies are 
conducted include:
(i) The likely scenario if open-access is pursued from the current level of extraction of 
fodder and fuelwood from the common lands;
(ii) The likely scenario if common property is pursued rigorously with stricter controls 
in access, distribution of produce from the common lands accompanied by proper 
enforcement;
1 Means a range of view or the extent to which it is possible to range (Oxford Dictionary of Current 
English, 1992).
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(iii) The likely scenario under both common property and open-access if the present 
level of increase in both human as well as livestock populations takes place over a 
period of time (dynamic situation);
(iv) The likely scenario if alternative energy sources are provided by restricting 
different households access to the common lands for both fuelwood as well as fodder;
(v) The likely scenario if access to common lands is restricted to only small farmers 
and landless households;
(vi) The likely scenario if agricultural production levels increase or decrease from the 
current level of production. These scoping studies results are presented and discussed 
in the following sections.
9.1.1 The likely scenario if open-access is pursued from the current level
For conducting the scoping studies under this scenario the observed resource 
degradation patterns in various case study villages formed the basis for determining 
the output that would be extracted successively by different households. The 
fuelwood and fodder resources were assumed to be degraded and are likely to result 
in a short fall of 20 percent successively from year to year since it is a free for all 
situation resulting in the absence of any proper management structure. In this 
scenario, no improvements in the situation are possible and a stage would eventually 
result whereby it would not be possible to extract anything, implying that the ultimate 
resource availability would be zero. The current level of extraction was the level 
which was prevailing at the time of the survey (1995-96). The solution runs were 
undertaken with the current annual extraction level of fodder and fuelwood from the 
common lands at 219,450 kilo grams and 184,000 kilo grams respectively. These 
figures were calculated by extrapolating and aggregating the extraction levels for 
whole of the village from the sample surveyed. The results from different runs with 
the successively declining extraction levels show that the village income declines 
under open-access for all the households. The net income of the entire village declines 
from Rs.5,973,569 to Rs.5,487,790 in a span of 60 years at the current prices (1995- 
96). While the decline is initially faster compared to the later years. As the following
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sub sections show, almost every household gets affected under open-access, 
irrespective of land holding status.
9.1.1a Large farmer households under open-access
A marginal decline in the net income of the large farmer household takes place after 
the first three years. Thereafter it remains constant, since large farmers are not very 
dependent on fuel and fodder resources from the common lands (Figure 9.1).
Years
- ♦—  Net Income
Figure 9.1: Large farmer household net income (in Rupees) under open-access
Apart from the slight decline in the net income of the large farmers a slight change in 
landuse pattern takes place in order to compensate for the loss of fodder and 
fuelwood supply from the common lands. The area under mustard crop grows slightly 
from 1.6 ha. to 1.7 ha. The model uses the alternative source of fuel (mustard sticks) 
in order to compensate for the loss of fuelwood supply from the common land. A 
similar pattern emerges from the fodder point of view. While the production of wheat 
declines an increase in Jowar (Sorghum) production takes place in order to 
compensate for the loss of supply of fodder from the common lands (Figure 9.2).
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Years
— ♦ — Wheat 
— 0 — WheatND 
— A—  MustardND 
— H —  Barley 
— * — TomatoND 
— * —  ChickPea 
— I—  Fbtato 
— —  JowarND 
— — —  Bajra ND 
— O—  OnionND 
— Q—  Gram
Figure 9.2: Land use pattern of large farms under open-access
Years
^  Farm Fuelwood 
E3 Common land Fuelw ood 
□  Mustard Sticks
Figure 9.3: Fuel consumption scenario under open-access (large farmer household)
As far as fuel sources are concerned the model predicts the non-usage of dung cakes 
as a source of fuel. Instead, it increases the usage of mustard sticks produced through
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increased area under mustard crop (Figure 9.3). In reality, most large farmer 
households do use some dung cakes for cooking some of the traditional items but the 
model allocates dung to more productive purposes for increasing the usage of dung as 
a manure for agricultural crops for increasing yields and hence, the net income.
The fodder consumption pattern for large farms does not indicate any major changes 
to overall consumption patterns (Figure 9.4). The compensation of lessened fodder 
supply from the common lands is met by an increased supply of fodder through the 
increase in Jowar production.
1 5 10 15 20 25
Years
0 Farm Fodder
E3 Farm LandTree Fodder
0 Common Land Fodder
Figure 9.4: Fodder consumption scenario (large farm) under open-access 
9.1.1b Small farmer households under open-access
The net income of the small farmer household also declines over a period of time 
under open-access. The level of decline in the initial years is not appreciable. From 
year 3 onwards it declines gradually from Rs. 11420 to Rs. 10230 at current prices 




-•—  Net Income
Figure 9.5: Small farmer household net income (in Rupees) under open-access
Figure 9.6: Land use pattern of small farm under open-access
As the open-access situation continues changes in landuse pattern become substantive 
indicating the increase in area under production of agricultural crops that provide fuel
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for cooking (Figure 9.6). For example, mustard production goes up from 0 ha in year 
1 to 0.3 ha in year 25 in order to compensate for the loss of fuelwood supply from the 
common lands. At the same time, the area under wheat declines from 1.08 ha to 0.77 
ha in 25 years.
The fuel consumption scenario also undergoes a change (Figure 9.7). Surprisingly the 
diversion of dung as manure to agricultural crops increases with the falling usage of 
dung cakes. Since the area under mustard crop increases, the amount of available 
mustard sticks for cooking purposes goes up. This increased mustard stick availability 
not only makes up the loss of fuelwood from the common lands but also reduces the 
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Figure 9.7: Fuel consumption scenario under open-access (small farmer household)
Since the area under mustard crop increases a shortfall in fodder production from 
farm lands occurs (Figure 9.8). Since fodder from the common lands also declines 
under the open-access situation the amount of TBU’s that can be fed decreases from 
1.81 to 1.59. The model uses only 1.81 TBU’s as against the 2.6 TBU’s available in 
the model. This indicates that the present livestock is underfed and will continue to be
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underfed. This decreases the livestock productivity and reduces the income level of 
the small farmer households.
Years
0  Farm Fodder 
@ Farm LandTree Fodder 
□  Common Land Fodder
Figure 9.8: Fodder consumption scenario (small farm) under open-access 
9.1.1c Landless households under open-access
The net income levels of the landless households also decline under open-access 
considerably over a period of time (Figure 9.9). The net income decreases from 
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Figure 9.10: Fuel consumption scenario under open-access (landless household)
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Increasing open-access, resulting in a reduced availability of fuel and fodder 
resources, makes it difficult for the landless households to meet their fuel and fodder 
requirements (Figures 9.10 and 9.11).
Figure 9.11: Fodder consumption scenario (landless) under open-access
Most of their fodder and fuel requirements have to be met from the market by paying 
cash. The landless households earnings are totally dependent upon their income from 
the sale of labour to either large farmers or small farmers or government agencies. 
Labour requirement from these areas of employment is almost stagnant. With no 
other industries coming up in this area the level of unemployment is likely to be higher 
as at present. This will force them to migrate to nearby towns and seek employment 
elsewhere. Given the mindset of people of this area it is unlikely that this might 
happen. With the increasing rate of growth of population it becomes a question of 
survival for the landless households. This proposition is examined later under a 
dynamic situation.
160
9.1.2 The likely scenario if common property is pursued by the village
In this section the model results are presented assuming that there exists a common 
property situation. This means that the regulated access system is in force in place of 
an open-access situation. A strict common property regime includes regulation of 
access, equitable distribution of produce, monitoring all the behaviour and sanctioning 
the violators of the commonly agreed restrictions.
For conducting the scoping studies under this scenario the growth parameters 
concerning the increase in bio-mass of this forest type are taken into consideration. 
Since there would be stricter controls and the common lands are free from grazing it 
can safely be expected that there would be an increase in the availability of fodder and 
fuelwood. The solution runs were conducted using a much lower level of extraction 
of fuelwood and fodder levels from the common lands initially as against the current 
level of extraction. An amount of 46,200 kg fuelwood and 69,300 kg fodder 
extraction in the first year is considered for safe removal as against the current level of 
extraction of 184,000 kg and 219,450 kg of fuelwood and fodder respectively. With 
reduced removal of fuelwood and fodder from the common lands, with proper 
monitoring and enforcement in place, was assumed to make that the resource supply 
levels will continue to increase at the rate of 7.5 percent per annum over the next 25 
years until production levels peaked at 262,086 kg fuelwood and 393,130 kg fodder. 
These increases are in line with the projections predicted in the unpublished reports of 
the Aravalli project (GOH, 1989) assuming the scenario without the tree plantations 
on vacant spaces in common lands. Removal of 1134 kg fuelwood per ha of common 
land and 1701 kg fodder per ha in the 25 th year is a reasonable estimate if the access 
controls are strictly enforced by the village community. This exercise may be termed 
suspect but it provides reasonable answers to the likely scenarios under common 
property regime. In the absence of any published volume tables for this type of mixed 
forest, dominated by the presence of Anogeissus pendula the output levels prescribed 
are considered reasonable for forecasting the likely scenario.
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The changes in net income and the resulting changes in landuse patterns, fuel 
consumption scenarios and fodder consumption scenarios for each of the different 
type of households are presented in detail in the following subsections under a 
common property regime.
9.1.2a Large farmer households under common property
The net income level of the large farmer households increases over a period of twenty 
five years from Rs.64,483 to Rs.65,885 at current price levels (1995-96) representing 
an increase of 2.17% (Figure 9.12).
Figure 9.12: Large farmer household net income in Rupees (under common property)
Since fuelwood and fodder from the common lands is allowed to be distributed 
equitably amongst all households from the common lands the availability of these 
resources increases year after year. Due to the increased availability of fodder and 
fuelwood from the common lands under the common property the land use pattern 
changes (Figure 9.13).
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Figure 9.13: Land use pattern of large farm under common property
The area under mustard production decreases from 1.65 ha to 1.4 ha. The area under 
wheat crop also increases from 1.49 ha to 1.74 ha. There is a slight shift in the pattern 
of wheat crop. Wheat using dung as manure declines from 0.55 ha to 0.33 ha, where 
as wheat crop with no dung application increases from 0.94 ha to 1.41 ha. The area 
under Gram production increases from 0.98 ha to 1.19 ha indicating a shift in 
production towards cash crops.
The fuel consumption scenario for large farmer household changes with the increased 
availability of fuelwood from the common lands (Figure 9.14). The usage of mustard 
sticks comes down from 3639 kg to 3099 kg over a period of twenty five years. 
Though the model does not show any usage of dung cakes for cooking, this is 
unlikely to happen since some of the traditional dishes are made using dung cakes.
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Years
E3 Farm f  uelw ood 
a  Common land f  uelw ood 
□  Mustard sticks
Figure 9.14: Fuel consumption scenario under common property (large farmer 
household)
The fodder consumption scenario also changes with the availability of increased 
fodder from the common lands (Figure 9.15).
Figure 9.15: Fodder consumption scenario under common property (large farmer 
household).
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The major change in the fodder consumption scenario is the increase in fodder 
availability from the common lands. The model predicts that the amount of fodder 
allocated to the large farmer households is cut and carried from the common lands. 
However, this scenario seems unlikely as the costs of labour may force them to 
abandon the difficult task of cutting and carrying the grass from the hills. It was 
observed from the survey that most of the large farmer households prefer to under 
feed the livestock rather than cutting and carrying the grass from the common lands. 
Some of them even consider it as below their status to cut and carry the grass from 
common lands although they may have no reservation in bringing headloads of 
fuelwood from the common lands.
9.1.2b Small farmer households under common property
The net income of the small farmer households increases substantially under common 
property from Rs. 10775 to Rs. 13034 over a period of twenty five years at current 
prices (1995-96) (Figure 9.16).
Years
- ♦—  Net Income
Figure 9.16: Small farmer household net income under common property
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The land use pattern of the small farms also undergoes some change. As the fiielwood 
from the common lands keeps increasing, the area under mustard production declines 
from 0.18 ha to 0 ha in 15 years. The area under barley also declines marginally over 
the same period whilst the area under wheat increases from 0.91 ha to 1.1 ha (Figure 
9.17).
Figure 9.17: Land use pattern of small farm under common property
The fodder consumption scenario also changes under common property as the fodder 
from common lands increases over the period (Figure 9.18). The model predicts 
increased activity levels in the utilisation of Tropical Bovine Units (TBU) from 1.69 
to 1.95 over the same period. This means that the present level of livestock numbers
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kept by the small farmers is underfed and the optimal levels that can be sustained are 
far below the existing level of 2.4 TBU.
Figure 9.18: Fodder consumption scenario (small farm) under common property
Years
S Farm Fuelw ood 
13 Common land Fuelw ood 
□  Mustard Sticks 
13 Dung Cakes
Figure 9.19: Fuel Consumption Scenario under Common Property (Small Farmer 
Household)
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The fuel consumption scenario also changes with the increased availability of 
fuelwood from the common lands (Figure 9.19). From year 1 to 15 the use of dung 
cakes as fuel increases from 3304 kg to 3539 kg with the decline in the availability of 
mustard sticks. Thereafter, with the increase in fuelwood supply from the common 
lands the use of dung cakes declines to 3104 kg in twentyfifth year, thereby increasing 
the availability of dung as manure for agricultural crops.
9.1.2c Landless households under common property
Landless households also benefit from the common property situation. Their net 
income levels increase from Rs.4456 to Rs.4848 over a period of twenty five years, 
showing an increase of 8.79% at current levels (1995-96) (Figure 9.20).
Figure 9.20: Landless household net income (under common property)
In this scenario fodder consumption undergoes minor changes. Since the landless 
households have to meet their fodder requirements only from two sources, namely, 
common lands and bought fodder. The increased availability of fodder over the period 
of time reduces the amount of fodder needed to be bought by the landless households.
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The fuel consumption scenario also undergoes similar changes as the common 
property situation continues (Figure 9.21). The use of dung cakes remains the same 
for the entire period since they have no need to apply it for any agricultural crops.
Figure 9.21: Fuel consumption scenario under common property (landless household)
9.1.2d Comparison of open-access and common property scenarios
The results obtained from different runs of open-access and common property 
situations clearly show that pursuing the common property option is the best solution 
for the village over a period of time. Figure 9.22 explains the changes in net income of 
different households under both common property as well as open-access. The 
changes in net income levels are less profound in large farmer households under both 
the scenarios in comparison to small farmer and landless households. The landless 
households suffer the most under open-access. They are predicted to experience a 
loss of 15.48% in their net income level over a period of 25 years from the current 
level (1995-96). The small farmer households gain considerably under common 
property due to the increased availability of fuelwood and fodder from the common 
lands, which results in an increase of 20.95% in their net incomes. Since 73.8 percent 
(324 out of 439) of the households belong to the small farmer type, this increase in
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the net income level will bring substantial benefits to a majority of the households in 
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Figure 9.22: Changes in net income over twenty five years from the current level 
(1995-96) under different regimes (in percentage)
This comparison clearly indicates the importance of pursuing the common property 
regime by different types of land holding classes. If they co-operate, they stand to 
gain or else they stand to lose substantially if the open-access situation allowed to 
continue. It is in their mutual interest that they all pursue a regulated access 
management system towards their common property resources.
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9.1.3 The likely scenario under common property if tree plantations are 
undertaken on village common lands
As part of the participatory development the Forest Department is raising tree 
plantations on village common lands as one-off investment for the welfare of the 
village community. This process is aimed at arresting the degradation of village 
common lands. This increases yields of fuelwood and fodder supply from the village 
common lands under the common property regime (Table 9.1).
Table 9.1: Estimated production of fuelwood and fodder from the plantations.
Fuelwood 6 th year (first thinning) 4.5 tonnes/ha.
11 th year (second thinning) 7 tonnes/ha.
21 st year 42 tonnes/ha.
Fodder 2 nd year - 6 th year 1.7 tonnes/ha/year
7th year - 12 th year 3.6 tonnes/ha/year
13 th year - 21 year 4.6 tonnes/ha/year
Source: Haryana Forest Department, 1989.
The model is run assuming that the common property situation would continue from 
the current year (1995-96), and that 5 ha of village common land is planted every year 
for 21 years on a 21 year rotation. That means, a total of 105 ha are afforested by 
planting trees out of a total of 232 ha of village common lands. These plantations 
continue to provide increased supplies from the common lands. These increases, 
resulting from thinnings and final harvest, are included in the model and the producéis 
assumed to be equally distributed amongst the households. The results from these 
model runs indicate a substantial increase in the net income of the village (Figure 
9.23).
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Figure 9.23: Net income of the village under common property if plantations are 
undertaken
Net income of the different households also goes up considerably over the period of 
time if plantations are raised and well protected (Figure 9.24).
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Figure 9.24: Net income of different Households under Common Property if 
Plantations are undertaken on Common lands
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Though the model predicts the increases in income of different households due to 
increased supplies from the plantations, it remains to be seen as to how the villagers 
decide to use final harvest proceeds. Since the Forest Department is providing the 
initial investment, in plantations which do not share any of the revenue accruing from 
the final harvest, the VFC has a responsibility to raise plantations in the second and 
subsequent rotations. For this purpose they need to set aside a portion of the revenue 
from the final harvests. That means, part of the produce from the final harvest has to 
be sold in the market in order to have sufficient money required for planting in the 
harvested area. This ensures that the village can continue to benefit from the village 
common lands on a sustainable basis. It is therefore hoped that the VFC will be 
responsible enough to take care of the tasks of management of the village common 
lands for the common good.
9.1.4 The likely scenario under different regimes if access to common land 
products is restricted to only small farmers and landless households.
In order to forecast the likely scenario under different regimes (open-access and 
common property) access of large farmers to common lands is denied and only access 
of small farmers and landless is provided in the model. Under common property 
equitable distribution of produce from common lands between the households is 
provided. Since no access of large farmers to common lands is allowed there is no 
change in the net income level of large farmers, irrespective of the extraction level by 
the small farmers and landless from the common lands. The general effect on 
environment and ground water level conditions are unaccounted for in the model 
since data on these parameters is unavailable. In general the net income level under 
both the regimes undergoes significant changes for small farmers as well as landless 
households over a period of 25 years. The net income levels of these two types of 
households follow an increasing trend under common property regime whereas they 





















Figure 9.25: Landless household net income under different regimes (no access to 
large farmer households to common lands)
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Figure 9.26: Small farmer household net income under different regimes (no access to 
large farmer households to common lands)
This scenario is unlikely to happen since no larger farmer household would like to be 
denied the benefit of access to the common lands. This sort of differential access will
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lead to tensions in the VFC’s and might ultimately result in destroying any semblance 
of organisation in managing the common lands. However, this scenario is likely to 
happen if all the large farmer households decide to keep away from the common lands 
and agree for the access to the common lands by the more disadvantaged sections of 
the society at their own cost.
9.1.5 The likely scenario if LPG (Liquefied Petroleum Gas) is supplied as an 
additional source of fuel
In this scenario an attempt has been made to visualise the net income changes at the 
current level if all the households in the village are allowed to buy an alternative 
source of fuel in the form of LPG. At present, LPG is supplied by the government at 
subsidised prices only in cities and big towns. If this supply is also made available to 
the villages then there would be substantial savings for the small farmer households. 
The model predicts that their net income level increases since the LPG is cheap and 
provides three times more energy per kg than the other sources currently being used 
by the households (Table 9.2). This increase in income levels would result from the 
utilisation of more dung as manure for agricultural crops rather than burning it as 
dung cakes. Large farmer households net income levels almost remain the same since 
the model does not utilise any dung cakes even without the supply of LPG for 
cooking purposes. Also, landless households net income levels remain the same even 
if LPG is provided.
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Table 9.2: Net income changes o f different households if LPG is supplied
Household Type Current level Net income if unlimited LPG supply is allowed
(in Rupees) (in Rupees)
Large Farmer 65115 65550
Small Farmer 11420 13454
Landless 5173 5173
9.1.5a The likely scenario if no fuelwood is extracted from common lands and 
LPG is supplied as alternative source of fuel
Under this scenario the net income level of the village goes up from Rs.5973569 to 
Rs.6297321. The net income level of different households undergoes significant 
changes if no fuelwood extraction is allowed from the village common lands. When 
LPG is provided as an alternative source of fuel, the results indicate that the landless 
households, who are critically dependent on fuelwood from the common lands have 
to spend more money for buying LPG/fuelwood, and as a result, suffer a reduction in 
their net income levels. On the other hand, the small farmers gain since they need not 
divert dung for dung cakes and can meet their energy requirements from LPG. The 
increase in dung availability as manure also again increases their agricultural 
production, which in turn increases their income levels (Table 9.3).





Net income if LPG supply is allowed and no fuelwood 
extraction is permitted from the common lands 
(in Rupees)
Large Farmer 65115 65174
Small Farmer 11420 12935
Landless 5173 3232
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9.1.5b The likely scenario if no fuelwood is extracted from common lands, LPG 
is supplied as alternative source of fuel and fodder extraction by only landless 
households is permitted.
The model was run under this scenario to see how the net income levels change for 
different households. LPG availability was ensured for all the households as an 
alternative source of fuel. No extraction of fuelwood from the common lands was 
allowed but fodder was allowed to be collected only by the landless households. The 
model predicted that if there was no fodder available to buy from the market then the 
income levels significantly changed for the landless households (Table 9.4). The 
optimum levels of the TBU’s that can be kept by the landless comes down to 0.34 
TBU. In this scenario, both large and small farmers tend to produce more crops that 
would provide sufficient fodder for their livestock, such as sorghum and bajra. At the 
same time since the labour requirements are less for these crops the overall 
employment available for landless households comes down. This resulting 
unemployment and the lessened income from the sale of livestock products on 
account of use of only 0.34 TBU as against 2.6 TBU by the landless households 
considerably reduces their net income to only Rs.540.
However, due to the increased availability of dung for application as manure on 
account of availability of LPG, the large and small farmer households are able to 
maintain their net income levels even though there is shift in the crop production 
pattern. The small farmer households net income level goes up slightly.
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Table 9.4: Net income changes if no fuelwood extraction is permitted and fodder 





Net income if LPG supply is allowed and no fuelwood 
extraction is permitted from the common lands and fodder 
extraction is permitted by landless only 
(in Rupees)
Large Farmer 65115 64699
Small Farmer 11420 12736
Landless 5173 540
9.1.5c The likely scenario if no fuelwood and fodder is extracted from common 
lands and LPG is supplied as alternative source of fuel.
The model was run under this scenario to see how this sort of situation can be
overcome by different households with no fuelwood and fodder extraction from the 
common lands and with non availability of fodder to buy from the market. However, 
in this case, no feasible solution could be found by the model since landless 
households are critically dependent upon the supplies from the common lands. Paying 
for their cooking fuel as well as being unable to feed the livestock and the reduced 
employment levels, drive them to a situation of starvation. The model is built to 
satisfy particular energy requirements of the households and since these energy 
requirements were not fulfilled (in the absence of money to pay for food and LPG by 
the landless households) the model cannot solve and provided an infeasible solution.
Although such a situation is unlikely to happen, it provides enough indications as to
what would be the likely result under such a scenario.
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9.1.6 The likely scenario under a dynamic situation under both open-access and 
common property
To examine the likely effect of increasing population numbers of both human and 
livestock, the model was run over a period of twenty five years. Increases in 
population numbers of humans was provided progressively at the current annual 
growth rate of 1.8% per annum (source: Census of India, 1991). Livestock numbers 
were also increased progressively at 3.4%, based upon the annual growth in livestock 
population for southern Haryana (Source: Livestock census, 1987).
Instead of splitting and increasing the number of households it was assumed that the 
number of households would remain the same with only number of members 
increasing in each household. This assumption is in line with the current joint family 
system prevalent in the case study area. A condition was imposed that the entire 
household needs (such as food energy and fuel energy requirements) are fully satisfied 
by all the households. This model was run under both open-access and common 
property situations. The changes in the net income of the village are profound under 
both these scenarios (Figure 9.27). After the tenth year with the continuing increase in 
the population numbers of both human and livestock, the situation gets in to a difficult 
position. From year 10 onwards there will be a continuous decline in the net income 
levels under the common property situation. The model does not run beyond ten years 
under open-access as it creates infeasible solutions since the entry of one or more 
persons into the landless households does not satisfy the minimum prescribed food 
energy requirements. The same is the case with common property situation after 15 
years. Hence, results are presented only until 15 years for common property and 10 





Figure 9.27: Village net income changes under dynamic situation
This situation clearly explains that if population growth is not controlled urgently it 
would lead to chaos and ultimately results in a general increase in poverty and 
environmental collapse irrespective of whether open-access or common property is 
pursued. The results of both these scenarios are presented and discussed for different 
types of households.
9.1.6a Large farmer households under dynamic situation
Large farmer households can accommodate the increase of more members in to their 
households. Since they own large farms they can even accommodate an increase in 
livestock numbers. Figure 9.28 shows how net income levels were predicted to 
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Figure 9.28: Net income of large farmer household under dynamic situation
Under both open-access as well as common property the net income levels decrease 
from year 1 to year 5 on account of increases in population numbers and the need to 
feed both human as well as increased livestock populations. From year 5 onwards the 
net income level increases under both the scenarios. Even though there is an increase 
in human population putting a drain on the net income level of the households this is 
more than offset by the increased livestock numbers to which there is sufficient 
fodder. As the milk production level increases on account of this increase in livestock 
from 2.6 TBU to 3.6 TBU revenue increases. The increased number of TBU’s also 
raises dung production and application of more dung to agricultural crops increases 
the production levels. This in turn increases the revenue of the household. The 
scenario is the same for the open-access and common property situations, with a 
slight increase in income in the common property scenario on account of an increasing 
availability of fodder and fuelwood from the common lands. Beyond year 10, as 
number of persons increases in the household the net income level starts decreasing, 
even under common property situation, as the marginal productivity of livestock no 
longer sustains food demands.
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9.1.6b Small farmer households under dynamic situation
The net income level of the small farmer household also undergoes similar changes as 




Figure 9.29: Net income changes of small farmer household under dynamic situation
Under the open-access situation the net income level declines gradually from 
Rs. 11420 to Rs.3466 in 10 years with the increasing human and livestock numbers. 
Increase in livestock numbers does not create any increase in the net income levels as 
in the case of large farmers since their livestock is already under fed and there is no 
more scope to increase the availability of fodder from the farm land. The net income 
level under common property also decreases in the first five years on account of 
restrictions in removal of fodder and fuelwood from the common lands, but registers 
an increase in the net income level marginally up from Rs.4678 to Rs.5036. This 
increase is attributable to the increased supplies from common lands. The income 
level declines marginally under common property from Rs.5036 in the tenth year to 
Rs.4936.
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9.1.6c Landless households under dynamic situation
Landless households are the worst affected if any increase in the number of members 
in the household takes place (Figure 9.30). With access regulations in force they 
cannot collect fuelwood and fodder under common property situation in an unlimited 
quantity. They can only collect in a limited quantity as specified by the VFC. With 
employment levels remaining constant, there is no scope for them to increase their 
income levels even though working members number in the household rises. Under 
open-access, resources will soon be exhausted due to excessive exploitation of fodder 
and fuelwood from the common lands. Under both scenarios they become the worst 
affected. The model creates infeasible solutions under open-access after 10 years time 
and under the common property situation, after 15 years. These infeasible solutions 
are the direct result of increase in the landless household size as they cannot fulfil their 
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Figure 9.30: Net income levels of landless households under dynamic situation
It can be safely concluded that under such a dynamic situation, people will be better 
of if they control the population and adopt a common property regime in place of an
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open-acces regime. This situation might change with the falling population growth 
level with the spread of better education and awareness about limiting the family size 
and the increasing adoption of family planning methods. In the coming years 
population growth will definitely come down as it has been the case in the last two 
decades. The key to the success of the common property regime and people’s 
participation in participatory development will depend upon the extent to which 
population growth can be reduced.
9.2 Sensitivity analysis of the model
An attempt has been made to understand as to how stable the model will be if either 
the yield levels of agricultural crops increase or decrease over the current level by 
20% and the prices of agricultural products and labour increase by 20%. Decreases in 
prices could not be anticipated since normally such a thing never takes place and the 
prices in the past fifty years have always shown an upward trend (Dantwala, 1996).
9.2a Sensitivity analysis due to fluctuations in agricultural crops yield levels
The model predicts that the changes in level of agricultural production can have a 
significant impact on the level of net income the households can generate. While it is 
more profound in large and small farmer households it does not have any change as 
far as the landless households are concerned. Their cash levels by and large remain 
constant irrespective of the decline or increase in the level of agricultural production. 
This situation can be understood easily by the fact that the land use almost remains 
the same, hence the level of employment for the landless remains the same as the 
labour requirement for different crops remains the same. These runs are undertaken at 
the current level of extraction of fodder and fuelwood from the village common lands. 
Increase in agricultural production is anticipated at 20% on account of better 
monsoon and other favourable conditions. Similarly a decline of 20% in agricultural 
production level is anticipated if there is a drought or flood. The model remains fairly 
stable under these changing scenarios (Figure 9.31).
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Figure 9.31: Sensitivity to different agricultural yield levels (net income at the 
household level)
The landuse pattern does not undergo any significant variation whether the 
production levels of agricultural crops change by 20% either way. The model is 
therefore fairly stable in its’ projections in both the scenarios and does not predict any 
significant changes in the landuse pattern as far as Large Farms are concerned (Figure 
9.32).
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Figure 9.32: Land use pattern of large farm
The model does, however, predict some change in to landuse as far as Small Farms 
are concerned (Figure 9.33).
Figure 9.33: Land Use Pattern of Small Farm
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Onions are grown to the extent of 0.057 ha. if the production level increases by 20% 
where as no onions are grown if the production levels fall by 20%, since the drop in 
food grains production has to be compensated by allotting more area under cereals in 
order to meet the food grains requirement of the family. Despite these minor 
variations the model is fairly stable under both the scenarios.
9.2b Sensitivity analysis due to increase in prices of agricultural products and 
labour wages.
The model was run to examine how net income levels would change under a scenario 
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Figure 9.34: Net income of different households if prices of agricultural products and 
labour increase by 20% over the current level
The model is fairly stable to price changes and corresponding increases in the incomes 







time landless households also substantially benefit from the increase in labour prices. 
It can be safely anticipated that the prices of agricultural products keep increasing 
every year as a result of increase in support prices by the government from time to 
time. Similarly the labour wages also go up periodically and are dictated by the 
minimum support price announced by the government from time to time under the 
provisions of the Minimum Wage Act. These increases in labour wages are due to the 
increase in inflation level.
9.3 Summary
In this chapter the scoping studies results are presented and discussed. The 
application of model under different scenarios enabled the analysis of success and 
failure of the village institutions in managing the common lands. In the next chapter 




10.1 Conclusions and implications of the study findings
The participatory development process currently being undertaken in the southern 
region of Haryana state, India has been critically analysed in this study. The scoping 
studies undertaken to forecast the likely scenarios under open-access and common 
property were presented. The study illustrated the importance of historical, legal and 
political factors determining the outcomes under open-access and common property 
regimes. A single objective linear programming model incorporating multiple 
objectives as associated constraints was used in conducting scoping studies. This 
model incorporated the household dynamics of different land holding classes, their 
interactions with the private property resources as well as common property 
resources. Reflecting the entire village community in a single model, facilitated 
analysis of the situation. The socio-economic survey undertaken in 1995-96 used to 
derive the coefficients used in the model.
The work confirms the hypotheses that:
(i) it is possible to define specific circumstances wherein the common property protects 
the natural resource base effectively;
(ii) there exists a level of complimentarity between common property resources and 
private property resources in the case study area;
(iii) that socio-economic and cultural factors favour converting open-access regimes to 
common property rather than to private property.
The historical perspective explained how traditional management of common 
property resources was taken away from the village communities, and after the dismal 
failure of the state management communities are being encouraged to take over the
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management of their natural resources. Further, factors responsible for the 
degradation of common property resources were identified and the legal aspects 
affecting the CPR management were explored by analysing various acts.
The theoretical aspects such as Garett Hardin’s tragedy of commons, the game 
theoretic models and the logic of collective action that define the ways of viewing the 
commons problems were presented. Certain aspects relating to the CPR management 
were clarified. The conclusions reached from the literature formed the basis of 
understanding the theoretical issues concerning the institutional building and the 
issues essential for the establishment of the community regulated access management 
system in place of an open-access situation. The perils of open-access and the 
prospect of a proper CPR management were explained.
People's participation level was quantified. Success index of the plantations was 
developed, and a comprehensive Resource Condition Index was developed in order to 
analyse the effectiveness of the institutions.
The survey results demonstrated that various aspects such as social, economic and 
cultural factors were crucial for the establishment of common property institutions. 
The results show that the empowerment of village institutions was essential for 
managing their common property resources. Provision of technical and financial 
support from the government and its role as 'enabler' rather than 'doer' is important in 
the context of participatory development process. The key factor in the Aravallis has 
been the institutional development at the village level for managing the common 
property resources and the involvement of all the sections of the society in evolving 
the commonly agreed restrictions/rules and their enforcement at the village level.
The regression analysis indicated that the participation of people was important but 
probably not enough on its own. The statistical evidence showed that there was a 
strong positive relationship between the proportion of resources committed to and the 
success of maintaining common property resources. Without effective 'Policing' of the
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common lands through the commitment of resources, participation itself is unlikely to 
guarantee successful maintenance of common property resources.
The development of a single objective Linear Programming model was useful in 
incorporating the household dynamics and their interactions with the private property 
resources as well as the common property resources.
The main advantages of the LP formulation included the generation of many 
management alternatives that may aid conflict resolution in the VFC's with regard to 
efficient management of common property resources of the village, evaluation of 
management strategies and forecasting likely scenarios under open-access and 
common property regimes.
The major conclusions that emerged from the scoping studies were:
a. Pursuing open-access was untenable. All the households would be negatively 
affected. Large farmers would be least affected, whereas the small farmers and 
landless households would suffer significantly. Landless households would suffer a 
reduction in their net income by over 15%.
b. Under a common property regime the natural resource base would be protected 
and would continue to benefit the large farmers, small farmers and the landless 
households in a significant way. Under this scenario small farmer households gain the 
most. Their income levels increase by 21% over a period of 25 years. The scoping 
studies under open-access and common property scenarios indicate that the entire 
village would gain if all the people co-operate, and would lose substantially if the 
open-access situation was allowed to continue. It is in their mutual interest that they 
all pursue a regulated access management system towards their common property 
resources.
191
c. If tree plantations were undertaken on common lands under common property 
situation the net income of different households increase considerably over a period 
of time if plantations are raised and well protected.
d. The scoping studies undertaken by restricting fuelwood extraction or fodder 
extraction from the common lands by certain classes of households suggest it was 
unlikely that such a scenario might arise as no one would like to have differential 
access to the common lands.
e. Introduction of an alternative fuel source, like LPG, was found to be significant as 
this would change the landuse patterns and substantially raise the net incomes of the 
individual households.
f. The likely scenarios under open-access and common property with unrestricted 
population growth suggest that if population growth (human and livestock) were not 
controlled quickly it would lead to chaos and ultimately result in a general increase in 
poverty and environmental collapse irrespective of whether open-access or common 
property were pursued. It can safely be concluded that people will be better off if they 
control the population and adopt to common property regime in place of an open- 
access regime.
Rehabilitation of village common lands in Haryana is a unique experiment which has 
no parallels in the participatory development in India. The Joint Forest Management 
(JFM) programmes currently being undertaken in various states of India is on 
government owned forest lands. The JFM is a response to the policy initiatives 
prescribed in the National Forest Policy of 1988 whereby people living in and around 
the reserved forests and protected forests owned by the government offer protection 
to the forests in return for a share in the usufructs. The National Forest Policy 1988 
states that;
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“the life o f tribals and other poor living within and near forests revolves around the 
forests. The rights and concessions enjoyed by them should be fully protected. Their 
domestic requirements o f fuehvood, fodder, minor forest produce and construction 
timber should be the first charge on forest produce. ”
One of the basic objectives governing the new National Forest Policy was to create a 
massive people’s movement to minimise pressure on existing forests. In order to 
implement the policy prescriptions the Ministry of Environment and forests, 
Government of India issued a set of guidelines on June 1, 1990 concerning the 
involvement of village communities and voluntary agencies in the protection and 
development of degraded forest areas on the basis of their taking a share of the 
usufruct from the areas they agree to protect and develop. These guidelines 
formalised the concept of Joint Forest Management and provided an operational 
framework for involvement of people in the management of degraded government 
owned forest areas. So far, 14 state governments have issued notifications providing 
for collaborative relationship with local communities under these JFM guidelines 
(SPWD, 1993). The slow expansion of the JFM may be explained to the fact that 
most of the states issued notifications only recently. Despite this slow coverage till 
now, the JFM movement has brought a revolutionary change in the forestry sector. 
All the state governments in India treat the issue of people’s participation in forestry 
sector as a strategy for protection of degraded forest areas with the co-operation of 
local communities. Accordingly all the state governments’ notifications keep the 
control over management of JFM areas with themselves and solicit the participation 
of village communities only in protection of forest areas in lieu of usufructory 
benefits. It is, therefore, not surprising that more emphasis is being accorded to 
creation of village protection committees and seeking their co-operation in protection 
of such areas. However, it would be too simplistic and perhaps harmful in the long 
run to regard the issue of people’s participation as a mere strategy for protection of 
degraded forest areas. These areas were degraded over a period of time, because 
local communities continued to draw bio-mass for their requirements from these areas 
irrespective of whether the state governments accorded them usufructory rights or
193
not. Lack of involvement of local communities in management proved to be a 
disincentive and these areas in practice became open-access areas. In order to be 
more effective the JFM programme has to progressively increase the participation of 
local communities in management of forest areas near habitations and empower and 
equip them to manage such areas on a sustainable basis with the government agencies 
playing a role of facilitator rather than controller. The fundamental questions, like 
who controls and manages natural resources and for whose benefit these resources 
are going to be managed, are the important issues of the JFM which need to be 
explicitly stated.
JFM can be successful only if common property resources of the villages such as 
village common lands are protected and regenerated. The rural economy still being 
agrarian in character and a large amount of rural energy needs are met through the 
drawl of bio-mass from forest areas and common property resources in the form of 
fuelwood, fodder and non-timber forest produce. However, over the last few decades 
CPR’s have shrunk in area and their productivity has also reduced substantially, 
which in turn has led to increased subsistence pressure on the forest areas (Jodha, 
1992).
The case study presented in this work shows a way towards the participatory 
development of common property resources. The common property resources 
contribution to the village economy and the importance of their development did not 
find any encouragement from the government so far. The pressure on forests can be 
considerably eased if people can meet their fuelwood and fodder requirements from 
their CPR’s.
Unlike Sal forests of West Bengal most of the JFM areas in India are in a degraded 
condition and may not be ready for final harvest in the next 15 years. Even if these 
areas are felled, the returns may be too poor to satisfy the aspirations of village 
communities (Sharma, 1994). The major conclusion emerging out of the present 
research is that government is working as a facilitator in the institutional development
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as an ‘enabler’ rather than ‘doer’ in developing the common property resources. 
‘Policing’ the common lands is also equally important in order to effectively restrict 
the intentions of the free riders acting with self interest.
Creation of forest user groups and handing over of the national forest to communities 
is being attempted in Nepal in the last two decades (Hobley, 1996). The creation of a 
category of forest owned, utilised and protected by local communities has now been 
recognised as being the only realistic means of halting the slow degradation of forests 
in the middle hills of Nepal. This process need not be repeated in India. Community 
forests were nationalised in Nepal in 1957 where as, community forests were restored 
to village communities in the form of panchayath lands in India after independence in 
1947 (Pradhan, 1995). The present case study shows the way Haryana villages can 
develop the CPR’s for their welfare. The results of the research show the importance 
of the creation and development of a village level organisation which can deal 
effectively with the development and management of the common property resources.
10.2 Limitations of the present study
Due to paucity of funds and time limits the survey sample could not be more than 5 
percent of the households in the surveyed villages. A larger sample size may have 
increased the statistical significance of the results.
The weighting process adopted in calculating people's participation level was highly 
subjective matter and for this reason may be open to criticism. Despite this potential 
weakness the study did quantify the participation. The resource condition index 
developed could also be criticised and other parameters could be included within it in 
order to make it more meaningful. However, the development of the resource 
condition index as a uniform measure was crucial to analysing the effectiveness of 
village institutions.
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The model was also weak in some aspects. For example, the paucity of specific data 
relating to the case study area made estimation of model coefficients difficult. Most of 
the data for deriving the coefficients was taken from the survey. Detailed specific data 
relating to current landuse was surprisingly scarce. In addition, other disadvantages of 
LP include: (i) it may be difficult to decide which of the several objectives are fulfilled 
in different strategies when so many management alternatives are presented to the 
decision maker, (ii) the technique is not truly multi-objective but rather single 
objective with associated constraints, (iii) there are situations when some of the 
activities may take a zero or a very high level. This problem can be overcome by 
assigning lower and upper bounds to the objectives to be maximised or minimised. 
The main limitations of an LP model are divisibility of variables, linearity of 
constraints, additivity, and non-negativity of activities (Pannell, 1997). However, 
Dent, et al (1986) observed that, “the limitations imposed by the assumptions of linear 
programming are more perceived than real; given sufficient time and ingenuity it is 
possible to achieve a high degree of realism in representing a complex situation.”
Despite these limitations and weaknesses, LP proved to be a useful tool in 
representing a complex system in a single matrix. Unlike humans, an LP model is free 
to consider all strategies without preconceptions or prejudices. The LP model allows 
the modeller to put technical and biological information into an economic context and 
to quantify the economic, technical, and biological trade-offs in the system (Pannell, 
1997). Often the amount of information available about a system may be so complex 
that managers may not be able to make coherent management decisions. The LP 
model fills this need well for large problems and is a valuable tool for developing an 
understanding of the subtleties and interactions of a complex management system 
(Pannell, 1997).
In this study, model validation/verification relies on the logical framework with which 
the model was built. Most of the data was either collected during field survey or 
taken from the published sources. Model validation was done based on the construct 
method. Validation by construct means the validity of the model is assumed based on
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its logical construction. In the absence of recorded data the validation could not be 
possible. Ideally speaking each of the coefficient values in the matrix should be 
validated individually. But in reality, this was not entirely possible in the absence of 
recorded data on many of the coefficients.
Most of the data were judged to be reliable as they were based on either records or 
observation or estimates and experience of the households participated in the area. 
Village landuse patterns and crop production parameters were not available. The data 
regarding the activities on common lands were obtained from the Forest Department 
records. Specific data was not available in respect of demand for various products. 
The survey results provided the much needed information in specifying the 
coefficients. Due to the limitations in the availability of the recorded data the model is 
assumed to be valid by the experience and knowledge of the researcher concerning 
the area.
Despite these limitations the model is a useful tool for analysing the different 
scenarios of CPR management. This is also a novel application of mathematical 
modelling which has not previously been applied to study the effect of participation in 
CPR management and to the outcomes of open-access and common property. These 
outcomes are extremely useful in understanding the institutional success in 
management of common property resources. No single optimal solution to the 
problem exists. Under different scenarios the model generates a different set of 
outcomes and each scenario has to be judged from its usefulness from the 
management point of view. The model developed can be used to judge the 
institutional success or failure in managing the common property resources.
10.3 Suggestions for further research
There is a need to explore further possible management options based on different 
level of inputs on the common land and the farm lands. More data collected on the 
basis of field experimentation and work studies would have made the model more
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useful. For example, plantation species in different combinations and different 
agroforestry techniques to augment the fuel and fodder resource supplies from the 
farm lands would have given a wide range of potential options to choose from. Only 
through the multidisciplinary team work can problems of resource management be 
solved.
Any such follow up work should involve a multi-disciplinary team comprising experts 
from various fields of rural development. This team should be as broad based as 
possible, but it should, at least include a forester, a sociologist, a political scientist, a 
soil scientist, an agronomist, an economist, a farmer and a modeller in order to make 
this model a more meaningful tool for testing the efficacy of different options 
available to them.
The development of a success index, a resource condition index and a people’s 
participation level are definitely steps forward and there is scope for their further 
improvement. It is also the first time that the concept of modelling has been applied to 
test the effectiveness of the institutions under open-access and common property. 
Despite the limitations presented in section 10.2 the modelling can be made more 
elaborate to accommodate further activities in order to make the model reflect every 
activity of the households.
Thus far the research work in common property resource management has been done 
in isolation. The political scientists looked at the commons problem from the 
institutions point of view. The social scientists looked at the problem from the social 
point of view (Ostrom, 1990). The economists looked at the problems from a 
theoretical basis rather than empirical basis. Similarly, the literature is full with 
econometric models and game theoretical models which do not explore the empirical 
applications to the real world problems (Jodha, 1992). This research work fills the 
gap in integrating theoretical concepts in to a modelling framework and testing the 
effectiveness of the open-access and common property regimes.
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1. Code number of the Respondent.
2. Name:
3. Age (Yrs.):
4. Sex: Male / Female
5. Religion: Hindu / Sikh / Muslim / Christian / Others
6. Caste:
7. Annual Income of the Household:
8. Education: Literate / Illiterate
8.1 If  Literate level o f Education
(Primary School/High School/Under Graduate/Graduate/PG
9. No. of Family Members
Adults.............  Children.........................












11. Are you a:
Absentee landlord 
Big Farmer (>4 ha.)
Small farmer (2 ha. to <4 ha.) 
Marginal farmer (<2 ha.) 
Landless labourer/artisan





Meets household needs 
Less than household needs
14. Are you a:
Full time worker 
Part time worker









17. Do you have trees on your farm land.
Yes
No
17.1 If yes What purpose do they serve:
Income
Household needs 
Use of poorer land
18. What requirements are met by your farm land
Food crops required for the family 
Fodder required for the cattle 
Agricultural residues for fuel purposes 
Small timber from the trees standing 
Employment for the family members
19. Cropping pattern during the last year


















20.2. Where from you meet rest of the requirements.
From the village common lands
From the PF/RF_____________
From the market











21.2. Where from you meet rest o f the requirements.
From the village common lands 
From the PF/RF 
From the market
22. Do you use the village common land (Panchayath land, Forest)
Yes
No





Small timber and poles 
Other minor forest produce
23. What trees are standing in your own land.
No. Species Fuelwood Produced during 













24. Did you sell the fuelwood produced by your own trees.
Yes
No
24.1 Quatity ------------------- Quintals
24.2 Amount received------------------ Rupees.
25. In case fuelwood or shrubs are collected (gathered)
No. Place of its Collection Quantity of Collection(Qts)





6. Other farmer's fields
26. Are you concerned of the degradation of the village common land. Yes / No
26.1. If  Not, Why are you not concerned.
26.2. If  yes, In what way common land degradation is affecting you.
Lack of sufficient fodder 
Loss o f tree cover 
Non availability of fuelwood 
Soil erosion
Non availability of timber
Loss of employment
Un productive livestock
Affecting the productivity of agricultural lands
Other environmental considerations
If any other, please specify
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27. Why is the common land degrading?
Excessive tree felling
Mining / Quarrying
Over Grazing by livestock etc.
Extension of agriculture crops 
VFC etc. has no control over the violators 
Lack of co-ordinated management 
Lack o f sufficient investment




29. Who manages the village common land





30. Are you member of the VFC etc. that manages the village common land
Yes
No
30.1. If not, why are you not a member
30.2. If yes,
30.2a. What are the duties of the member?
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30.2b. What are the rights o f each member?
31. What are the commonly agreed restrictions with regards to the usage of common 
lands by individual villagers.
32. In case of any violation of commonly agreed restrictions on the usage of the 
common land by the members is there any penalty.
Yes
No
32.1. If  yes, what sort of penalty, please explain.
33. Who is responsible for the enforcement of commonly agreed norms.




Any other committee of villagers





34.1. I f  not, What are the reasons for non co-operation.
I don't agree for any such arrangement
I don't think everybody has the same needs as I have_______________________
People from upper castes don't follow any norms
I am a grazier, I cannot survive without grazing my cattle on the common land. 
Since I am landless I do not want to co-operate 
I do not feel like co-operating 
Any other.
34.2. If yes, What makes you to co-operate.
Fear of punishment/penalty
I like co-ordinated management since it ensures better management o f common 
lands and the availability of the resources to all
Distribution of available resources is done equally amongst the households.
I was motivated by the Forest Dept, to co-operate
Degradation of the resource under open-access makes me to co-operate
I was motivated to co-operate by the VFC etc.
Any other, please specify
35. What are the benefits that you derive from the common lands/ village forests and 
in what quantités per year.
Quantity(Kg.) /Year
Fuelwood
Fodder for the cattle and livestock
Grazing by the cattle and livestock
Small timber for the agricultural requirements
Charcoal
Rope making grass
Other minor forest produce
Mining for construction material or soil
36. Any other benefits in terms of cash etc. please specify
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37. Is there any sharing mechanism of the produce from the common lands.
Yes
No
37. I lf  yes, what sort of sharing mechanism exists.
Through permits 
Through quotas
Distributed equally amongst the households 
Distributed equally amongst the individuals
No distribution at all. It is free for all since no sharing mechanism exists. 
Any other, please specify
38. Who enforces the sharing mechanism




Any other committee of villagers
39. Do you think proper distribution of benefits exists
Yes
No
40. Do you think your village common land needs to be planted with trees
Yes
No




42. Does tree planting on common lands create assets.
Yes
No
43. Who should plant trees on the village common lands.




Any other committee of villagers
44. Are village panchayaths actively associated with the VFC's.
Yes
No




45. Do you think women are actively associated with the VFC's
Yes
No





47. Do you have any conflicts in VFC decision making.
Yes
No
47.1 If yes, who helps in resolving the conflicts.




Any other committee of villagers
48. What type of issues cause conflicts in VFC decision making.
Benefit sharing
Maintenance of tree plantations 
Harvest of the produce 
Water sharing 
Any other, please specify
49. Do you envisage reinvesting a part of the income, obtained from the current tree 
plantations raised by the Forest Dept, on your village common lands.
Yes
No
49.1. If  yes, through whom




Any other committee of villagers
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50. Do you feel like protecting the tree plantations raised by the government on 
your village common lands
Yes
No
50.1. If  not, what are the reasons.
51. In what way do you think that the government should help for the village 
common lands improvement/rehabilitation.
By carrying out tree plantations and maintaining them for some time 
By providing finances and technical know-how directly to the VFC's 
With strict controls supported by stiff penalties and punishments.
By undertaking water and soil conservation measures 
By providing adequate training to the villagers 
Any other, please specify




52.1. If yes, what do you know?
53. Are you in touch with any Forest Dept, officials who are concerned with 





54. What is their attitude towards you and the VFC
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54.1. Is it friendly
Yes
No
54.2. Is it co-operative
Yes
No
55. What should be done to make them friendly and co-operative.
56. Do they encourage you to raise and protect the tree plantations on village 
common lands? If  yes, in what way they encourage you.
57. Are you aware of any publicity and extension efforts of the Forest Dept, directed 
towards the village common lands improvements. If yes, what are they?
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Appendix - 6.2 
Questionnaire for the Officials
1. Your name
(optional if  you wish to be anonymous)
2. Your designation/rank
3. How many years of service you have put in so far..........................
4. In what capacity you have been concerned/connected with the 
management/rehabilitation of the village common lands, please explain.
5. People's participation in the rehabilitation/management of the village common 
lands has been the key phrase of developmental efforts from the government in the 
recent past. Do you think you could successfully enlist people's participation in the 
rehabilitation of the village common lands.
a. If yes, please explain your efforts and your experiences
6. In which villages do you think you could establish a successful community 
regulated access system to the village common lands.
7. Can you please explain the contributory factors for this success
(Please tick the measure, which ever is more appropriate)
No. Item Low Medium High
a. Villagers are enterprising/rational
b. Villagers are co-operative
c. Sincere, receptive and well trained staff
d. Villagers get employment
e. Villagers get additional income
f. Presence of active panchayath
g- Presence of strong local leadership
h. Availability of land for plantations
i. Involvement of women
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Mention if  others
8. In which villages do you think the establishment of the proper community 
regulated access to the village common lands and the successful rehabilitation of the 
village common lands could not be accomplished.
9. Can you please explain the contributory factors for this low level of success 
(Please tick the measure, which ever is more appropriate)
No. Item Low Medium High
a. Malfunctioning/absence of the VFC
b. Villagers are non co-operative
c. No good staff
d. Outsiders were provided employment
e. Fatalistic attitudes of the villagers
f. In active panchayath
g- Presence of weak local leadership
h. Non-availability of sufficient land for plantations
i. Non involvement of women
j- Insufficient grazing land for the cattle
k. No economic rationality among the villagers
1. Unsure of equal benefits from the produce
m. Communication gap between staff and villagers
n. Poor or no Joint Management Plan
0 . Inadequate training of the villagers
P- Illiteracy
10. Please suggest the normal contributory factors for proper establishment of the 
common property resource management/community regulated access system.
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11. Do you think that rewarding the staff for their good work will improve their 
performance and involvement in enlisting people's participation and subsequently 
establishing co-ordinated community regulated management of the village common 
lands. If yes, please explain as to what should be the criteria.
12. Please state the main problems and improvements in constituting a representative 
village forest committee and drafting a good JMP for the common land management.





Other minor forest produce
Grazing
14. Can you please explain the level of awareness amongst the villagers towards 










15. State main constraints in successful institution building at the village level.
16. Can you please explain how to improve women's involvement in the successful 
management of the common lands under the regulated access system.
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Appendix - 7.1
Pictures o f common land degradation and development
Photo 1. Degraded Common Lands devoid of vegetation
Photo 2: Grazing pressure on village common lands
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Photo 3: Villagers bringing ftielwood from common lands
Photo 4: A Village Forest Committee general body meeting in progress
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Photo 5: A two year old Bamboo plantation on village common lands
Photo 6: Village Forest Committee and the Forest Department officials meeting at a 
plantation site on village common land, Sonkh village.
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Photo 7: A two year old plantation of neem on Nayan village common lands.
Photo 8: Improved smokeless stoves being used by villagers in place of traditional 
smoky hearths. This allows poor villagers cook their food without resorting to use of 
expensive fuelwood. These stoves allow practically any biomass to be burnt with 
less smoke. These inexpensive mud made stoves are a result of participation.
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Photo 9: Drinking water facility for human and livestock created in a village using 
the incentive money provided by the Forest Department
Photo 10: Women’s training centre where sewing machines were provided from the 
incentive money to train village women in sewing.
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Photo 11: Villagers brining grass from the common lands for collection and storage. 




Common Property Resource Management in Haryana State, India - A success 
story of the Rehabilitation of Degraded Village Common lands*
P.V. Subhash Chandra Babu, J.B. Dent
Institute of Ecology and Resource Management, University of Edinburgh, West 
Mains Road, Edinburgh, EH9 3JG, UK.
Summary
Common property resources continue to be a significant component of the land 
resources base for rural communities in developing countries such as India. Despite 
significant contributions to the rural community, common property resources have 
experienced severe degradation, continuous erosion and are becoming transformed 
in to open access regimes due to increasing population pressure. For many villages 
in southern Haryana this has increasingly turned out to be the dual tragedy of 
environmental collapse and pauperisation of the already poor.
Southern Haryana consists of the oldest mountain range in India, the Aravallis. The 
Aravallis play a significant role in protecting the fertile Indo-Gangetic plains on their 
eastern side against invading sand drifts from the Thar desert. Increasing pressure 
from human and livestock numbers has taken a heavy toll of the vegetation leaving 
the Aravallis almost bare with consequent adverse environmental effects. This has 
resulted in reduced welfare of the inhabitants of the region, particularly the women, 
who have to travel long distances to collect firewood and fodder. Realising the 
enormity of the problem and the critical need to initiate action for greening the 
Aravallis, the Government and the people have come together to establish a 
participatory planning and development process at the village level.
Where the participatory process has resulted in establishing a common property 
regime in place of an open access system reversal of environmental degradation has 
been recorded together with improvement in welfare of local people. Mechanisms 
and processes involved in assisting local people to establish common property 
resource management will be discussed.
Keywords: Haryana, Common Property, Aravallis, Institutional Development.
* Paper presented at the Sixth Annual Conference of the International Association of study on 
Common Property held at the University of California, Berkeley, USA. June 5-8,1996.
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Common Property Resource Management and Rural Institutions: Testing the 
Relationship between Resource Condition and the levels of Participation and
Enforcement
P.V. Subhash Chandra Babu1, J.B. Dent1, G. Edwards-Jones2
1 Institute o f Ecology and Resource Management, University o f Edinburgh, West Mains Road,
Edinburgh, EH9 3JG, UK.
2 Rural Resource Management Department, Scottish Agricultural College, West Mains Road,
Edinburgh, EH9 3JG, UK.
Summary
This paper provides an overview of the common property institutions at the global and 
micro level based on a case study from India. The results of the case study, which 
show clear benefits deriving from common property regimes, will be used to examine 
institutional development at the village level and the Government’s role as an enabler 
in establishing the common property regime in place of an open-access situation. A 
composite resource condition index has been developed in order to measure the 
success of village institutions. Mechanisms and processes involved in assisting local 
people to establish common property regime are also discussed.
Keywords: Common Property, India, Haryana, Management, Institutions, Forestry.
Paper submitted to the Journal, “World Development”.
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P.V. Subhash Chandra Babu1, J.B. Dent1, G. Edwards-Jones2
1 Institute o f Ecology and Resource Management, University of Edinburgh, West Mains Road, 
Edinburgh, EH9 3JG, UK.
2
Rural Resource Management Department, Scottish Agricultural College, West Mains Road, 
Edinburgh, EH9 3JG, UK.
Abstract
Common property resources continue to be a significant component of the land 
resources base for rural communities in developing countries such as India. Despite 
making significant contributions to the rural community, common property 
resources have suffered severe degradation, continuous erosion and are becoming 
transformed in to open access regimes due to increasing population pressure. 
Southern Haryana consists of the oldest mountain range in India, the Aravallis. 
Increasing pressure from human and livestock numbers has taken a heavy toll of the 
vegetation on Aravallis. This has resulted in reduced welfare of the inhabitants of the 
region. Realising the enormity of the problem and the critical need to initiate action 
for “greening” the Aravallis, the Government and the people have come together to 
establish a participatory planning and development process at the village level.
This paper provides an overview of the common property institutions at the global 
level and at the micro level based on a case study from India. The results o f the case 
study will be used to examine institutional development at the village level and the 
Government’s role as an enabler in establishing the common property regime in 
place of an open-access situation. Mechanisms and processes involved in assisting 
local people to establish common property regime are also discussed.
Keywords: Common Property, Haryana, Aravallis, Management, Institutions
Common Property Resource Management and the Role o f Institutions*
Paper presented at the Joint Congress of International Union of Anthropological and 
Ethnological Sciences (IUAES) and the International Geographers Union (IGU) “Livelihoods 
From Resource Flows,” held at the Linköping University, Sweden, August 19-22,1996.
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1 Institute o f Ecology and Resource Management, University of Edinburgh, West Mains Road, 
Edinburgh, EH9 3JG, UK.
2 Rural Resource Management Department, Scottish Agricultural College, West Mains Road, 
Edinburgh, EH9 3JG, UK.
Summary
Common property resources continue to be a significant component o f the land 
resources base for rural communities in developing countries such as India. Despite 
making significant contributions to the rural community, common property 
resources have suffered severe degradation, continuous erosion and are becoming 
transformed to open access regimes due to increasing population pressure.
Southern Haryana consists of the oldest mountain range in India, the Aravallis. The 
Aravallis play a significant role in protecting the fertile Indo-Gangetic plains on their 
eastern side against invading sand drifts from the Thar desert. Increasing pressure 
from human and livestock numbers has taken a heavy toll of the vegetation, leaving 
the Aravallis almost bare with consequent adverse environmental effects. This has 
resulted in reduced welfare for the inhabitants of the region. Realising the enormity 
of the problem and the critical need to initiate action for “greening” the Aravallis, 
the Government and the people have come together to establish a participatory 
planning and development process at the village level.
This paper provides an overview of the common property institutions at the global 
and micro level based on a case study from India. The results of the case study, 
which show clear benefits deriving from common property regimes, will be used to 
examine institutional development at the village level and the Government’s role as 
an enabler in establishing the common property regime in place of an open-access 
situation. A composite resource condition index has been developed in order to 
measure the success of village institutions. Mechanisms and processes involved in 
assisting local people to establish common property regime are also discussed.
Keywords: Common Property, Haryana, Management, Institutions, Forestry.
Socio-economic Planning in Common Property Resource Management*
Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the Agricultural Economics Society held at 
Edinburgh University, March 21-24, Edinburgh, Scotland.
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Common Property Resource Management in Haryana State, India
P.V. Subhash Chandra Babu1 and J.B. Dent1
1 Institute o f Ecology and Resource Management, University o f Edinburgh, West Mains Road, 
Edinburgh, EH9 3JG, UK.
Summary
Common property resources continue to be a significant component of the land 
resources base for rural communities in developing countries such as India. Despite 
significant contributions to the rural community, common property resources have 
experienced severe degradation, continuous erosion and are becoming transformed 
in to open access regimes due to increasing population pressure.
The research work is aimed at evolving an alternative planning framework for better 
management of common lands, while ensuring the distributional equity of the 
benefits accruing from the village common lands without degrading their 
productivity. All aspects related to the socio-economic, cultural, legal, historical and 
environmental aspects are taken into consideration.
* Poster presented at the Annual Conference of the Agricultural Economics Society held at the 
New Castle University, March 27-30, New Castle upon Tyne, England.
Book Reviews Published
Dilemmas o f Growth: The Indian Experience* by Dantwala, M.L., edited and with an introduction 
by Visaría, P., Majumdar, N.A. and Sundaram, T.R. New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1996. Pp. 403. 
£35.00 (hard back). ISBN 0 8039 9266 1, 0 8039 9267 X, 81 7036 499 X and 81 7036 500 7.
The process o f economic growth all over the world has almost always been accompanied by 
tensions and even conflicts. Developed nations coped more easily with such strains because o f their 
access to the resources o f the erstwhile colonies. On the other hand, some developing countries have 
resorted to authoritarian rule to overcome dissent and dissatisfaction. India has chosen an unusually 
difficult development path, with a democratic form o f government and a very large growing 
population o f over 940 million. As a result India has faced an acute dilemma o f growth vs. equity 
over the last five decades. Such dilemmas are likely to become sharper in the years ahead in the 
wake o f the ongoing liberalisation process initiated in 1991.
The twenty-two papers in this volume, written by one of the India's eminent economists and 
perceptive social scientists highlight the major problems India has faced in its growth and 
development over the last fifty years. Grouped into six sections, these papers deal with values in 
economic thought; agricultural development and policy; planning for rural development; 
agricultural price policy; rural credit; and agricultural labour and employment. The selected papers 
demonstrate Dantwala's intuitive feel for the complexities of Indian economic scene. While each 
essay has a historical context, the thrust and approach retain their relevance as much now as when 
they were first written.
The section ‘values in economic thought’, highlights the concept o f ‘trusteeship’, an alternative 
form o f ownership, propounded by Mahatma Gandhi. It elucidates Gandhi's views on ownership and 
management o f wealth. Apart from trusteeship, ethics and economics o f socialism and an approach 
to eradicating poverty in India are discussed in detail in this section. While the expressions like 
'socialist ethics' or 'value system' are difficult to define. Dantwala considers restraint of  
acquisitiveness, limitation o f wants and the desire to share the gains from development as their basic 
components. An emphasis on reorientation o f values as a precursor to the establishment o f an 
egalitarian society is a distinguishing feature o f Dantwala's approach to socio-economic change.
The section ‘agricultural development and policy’ addresses mainly two themes: the relative 
contributions o f economic policy, technology and agrarian institutions to agricultural development 
and the issues o f reconciling growth with social justice. The sections planning for rural 
development, agricultural price policy, rural credit and agricultural labour and employment explain 
the changes through which India has undergone during the planned period. The only drawback in 
the book is the lack o f information on the impact of liberalisation programme launched in 1991 on 
various aspects such as rural credit, agricultural price policy and subsidies.
Authored by a sensitive observer o f Indian society who has an intuitive understanding of India's 
complex reality and an egalitarian value orientation, this book will be valuable reading for anyone 
interested in the problems o f economic and social development in India. In particular it will be of 
immense value to students and scholars in the fields of economics (especially agricultural 
economics), policy studies, development studies and sociology.
P.V. SUBHASH CHANDRA BABU 
University of Edinburgh
* Book Review Published in Journal, “Environmental Politics” Volume 6, Number 1. Spring,
1997.
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Sustainability: A Systems Approach* by Anthony M H Clayton and Nicholas J Radcliffe. London: 
Earthscan Publications Limited, 1996. Pp. xiv + 258. £35.00 (hardback); £15.95 (paperback). ISBN: 
1 85383 319 3 and ISBN: 1 85383 314 2.
Life on earth has evolved into a unique, complex and beautiiul phenomenon, in which there is both 
change and stability. The stability results from interlocking checks and balances, in which every 
species plays its role with little or no awareness of the true complexity of the ecological, biological, 
biochemical, geochemical and physical dynamics that constitute the system o f which it forms a part. 
The rate and scale o f human impact on the global ecology is such that it has now become necessary 
to think about these system dynamics, and whether it is possible that our species could engineer its 
own decline or even demise. This is the challenge of sustainability and goes far beyond mere 
environmentalism.
The question o f sustainability affects all areas o f human activity. It is well known that human 
activity can, potentially affect the global ecology in ways and to an extent not previously thought 
possible. Global warming, ozone depletion, soil erosion, deforestation, and species extinctions are 
all indicators o f the extent to which human activity is now altering the conditions for life on earth. 
There is now concern that current and projected human demands might exceed the mineral and 
biological flow rates that planet earth can yield without adverse consequences, such as ecological, 
social and economic disruption. Similarly there is concern that the flow o f wastes generated in 
meeting these demands could exceed the capacity of the global ecology to absorb these wastes 
without adverse consequences. Some o f these problems might, if  unchecked, eventually cause 
widespread damage to the human society. Some could conceivably threaten the survival of human 
species. Some o f the more obvious environmental problems are reviewed in this book. It is 
important to note that the problem is not one o f absolute shortages o f energy, resources, or pollution 
absorption capacity. The problem is in the pattern o f interaction and usage. It is in effect, a problem 
o f poor management.
This book introduces complex adaptive systems, a new discipline that is transforming our 
understanding o f the ecological and socio-economic systems that make up our world. It bridges 
theory and practice linking an underlying analysis to a coherent rationale and programme for 
change. It explains why a transition to a more sustainable way o f life means abandoning the search 
for simple solutions and adopting a systems perspective, in which both problems and solutions are 
multi-dimensional, dynamic and evolving. It also explains why macroeconomic policy is the key to 
the transition, and how an agenda for fundamental regulatory and fiscal reform has to be combined 
with a new framework for decision-making. The book also suggests a set o f criteria to allow 
political and economic decision-makers to assess their strategies in terms of their impact on 
sustainability, and puts forward a series o f proposals for specific actions to enable a general 
transition to a more sustainable way o f life.
The book is written as an introductory text to the systems perspective for readers at approximately 
undergraduate level and will be o f immense value to students and scholars in the fields o f ecology, 
rural development, economics (especially agricultural economics), policy studies, development 
studies and sociology.
P.V. SUBHASH CHANDRA BABU 
University o f Edinburgh
* Book Review Published in Journal, “Environmental Politics” Volume 6, Number 2. Summer,
1997.
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Institutions for Environmental Aid* edited by Robert O. Keohane and Marc A. Levy. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1996. Pp. xii + 405; index. £38.50 (cloth back); £18.95 (paperback). 
ISBN 0 262 11213 2 and ISBN 0 262 61120 1.
The discrepancy between levels o f environmental quality o f rich and poor countries will continue as 
long as large differences in per capita income persist. This book draws on research from economics, 
international relations, and development assistance, as well as the growing literature on international 
environmental relations, to evaluate the effectiveness o f international institutions designed to 
facilitate the transfer o f resources from richer to poorer countries, in conjunction with efforts to 
improve the natural environment.
This book has case studies on the Global Environmental Facility, aid arrangements associated with 
the Montreal Protocol on the ozone layer, environmental operations o f world financial institutions 
with respect to aid to Eastern Europe and efforts to save tropical forests, debt-for-nature swaps, and 
attempts to protect the Rhine river from ever increasing pollution. All these case studies have been 
presented in an elaborate and critical manner. Each case study contains descriptive, analytical and 
evaluative arguments. None o f the case studies in the book represent an unqualified success. This 
book primarily asks whether the institutions for the environmental aid increase concern, improve the 
contractual environment between member states, and increase national capacity.
This book explains risky initiatives that have been undertaken under severe constraints and notes 
that financial transfer institutions can only work well when the interests o f powerful actors intersect. 
But even if  such complimentarity exists, lack of organisational or national capacity pervade the 
process. This book brings out the proposition that international politics are resistant to reform; and 
much o f the activity within international environmental institutions is doomed to frustration. It also 
explains how political constraints make the action difficult and points out where and how it is 
possible for the dedicated people and well-structured organisations to make a difference.
This book is a carefully planned collaboration o f people connected with the research on 
environment, economics, ecology, development studies, political science and international relations. 
The authors observe that although there is some evidence of effectiveness, conflicts o f interests 
within and between states (and involving government and non-governmental organisations) are 
frequently debilitating; successful initiatives result from a combination o f favourable constellations 
of interests and creative, dedicated leadership. The book also suggests a set o f criteria to allow 
political and economic decision-makers to assess their strategies in terms o f their impact on 
sustainability, and puts forward a series o f proposals for specific actions to enable a general 
transition to a more sustainable way o f life.
This book will be o f immense value to students and scholars in the fields o f ecology, rural 
development, economics, policy studies, development studies, political science, international 
relations and sociology.
P.V. SUBHASH CHANDRA BABU 
University o f Edinburgh
Book Review accepted for Publication in Journal, “Environmental Politics” Volume 6,
Number 3. Autumn, 1997.
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Societies and Nature in the Sahel* by Claude Raynaut, Emmanuel Gregoire, Pierre Janin, Jean 
Koechlin and Philippe Lavigne Delville. London: Routledge, 1997. Pp. xxiii + 351. £50.00 (hard 
back). ISBN 0 415 14102 8.
I have really enjoyed reading the book on an important environmental crisis that cought the 
attention of rest o f the world in the past few decades. The Sahelian crisis has been with us for many 
years now but, until the late 1960's, the outside world was largely ignorant o f the turmoil that was 
going on in semi-arid West Africa. The devastating drought o f 1972 put an end to that. The terrible 
aftermath o f that drought and the cumulative impact of those that were to follow has focused the 
attention of researchers, o f aid agencies and of international political concerns. The growing 
awareness o f the tragic consequences o f these droughts, reflected in the collapse of pastoral systems, 
widespread impoverishment and destitution, the disruption of whole production systems and the 
threatening imagery o f desertification, has drawn in the full force o f international development 
assistance. The colossal amount o f money, that has been provided through a multitude o f aid 
programmes has yielded practically nothing. This failure o f international assistance has been 
attributed to misidentification o f the problem with simplistic references to desertification resulting 
from over population and consequent misuse o f environment. More recently, international efforts 
have been directed towards a more holistic approach to an understanding o f Sahelian realities, in 
which both physical and social sciences play a role.
There exists a vast amount o f literature on this subject but, almost no research work examined the 
problem from a holistic point o f view. This book provides an in-depth analysis o f the diverse 
Sahelo-Sudanian environment. Drawing on a wealth of research and historical development, this 
book explores the possible links between the environment and social systems in the Sahel, 
integrating ecological, demographic, economic, technical, social and cultural factors. Examining the 
conditions for land occupation and natural resource use in the Sahel, this book offers a conceptual 
and practical approach to social organisation and environmental management in the face o f rapid 
environmental change.
This book neither presents this entire region purely in terms of environmental constraints nor does 
it position its peoples as victims o f uncontrollable outside forces. Instead, it adopts a scale of 
analysis that allows for the derivation of a number of characteristic situations. In a sense this is a 
typology, which combines the most salient features of the environment and o f the societies that 
exploit it. This book attempts to explain the particular set o f circumstances that determine these 
situations at the present time and the historical processes through which they have evolved. With a 
unique focus on the Francophone states, this book presents important implications for future 
intervention strategies in order to address the crisis o f desertification across the sub-Saharan 
Africa.
This book will be valuable reading for anyone interested in the problems of economic, 
environmental and social development of Sahel region. In particular it will be o f immense value to 
students and scholars in the fields o f economics, policy studies, development studies, social 
anthropology and sociology. It may also be helpful for the administrators concerned with the 
development o f Sahel region in providing a better insight into the problems that confront this 
region.
P.V. SUBHASH CHANDRA BABU 
University o f Edinburgh
Book Review accepted for Publication in Journal, “Environmental Politics” Volume 6,
Number 4. Winter, 1997.
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Sustainability: A Systems Approach* Anthony M H Clayton and Nicholas J Radcliffe. London: 
Earthscan Publications Limited, 1996. Pp. xiv + 258. Price: £35.00 (hardback); £15.95 (paperback). 
ISBN: 1 85383 319 3 and ISBN: 1 85383 314 2.
Life on earth has evolved into a unique, complex and beautiful phenomenon, in which there is both 
change and stability. The stability results from interlocking checks and balances, in which every 
species plays its role with little or no awareness o f the true complexity o f the ecological, biological, 
biochemical, geochemical and physical dynamics that constitute the system of which it forms a part. 
The rate and scale o f human impact on the global ecology is such that it has now become necessary 
to think about these system dynamics, and whether it is possible that our species could engineer its 
own decline or even demise. This is the challenge of sustainability and goes far beyond mere 
environmentalism.
The question o f sustainability affects all areas of human activity. It is well known that human 
activity can, potentially affect the global ecology in ways and to an extent not previously thought 
possible. Global warming, ozone depletion, soil erosion, deforestation, and species extinctions are 
all indicators o f the extent to which human activity is now altering the conditions for life on earth. 
There is now concern that current and projected human demands might exceed the mineral and 
biological flow rates that planet earth can yield without adverse consequences, such as ecological, 
social and economic disruption. Similarly there is concern that the flow of wastes generated in 
meeting these demands could exceed the capacity o f the global ecology to absorb these wastes 
without adverse consequences. Some o f these problems might, if  unchecked, eventually cause 
widespread damage to the human society. Some could conceivably threaten the survival o f human 
species. Some o f the more obvious environmental problems are reviewed in this book. It is 
important to note that the problem is not one o f absolute shortages o f energy, resources, or pollution 
absorption capacity. The problem is in the pattern o f interaction and usage. It is in effect, a problem 
of poor management.
This book introduces complex adaptive systems, a new discipline that is transforming our 
understanding of the ecological and socio-economic systems that make up our world. It bridges 
theory and practice linking an underlying analysis to a coherent rationale and programme for 
change. It explains why a transition to a more sustainable way of life means abandoning the search 
for simple solutions and adopting a systems perspective, in which both problems and solutions are 
multi-dimensional, dynamic and evolving. It also explains why macroeconomic policy is the key to 
the transition, and how an agenda for fundamental regulatory and fiscal reform has to be combined 
with a new framework for decision-making. The book also suggests a set of criteria to allow 
political and economic decision-makers to assess their strategies in terms o f their impact on 
sustainability, and puts forward a series o f proposals for specific actions to enable a general 
transition to a more sustainable way of life.
The book is written as an introductory text to the systems perspective for readers at approximately 
undergraduate level and will be of immense value to students and scholars in the fields o f ecology, 
rural development, economics (especially agricultural economics), policy studies, development 
studies and sociology.
P.V. Subhash Chandra Babu
* Published in Journal, “Agricultural Systems”, December 4, 1997. Volume 55, 
No. 4.
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